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Abstract 
Chapter 2 summary 
As the devices that used software became more available to the masses the problem of 
software piracy increases. Recent theoretical works have attempted to model the 
phenomenon of software piracy; others tried to describe empirically the determinants that 
may explain this phenomenon. The empirical literature in the latter case is still in its infancy. 
This chapter reviews the theoretical literature focusing on three major models: those dealing 
with diffusion models, with network externalities and with game theory. It also presents the 
empirical literature where we identify eight stylized results that reflect the main 
macroeconomic variables in five dimensions that explain software piracy: the Economic, 
Cultural, Educational, Technological and Legal and dimensions.  
Chapter 3 summary 
This chapter studies the determinants of software piracy losses along five major 
macroeconomic dimensions: Technological, Educational, Institutional, Access to 
Information and Labor force. The study was conducted based on a large dataset available 
from 1994 to 2010 and comprising 81 countries. 
As for the Technological dimension, more patents by residents increases piracy losses  while 
the effect of R&D is opposite (decreases piracy losses).  In terms of the Educational 
dimension the results obtained show that more spending on education increase the piracy 
losses but, at the same time, more schooling years have the opposite effect. In the 
Institutional dimension, more corrupt free nations have low piracy levels. Regarding the 
Access to Information, it seems that access to Internet diminishes the losses while the share 
of Internet broadband subscriptions has no effect. The results show that, regarding the Labor 
dimension, employment in services has a deterrent effect while labor force with higher 
education and youth unemployment increases piracy losses.  
Chapter 4 summary 
This chapter explores the relation between the levels of taxation among different types of 
households and the levels of software piracy from 1996 to 2010, in the European Union 
(EU). It extends previous work by introducing large sets of panel data for the EU and its 
various regions. We estimate our model using the fixed effect, comparing results from the 
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Euro Area and the Countries that joined EU in 2004 and 2007. Results show that levels of 
taxation increase the levels of software piracy losses; moreover these results depend on 
marital status and number of children. The weight of taxation on GDP (e.g. the taxes on 
consumption) increases piracy losses while the impact of inflation is negative and marginal. 
Additional to this we also found that the relative importance of these taxes in relation to total 
taxation can affect this phenomenon. An increase in the weight of capital taxation would 
decrease software piracy while this effect was opposite when considering the relative 
importance of consumption taxes. 
Chapter 5 summary 
In this chapter we construct a panel data set from 2000 to 2011 for the EU 28, studying the 
impact of education on the levels of software piracy in a country.  
When an aggregated analysis is made, e.g. considering all ISCED (International Standard 
Classification of Education) levels, expenditure on public educational institutions as well as 
public spending on education have a deterrent effect on piracy, being significant. However, 
the effect of financial aid to students is positive. When the analysis is made taking into 
account the ISCED 1997 disaggregation, expenditure on ISCED 5-6 has a negative and 
significant effect. Taking into account the type of educational institutions, more expenditure 
on ISCED 1 to 4 will lower piracy. We also found that more financial help to students on 
higher levels of education, e.g. ISCED 5-6, have a positive and significant effect. Finally, 
more years of schooling of both primary and secondary education will have a deterrent effect 
on software piracy. 
Chapter 6 summary 
This chapter analyses the interactions between software piracy and economic growth using 
a simultaneous equation approach to a panel of countries for which information on software 
piracy is available for 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. This allows us to establish the interactions 
between these variables, but also to measure the direct and indirect effects of other variables 
that have shown relevancy for both economic growth and software piracy. Results indicate 
that there exist a concave nonlinear relationship between software piracy and economic 
growth. 
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Resumo 
Resumo do Capítulo 2 
Há medida que os computadores que usam software se disseminaram, o problema da 
pirataria informática surgiu. Estudos teóricos recentes modelaram o fenómeno da pirataria; 
outros tentaram explicar empiricamente os determinantes que podem explicar este 
fenómeno. A literatura empírica ainda está em sua infância. Este capítulo analisa a literatura 
teórica com foco em três grandes modelos: aqueles que lidam com modelos de difusão, as 
externalidades de rede e com a teoria dos jogos. Apresenta, também, a literatura empírica 
em que identificamos oito resultados estilizados que refletem as principais variáveis em 
cinco dimensões macroeconómicas que explicam a pirataria de software: económicas, 
culturais, educacionais, tecnológicas e dimensões legais. 
Resumo do Capítulo 3 
Este capítulo estuda os determinantes das perdas resultantes da pirataria de software ao longo 
de cinco dimensões macroeconômicas principais: tecnológica, dimensões educacionais, 
aspectos institucionais, força de trabalho e acesso à informação utilizando um conjunto 
grande de dados disponíveis de 1994-2010, composto por 81 países. 
Quanto à dimensão tecnológica, mais patentes por residentes aumenta as perdas de pirataria 
enquanto o efeito do I&D é oposta (diminui as perdas de pirataria). Em termos da dimensão 
educacional, os resultados obtidos mostram que mais gastos em educação aumentam as 
perdas de pirataria, mas, ao mesmo tempo, mais anos de escolaridade têm o efeito oposto. 
Na dimensão institucional, as nações livres de corrupção,  têm baixos níveis de pirataria. Em 
relação ao acesso à informação, parece que o acesso à Internet diminui as perdas, enquanto 
a quota de assinaturas de banda larga à Internet não tem efeito. Os resultados mostram que, 
em relação à Força de Trabalho, o emprego nos serviços tem um efeito dissuasor, enquanto 
força de trabalho com o ensino superior e o desemprego dos jovens aumenta as perdas de 
pirataria.  
Resumo do Capítulo 4 
Este capítulo explora a relação entre níveis de tributação entre os diferentes tipos de famílias 
na União Europeia e os níveis de pirataria de software entre 1996-2010. Melhora estudos 
anteriores na medida em que introduz dados em painel, estudando a União Europeia e as 
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diferentes regiões. Nós estimamos o nosso modelo utilizando o efeito fixo (FE), comparando 
os resultados a partir da zona do euro e os países que aderiram à UE em 2004 e 2007. Os 
resultados mostram que os níveis de tributação aumentam os níveis de pirataria de software. 
Além disso, estes resultados dependem do estado civil das famílias e do número de filhos. 
O peso da tributação sobre um PIB na Economia (Produto Interno Bruto), ou seja, os 
impostos sobre o consumo têm um efeito positivo sobre os prejuízos da pirataria, enquanto 
o impacto da inflação é negativa e marginal sobre a pirataria de software. Alem disto, a 
importância relativa desses impostos em relação ao peso total de impostos pode afetar este 
fenômeno. Um aumento no peso da tributação do capital diminuiria a pirataria de software, 
enquanto este efeito foi oposto ao considerar a importância relativa dos impostos sobre o 
consumo. 
Resumo do Capítulo 5 
Neste capítulo vamos construir um painel de dados entre 2000-2011 para a UE 28, estudando 
o impacto da educação sobre os níveis de pirataria de software. 
Quando uma análise de agregados é feita, e.g. considerando todos os níveis de ISCED 
(Classificação Internacional Tipo da Educação), gastos com instituições educacionais 
públicas, bem como os gastos públicos com a educação tem um efeito dissuasor sobre a 
pirataria, sendo significativo. No entanto, o efeito de ajuda financeira aos estudantes é 
positivo. Quando a análise é feita tendo em conta a desagregação ISCED 1997, as despesas 
com ISCED 5-6 tem um efeito negativo e significativo. Tendo em conta o tipo de instituições 
de ensino, mais despesas com ISCED 1-4 irá reduzir a pirataria. Também encontramos que 
mais ajuda financeira aos estudantes nos níveis mais elevados do ensino, por exemplo, 
ISCED 5-6, tem um efeito positivo e significativo. Por fim, mais anos de escolaridade do 
ensino primário e secundário terá um efeito dissuasor sobre a pirataria de software. 
Resumo do Capítulo 6 
Este capítulo analisa as interações entre a pirataria de software e o crescimento económico 
através de uma abordagem de equações simultâneas, utilizando um painel de países para os 
quais informações sobre a pirataria está disponível para 1995, 2000, 2005 e 2010. O que nos 
permite estabelecer as interações entre essas variáveis, mas também para medir os efeitos 
diretos e indiretos de outras variáveis que mostraram relevância para o crescimento 
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económico e a pirataria de software. Os resultados indicam que existe uma relação não linear 
côncava entre a pirataria de software e crescimento económico. 
Palavras-chave: Pirataria de Software, Direitos Autorais, Direitos de Propriedade 
Intelectual, Sistema GMM, dados em Painel, impostos sobre o rendimento do trabalho, 
Educação, classificação ISCED, Crescimento Económico, 3SLS 
 
Classificação JEL: C12, C23, C33, C50, C51, C70, D85, H20, I21, L86, O34, O40 O52 
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During the past decade, the information society witnessed a huge development 
across the globe. In 1994, the use of Internet was very small (less than 1 user per 100 
habitants) while in 2010 this number increased to 52/100 Internet users1. Information is 
widely available and almost instantly accessible with a simple click on the mouse. This 
access to information was developed alongside to the new technologies, namely the Internet 
and Computers. But to be able to access this information operating systems that are installed 
on Computers are necessary. Some of these operating systems are free, based on Linux; on 
the other side we have proprietary systems such as Microsoft® Windows and the Apple® 
Mac OS X. Furthermore, in each of these operating systems, complementary software can 
be used to facilitate and take profit of this global access (communication tools, productivity 
and media suites, and games). 
These developments also brought problems to the society; on one side we have 
programs such virus that could access private information. As an example of the extremely 
large number of treats, Kaspersky lab products neutralized 5 188 740 554 cyber-attacks, and 
almost 3 billion malwares attacks. Out of the 3 billion malwares, 1.8 million malicious and 
potentially unwanted programs were detected. We also have pirates that for the sake of 
visibility (or personal ideology of open access to software) will hack software; they will 
break its protection and distribute it to the general public for free. This is known as software 
piracy that can be defined as the unauthorized use of software that is copyright protected. 
This phenomenon has been increasing over the years (see Figure 3.1) and can bring 
harmful consequences for countries and firms, because taxes are not collected and jobs are 
lost. Since 1994 the Business Software Alliance (BSA) provides estimates for this 
phenomenon across a large group of countries.  
Due to the importance of the software piracy, with losses that represent more than 
62.7$ billion in 2013 (BSA, 2014), this thesis will study this phenomenon trying to find the 
major macroeconomic determinants that may explain it. Software piracy is a relatively recent 
phenomenon and follows the technological development of a country; e.g., greater access to 
global digital content increases the ease of obtaining information and utilities to break the 
protection of the protected software and simultaneously increases the ease of finding and 
distribute this software after unprotected. Chapter 2 of this thesis has the main objective to 
                                                 
1 Data based on the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
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provide an introduction to the problem, and consist on a survey of the literature on software 
piracy in which we systematize previous findings in a series of stylized facts that may 
constitute the basis for future empirical literature. Chapter 3 gives a broad picture of the 
software piracy phenomenon across all the countries present in official publications. Chapter 
4 and Chapter 5 focus on this phenomenon across the European Union to give a detailed 
analysis of previous findings. Finally in Chapter 6 we will try to find what are the effects of 
the software piracy on economic growth. We now provide a detailed summary of the main 
chapters; in each one we identify the main objectives, methodology, brief conclusions and 
also the relationships between the different chapters.   
Chapter 2  presents a systematic review of the empirical literature on software 
piracy in which we identify several stylized facts across five major macroeconomic 
dimensions: economic, cultural, educational, technological and legal/institutional 
dimensions. Surveys on theory that can explain software piracy already exist, namely Peitz 
and Waelbroeck (2006a) and Belleflamme and Peitz (2010). We also provide some 
advantages of theoretical works. This work focuses essentially on economic theory 
(describing the different approaches, game theory, diffusion models and network 
externalities) and empirical results found that can be applied to the economy and will be the 
building blocks for the remaining thesis.  
In Chapter 3  we investigate the major worldwide macroeconomic dimensions that 
can affect software piracy losses. This variable (piracy losses) is present in the official 
publications, but no empirical work has focused on its determinants. This variable provides 
different results (compared with piracy rates) as it measures different realities; for instance, 
United States has low piracy rates but represent huge losses, comparable to the European 
Union as a whole. This work tries to identify which of the macroeconomic dimensions, 
including the structure of the Labor force; Technological dimension; Access to Information, 
Educational dimension and the correct functioning of Institutions, that can explain this 
phenomenon. The majority of empirical studies used cross-sectional data or panel data for a 
short period of time. We contribute to the debate on this problem because we introduce a 
large dataset from 1994 to 2010 corresponding to 81 countries. It was found that the dataset 
was persistent and to take into account this, we implemented a dynamic panel data analysis 
using the System GMM proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998).  
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After studying this phenomenon worldwide we investigate a relatively small group 
of countries; the European Union, in chapters four and five (fixed effect model will be used). 
Chapter 4  identifies what are the consequences of personal taxation on the disposable 
income that will be used to spend on digital goods. This chapter also uses software piracy 
losses as a dependent variable. The main question that we try to answer is how the level of 
taxation and the taxation structure will affect households. Data on different households are 
provided by the Eurostat (from 1996 to 2010), the effective level of taxation is available for 
thirteen households that are representative of the population.  
European Union has several taxes, we consider those that are more representative, 
e.g. the personal income tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT) and value added tax (VAT). 
We provide a comprehensive analysis of these taxes as well as the effective taxation level of 
households that include social security contributions. We found that taxation positively 
affect software piracy, e.g., it increases piracy, although this depends of income and number 
of children. To assess the validity of our results we also split the sample into the different 
regions, only on countries outside the euro and the countries that recently entered in 2004 
and 2007 significance was maintained. The final question that we tried to answer was the 
relative importance of these three taxes (PIT, CIT and VAT) as a share of total taxation. 
Results indicate that there is still room in reducing the impact of taxation on consumption. 
On Chapter 5 we study the effects of education on software piracy, namely focusing 
on financial aspects. We introduce as a dependent variable the software piracy rates (from 
2000 to 2011). The main contribution to the empirical literature is the introduction of 
educational dimension reflecting financial aspects as opposed to previous studies (Goel & 
Nelson, 2009) that only used non-financial variables such as literacy rate. Furthermore our 
analysis disaggregates this expenditure into the different levels of education (primary, 
secondary and tertiary education). Results show that spending on education will reduce 
software piracy but at the same time more financial aid to students will increase it. 
In Chapter 6  we present a different perspective of this phenomenon; we extend the 
results found by Andrés and Goel (2012), which using a cross sectional analysis found that 
software piracy affected economic growth, although this relation was not robust. This 
chapter identifies what are the consequences of software piracy on economic growth. To 
take into account the effects of software piracy on economic growth and the effects of 
economic growth on software piracy we, implement a system of equations using the 3SLS 
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(3 stage least squares) for the years 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 for the 75 countries present 
in the official publications. To implement this analysis we introduced a full set of country 
dummies (fixed effects). Proceeding this way we obtained robust results. We found that 
piracy has a concave relationship on economic growth. 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes. We summarize the main findings and possible 
limitations, providing future paths for research.  
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2.1 Introduction  
Technology has evolved over the years and is present in almost everything we use. 
Common examples of that fact are the computers and the Internet. Computers and the 
Internet play an important role in our lives; they increase the productivity of firms, make life 
easier for households allowing, for instance, home banking or online shopping. Other 
examples can be added; perhaps one of the tools that most significantly improved the 
productivity of enterprises was the replacement of the typewriter by the computer. That 
device has been used since the 19th century when Christopher Sholes developed the first 
modern typewriter in 1866. Other devices have benefited from these developments and with 
miniaturization of components. Examples are the smartphones, tablets, laptops, etc. 
The above-mentioned devices cannot run without the software; only with it can we 
exploit its full potential. An operating system will start and control these machines, but tools 
like Microsoft® Office to produce professional documents are also required, which can 
increase the initial price. Software and hardware are protected by Copyright laws. It is in the 
first case that these copyright laws must be better enforced, due to the nature of the software: 
i) it can be reproduced at almost no cost, with the same quality as the original , ii) it is easily 
modified by hackers that beat the protective barriers and iii) it is easily distributed.  
Software piracy occurs when there is an unauthorized use duplication or sale of 
commercially available software (Moores & Dhillon, 2000) that is protected under national 
or international copyright laws. This piracy can come in many forms2. Software piracy 
affects profits of firms because potential software units are not sold. Additional to this it can 
affect levels of employment. Annually, Business Software Alliance (BSA) publishes 
estimates of piracy losses and rates for a large group of countries (Annex I  provides a 
detailed summary of the Annual reports). At the moment these estimates are one of the most 
reliable ones. Nevertheless the full methodology is not publicly available as it uses 
                                                 
2 Softlifting: purchasing a single licensed copy of software and loading the same copy onto several computers, 
contrary to the license terms; Internet: making unauthorized copies of copyrighted software available to others 
electronically; Software counterfeiting: the illegal duplication and distribution of copyrighted software in a 
form designed to make it appear to be legitimate; OEM unbundling: selling stand-alone software that was 
intended to be bundled with specific accompanying hardware; Hard disk loading: installing unauthorized 
copies of software onto the hard disks of personal computers, often as an incentive for the end user to buy the 
hardware from that particular hardware dealer and Renting: unauthorized rental of software for temporary use, 
like you would a video. 
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confidential information provided by its members (Adobe®, AVG®, Intel®, Microsoft®, 
Symantec® are some of the members; they cover both the hardware and software industry). 
These estimates have been widely used in empirical works to analyze the underlining factors 
that affect software piracy. See, for instance, (Andrés, 2006a).   
We must separate two types of piracy: the commercial type in which we buy a DVD 
from the black market - in this case the reseller has profits and compete with other firms (the 
competition is asymmetrical3); and the end-user piracy, when consumers use, at home 
software that is not sold. Commercial piracy is a form of counterfeiting; it can be used both 
in hardware and software industry. There are some actions that firms can implement to 
protect software. One is in the courts, enforcing anti-piracy laws. Other actions can involve 
updating programs, introducing mechanisms that can detect pirated products making them 
unusable to the user. Some piracy can be beneficial for the software developer (Lahiri & 
Dey, 2013; Lu & Poddar, 2012). 
Due to the growing importance of software piracy, as a consequence of global 
digitalization of the economy, the main goal of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive 
survey of the theoretical and empirical literature that will serve as building blocks for future 
empirical studies that are still in their infancy. The main conclusions of the empirical works 
are summarized in a series of eight stylized results.  
This work is built on recent works by Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006b), who made a 
critical review of the recent theoretical literature that addresses the economic consequences 
of end-user copying and, more recently, Belleflamme and Peitz (2010), who made a review 
of the theoretical developments made on the subject of digital piracy, in which software 
piracy is included. 
The chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 reviews the theoretical literature 
focusing the main strategies adopted by authors to model this problem which are diffusion 
models, network externalities and game theory models; in section 2.3 the empirical literature 
on software piracy is reviewed, describing the stylized facts; finally section 2.4 concludes. 
  
                                                 
3 Some authors that model this phenomenon are Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004); Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006a); 
Duchêne and Waelbroeck (2005) and Zhang (2002). 
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2.2 Theoretical Literature 
Different studies from different areas of knowledge present important conclusions 
for the firms, software developers, consumers and governments. These agents are important 
to prevent piracy; they can enforce Intellectual Property Rights Protection, can deter 
consumers from using illegal software through positive incentives (e.g. inclusion of printed 
manual with legal software) or negative incentives (e.g. increasing penalties from using 
illegal software - these penalties can range from fines to prison). This section focuses on 
three theoretical methodologies.   
The first theoretical model considered will be the diffusion model (see Bass 
(1969)); we introduce this model because it can predict potential sales of software or 
potential software piracy.  
Another type of models analyzed will be the ones that introduce network 
externalities. A network effect can be defined as the additional benefit that a consumer 
retrieves from a product as more consumers use it. For example, a small group of consumers 
of an operating system has little technical support. As other users start to use it, more 
technical support is introduced which beneficiate all users; this can be seen as an advantage. 
As the use of a certain operating system increases it also increases the probability 
of virus attacks; this could represent a risky situation because when a person or a “team” 
develops a virus, their main objective may be to maximize damage. Other objectives may be 
less harmful, or even benefic, like a simple alert to a detected security hole in the system. 
Some pirated software downloaded from the Internet bring unwanted “presents” in the form 
of Trojans or Virus. After downloaded they attack computers that run, mainly, Windows® 
operating systems. Anti-virus software such as Kaspersky detect and neutralize millions of 
threats every year.  As the number of consumers increases, some will purchase illicit 
software; nevertheless the majority will purchase licit software. Based on Givon, Mahajan, 
and Muller (1995), some of pirates will purchase or licentiate the software in a later period.  
 Models that use game theory can model the behavior of consumers or firms; it is 
defined as “the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent 
rational decision-makers” (Myerson, 1997). These models allow policymakers to optimize 
the degree of software protection. Two of the most common representations of game theory 
models are in the extensive form and in the normal form. In the first case the policymaker 
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draws a tree where the different branches represent the different outcomes of the game, and 
moves of players are sequential in time. The normal form is represented by a matrix that 
shows the players, strategies and payoffs4.  
 
 Diffusion Models 
We start our analysis by describing the diffusion model first proposed by Bass 
(1969). This model describes the process of how new products get adopted as an interaction 
between users and potential users; it models the behavior of the innovator and imitators. 
Since its publication in 1969, many extensions were introduced; one example was the 
introduction of prices in the model. The Formula for this model is given by 
 
௧ܰ ൌ ௧ܰିଵ ൅ ݌ሺ݉ െ ௧ܰିଵሻ ൅ ݍ ே೟షభ ௠ ሺ݉ െ ௧ܰିଵሻ                       (2.1) 
 
where m is the market potential, p is the coefficient of external influence, q is the coefficient 
of internal influence and ௧ܰ  is the number of companies or consumers at time t. Mass media 
coverage of a certain software product affect p, while q is affected by "word-of-mouth" or 
other influence from those already using the product. Knowing the parameters of interest, 
we can use this model to forecast the potential use of products. Sultan, Farley, and Lehmann 
(1990) found that the average value of p is 0.03 and q is 0.38. With these results, this model 
could be implemented in many areas such as marketing or management. 
With known parameters, this model could be applied to the problem of software 
piracy. Givon et al. (1995) used a diffusion model based on Bass (1969) that could track 
shadow diffusion (e.g. piracy) and legal diffusion over time. This model is applied to word 
processor and spreadsheet software in the United Kingdom; it is analyzed what are the effects 
of word-of-mouth and pirates. Results show that pirates were responsible for piracy (piracy 
rate was very high) but, at the same time, they generate an increase of more than 80% in 
software sales. Shadow diffusion (which is imitation) positively affects legal diffusion 
                                                 
4 One example of this game is the prisoner’s dilemma used in Economics. Other games that are more complex 
may have more players and many periods that must be implemented mathematically.  
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(which is innovation). A consumer that pirates today software can, in the future, purchase 
the software. Prasad and Mahajan (2003) also find evidences that the control of piracy and 
of software prices can be used to promote sales. 
 More recently Liu, Cheng, Tang, and Eryarsoy (2011) developed an analytical 
model that embodied recent empirical findings on software diffusion. The model is 
constituted by innovators that are influenced by external factors (e.g. reviews, parameter p) 
and imitators that buy the software because of word-to-mouth influence from previous 
owners of software (parameter q). Results show that depending on the pricing schemes, a 
lower demand of innovators implies a higher profit from implementing multiple price 
schemes5.  
Summary: Having the ability to control piracy led to several important results: i) 
the effect of piracy on legal sales (which was positive); ii) track piracy over time and iii) the 
ability to optimize how many different configurations and prices can a product have and still 
manage to obtain a high profit for the firm.  
 
 Network externalities 
Network externality have been studied by some authors like Conner and Rumelt 
(1991), Slive and Bernhardt (1998), Shy and Thisse (1999) and D. S. Banerjee (2003). They 
argue that with the presence of network externalities it is profitable for software developers 
to allow some degree of piracy. Network externalities affect the valuation that consumers 
make of software, as the value of it is dependent on the number of users. An example of a 
productivity tool that beneficiate with this effect is the Microsoft® Office. Other examples 
are econometric tools that benefit with the increasing number of users (both legal and 
illegal); some of these users will develop modules that will permit to compute additional 
econometric models not initially available with the program. 
Authors such as Poddar (2002) tries to show that the existence of externalities 
cannot be generalized as the only explanation for the existence of software piracy when there 
is commercial benefit in using illicit software. More access to information won’t necessarily 
                                                 
5 Windows 7 has various versions; Basic, Home Premium, Professional and Ultimate. Each of these versions 
has different prices (www.windows.com). 
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mean more sales of illicit software. A model is developed to show that, even with network 
externalities, it is preferable to protect software instead of allowing some level of piracy. It 
is assumed the existence of three types of consumer: one that buys, one that pirates and other 
that do not use any software. It is shown that having the option of protection and non-
protection, it is always profitable to protect with or without network externalities. Others 
argue (see Rasmussen (2003)) that, with network externalities, some degree of piracy is 
beneficial for a software monopoly company (e.g. Microsoft® and Apple®). The level of 
network effects explains the degree of protection. With a high level of network externalities 
it is beneficial to have lower protection. In a monopoly, market competition induces firm to 
choose a low level of protection. 
More recently Lu and Poddar (2012) found that piracy rates depend on three 
parameters: the consumers’ willingness to pay the product, the quality of the pirated product 
and the strength of IPR protection that prevails in the economy. 
Summary: When software piracy is for personal use, network externalities are 
beneficial but, when this illicit behavior has a commercial nature, even with network 
externalities software piracy is not efficient. One example is illustrative of the benefits of a 
network externality on software: as the number of consumers increase, valuation of each one 
increases because more technical support becomes available.  Some degree of piracy is 
beneficial to Companies, as some of these pirates will purchase the software in a later time.   
 
 Game Theory Models 
As levels of software protection can vary, game theory allows modeling what level 
of protection is appropriate for a given software. Altinkemer and Guan (2003) develop a 
game theory model to analyze firms’ protection strategies for online software distribution. 
The basic setup of the models is as follows: there is a software market and two firms A and 
B present in both periods s1 and s2. Each firm produces software in period s1 an upgrade 
version in period s2; they both maximize profit. Consumers purchase, in each period, one 
unit of software. The quality of the pirated software is assumed to be the same as the original 
(ܳ௣ ൌ ܳ௢ሻ. This assumption is not far from the truth, if all the software components are 
present and functional; one single line of code (missed or corrupted) can make the software 
unusable. Many times the most significant differences between the original and the cracked 
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software are related to the package presentation and printed materials. Additional to these 
two firms a firm that pirates firm’s A software is introduced (AP) behaving the same as firms 
A and B.   
Piracy is present in period s1 when the price of AP is between firm A and B. In this 
situation firm B has higher pricing power in period s1 but the market combined share of 
firm’s A products (legitimate and pirate) is larger. A firm that protects the software has more 
pricing power that a firm that does nothing. In period s2, two scenarios can occur: pirate 
software stays in the market or disappears. In the first case, the price of firm A is always 
lower than the price of firm B. In the second scenario (pirate software disappears), if firm A 
has many costumers in period s1, a higher pricing power in period s2 will be achieved. 
Sometimes it is beneficial to allow some piracy in their products, knowing that, in the future, 
consumers will be locked to that software. When possible, firms implement protection with 
the updates that, when detect pirated products, influence pirates to purchase the software 
(sometimes with incentives like considering the pirated copy legit as long as the update are 
performed legally). 
More recently, in a study analyzing a copyright owner and several pirates that sell 
the same information good, and compete with each other, Kiema (2008) has considered the 
costs incurred by pirates, namely fixed costs and “advertising costs”. One important 
conclusion is that, as the quality of pirated copies increase, the revenue of pirates decrease. 
D. S. Banerjee (2011) shows that the socially optimal monitoring rate can prevent 
piracy and there is no investment in anti-copying technology in equilibrium. 
A group of software’s that suffers from piracy is the video-game industry.  Gürtler 
(2005) considers both software and hardware game industry. Home consoles can be 
modified, losing their warranty. This modification allows the use of contents other than 
games and in non-original supports. Additional to this, games must be hacked in order to be 
reproduced in a DVD or Blue-Ray. Some firms make both games and consoles, while others 
sell and/or develop only games for other firm’s consoles. Consoles can be expensive but they 
are purchased only once; one the other hand games are constantly being purchased. Some 
firms can allow some piracy. With this, they expect to increase the profits coming from the 
hardware. In the theoretical framework developed by Gürtler (2005) there are four firms: 
two competing in the market of hardware and video games (F1 and F2) and two firms 
compete only in the market of video games (F3 and F4). Firm F1 compete with firm F3 and 
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firm F2 compete with firm F4. With complete market covering (e.g. consumers choose to 
purchase hardware and software), both firms have the same probability of being affected by 
software piracy (they set the same level of protection). With partial market covering (e.g. 
some consumers will not purchase software at all) F1 chooses the lowest possible level of 
copy protection. This is also true for F2. 
 
 Alliances such as Business Software Alliance implement policies to deter piracy 
and its findings can influence anti-piracy laws. Jaisingh (2009) analyze how innovation with 
piracy is affected by policies implemented by these alliances. He develops a model in which 
there are three agents: a firm that develops the software, a pirate that creates an illegal copy 
and an alliance, such as Business Software Alliance, that implements anti-piracy policies. 
Firms and consumers share the market, being the consumers heterogeneous, which will 
depend on ethics and the cost of piracy. Depending on the quality and the level of policy 
implemented by the Business Software Alliance, the firm can choose to set a low price to 
make unprofitable (low policy) to pirate, or a high price allowing some piracy (high policy). 
It is possible to increase the surplus of legal users allowing at the same time firms to 
maximize its profits, depending on the bargaining power of both Governments and the 
Business Software Alliance. When Business Software Alliance set an aggressive policy 
against software piracy, making the perceived cost of using illegal software higher by the 
end-users, in some cases will increase software piracy and decrease software quality. 
Summary: These models allowed determining the optimal level of protection in the 
presence of piracy. A firm can shift the profits from the software to the hardware products, 
in a first moment, allowing (and even encouraging) some level of piracy; then it is 
implemented more protection in the form of hardware protection or software updates. 
Protection in the Software and Hardware is important to deter piracy. 
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2.3 Empirical literature 
Empirical literature has used the estimates provided by the Business Software 
Alliance to explain the phenomenon of software piracy. One measure that is present in all 
the studies is the Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc). Several approaches were 
used: surveys using respondents from universities and in the labor market; longitudinal/panel 
studies and cross sectional studies; the last two rely on macroeconomic data. Results 
presented by these studies are very important complementing each other and, at the same 
time, they provide actions for policymakers.  
Empirical literature that uses surveys can obtain richer results, being able to model 
each parameter (age, sex, income), but it relies on the willingness of the respondents to 
answer truthfully. Even if the inquiry is anonymous, due to the nature of the crime, they may 
sometimes underestimate responses. Surveys are used in a particular group of the population 
(students, business users) in a particular city. Many questionnaires rely on a likert scale6. 
When respondents answer questions it is possible that they go to the extremes or the middle 
(neither agree nor disagree), which can be sometimes a problem.  In 2010 Business Software 
Alliance, with the help of IPSOS, performed a survey on 15000 computer users7 to measure 
the commercial value of unlicensed software and the piracy rates.   
When surveys are implemented they suffer from a population bias problem, which 
can influence the main findings and extension of results. These studies covered specific 
population, like students Ram D. Gopal and Sanders (1998), Butt (2006), Higgin (2006) and 
Gan and Koh (2006) or business users Lau (2004). To overcome these problems authors 
such as Ram D. Gopal and Sanders (1998) and Holm (2003) used a cross sectional model 
that explained the phenomenon at a country level, complementing the results from the 
surveys. 
Several factors can influence questionnaires, from the group of people surveyed, to 
the age, sex and location of the survey.  Among the questions that can be asked we can find 
the following: 
                                                 
6 A Likert scale is a psychometric scale commonly involved in research that employs questionnaires. It is the 
most widely used approach to scaling responses in survey research, such that the term is often used 
interchangeably with rating scale. Usually it is divided into 5 ordinal values: 1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree; 
3. Neither agree nor disagree; 4. Agree and 5. Strongly agree. See Wuensch, Karl L. (October 4, 2005). "What 
is a Likert Scale? and How Do You Pronounce 'Likert? 
7 For more information see http://portal.bsa.org/globalpiracy2010/  
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- Do you use pirated software and how often do you use it? 
- Do you use legal, illegal or open source software?  
- Income plays an important factor in the choice to pirate? 
- Culture, education or legal system plays an important factor in this decision? 
 
These four examples can measure simultaneously several influences that the cross-
sectional or panel data analyses can lose. The location in which the survey is made can affect 
results. Lau (2004) conducted a survey in Hong Kong, which is a place with one of the 
highest piracy rates compared with the Western Europe (+33%), North America (+21%) and 
the European Union (+35%); in 2010 the piracy rate in Hong Kong was 45%. The main 
conclusion of this study is that knowledge of software copyright law and the availability of 
original software have direct effects on self-reported leniency towards software piracy.  
Being the empirical literature an important source for both policymakers and 
researchers, but being at the same time still in it’s infancy, we compile the major 
macroeconomic findings found by previous authors. Several dimensions have been found to 
affect piracy: Economic, Cultural, Educational, Technological and Legal dimensions; these 
will be discussed on the next subsections. 
 
 Economic dimensions 
      
Stylized fact 1: Gross Domestic Product per capita affects negatively software piracy and 
Gross Domestic Product Growth is influenced by the correct enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights. 
 
Income affects the decision to purchase or to pirate by the consumers or firms. One 
measure that is present in many studies on the determinants of software piracy is the Gross 
Domestic Product per capita. Some examples are Ram D. Gopal and Sanders (1998), 
Marron and Steel (2000) and Goel and Nelson (2009). The results show that an increase in 
income can decrease software piracy. Other measures can be used that reflect the levels of 
income of a country; Holm (2003) used the Gross National Income per capita (GNIpc) and 
obtained the same results. Levels of income are heterogeneous among countries, 
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furthermore, many software products are sold at the same price across countries; examples 
are movies, video games and music. Shin, Gopal, Sanders, and Whinston (2004) split the 
GDPpc into two subsamples: one which represents income less than 6 000$ and other that 
represents more than 6 000$. In countries that have GDPpc less than 6 000$, income affects 
negatively software piracy (-0.0032), but when GDPpc is higher than 6 000$, this negative 
effect becomes marginal (-0.0008). This result indicate that on households that have more 
disposable income the fraction of the income that is allocated to software is reduced. On the 
other hand, when the income is low this fraction increases. Increasing income on households 
with less income will result in less software piracy. 
Other authors studied what were the effects of piracy on economic growth. In spite 
of high piracy rates, indicating that property rights protection were not perfect, Andrés and 
Goel (2012) found that the existence of software piracy increased economic growth. Using 
an index of Intellectual property Rights, Park and Ginarte (1997) and  Falvey, Foster, and 
Greenaway (2006), found that intellectual property rights could promote growth. 
 
Stylized fact 2: Income inequality measured by the GINI index affects negatively software 
piracy. 
 
Additional work was done in explaining these differences using the GINI Index. To 
check this, Fischer and Andrés (2005) used a sample of 71 countries to analyze the 
relationship between income distribution and software piracy rates. To analyze this income 
inequality it is used quintile shares. This quintile analysis is divided into three classes: Q1 is 
low-income class; Q2-Q4 is middle-income class and Q5 is upper-income class. Software 
piracy is a middle class crime in Latin America, Caribbean, East Asia and the Pacific 
Regions. Software piracy is a crime committed by middle and lower class in the Central Asia 
and Eastern Europe and is an upper class crime in Western Europe and North America. In a 
recent study and using a sample of 35 countries, Andrés (2006b) found income inequality to 
be negatively related with software piracy; more equal societies have higher piracy rates.  
In a theoretical paper Poddar (2005) tried to study differences of software piracy 
across countries; using the same variables of interest (GINI index), but with opposite results. 
Poddar (2005) developed a model that assumes that software firms undertake R&D to 
prevent piracy, which can be replicated with measures of IPR (Intellectual Property Rights 
20 
 
protection). He considers three types of consumers: one that buys, one that pirates and other 
that do not use any type of software. These consumers are a simplification of the reality; in 
real life each one can, at the same time, use both legal and illegal software. A high income 
gap between users and a low protection cannot prevent software piracy. When this gap is 
reduced and with the existence of some protection, there is a probability of mitigating 
software piracy. This result was studied by Fischer and Andrés (2005) and Andrés (2006b) 
using the GINI index8.  
 
Stylized fact 3: HDI affects positively software piracy 
 
Software piracy can affect the development of a country; software development and 
distribution activities gives jobs to thousands of people, but these jobs are not necessarily 
made available where we buy the software. It can happen that national companies outsource 
software development to countries with highly qualified labor force but with lower wages. 
Using a panel data combining three years (1995, 2000 and 2002), Bezmen and Depken 
(2005) study this phenomenon. The measure of economic development is introduced with 
the HDI (Human Development Index). They used an equation system. In the first equation, 
piracy rates were the dependent variable and, in the second HDI where the dependent 
variable. This measure was used by Boyce (2011) introducing GINI index as well. In both 
works this variable increase software piracy rates. 
 
 Cultural dimensions 
 
Stylized fact 4: Hofstede cultural dimensions explain levels of software piracy across 
countries. 
 
                                                 
8 This variable “measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals, within an economy, 
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution”. A low value of this index represents an equal society while a high 
value represents an extremely unequal society. Source: Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM):2001-
2002, International Labour Organization, Geneva, 2002, page 704. 
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The Hofstede cultural dimensions (see G.  Hofstede (2004)) cover several 
dimensions: power distance (PDI)9, individualism (IDV), uncertainty avoidance (UAI)10 and 
masculinity (MAS)11. They represent “four anthropological problem areas that different 
national societies handle differently: ways of coping with inequality, ways of coping with 
uncertainty, the relationship of the individual with her or his primary group, and the 
emotional implications of having been born as a girl or as a boy”12. They allow a comparative 
analysis between the national culture and the levels of software piracy. Although this 
measure allows a rich analysis, but suffers some drawbacks as it does not vary over time, 
and the sample covered is not large enough. In 1991 it was introduced a fifth dimension: the 
Long-Term Orientation (LTO)13. This dimension was developed by Minkov (2007). More 
recently, in 2010, it was introduced a sixth dimension: the Indulgence versus Restraint 
(IVR)14, developed by Geert  Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010). 
Nevertheless, several authors used these dimensions to explain the levels of 
software piracy rates across countries. Some examples are Marron and Steel (2000), Moores 
(2003), Shin et al. (2004)15 and Kovačić (2007). These studies used a cross sectional 
analysis, covering at most 72 observations. Results show that individualism is negative and 
significant. Additional to this, Masculinity has a negative value and power distance a positive 
value. Other studies analyzed the effect of religion on the decision to pirate. Al-Rafee and 
Rouibah (2010) found that religion factors affect the decision to pirate. This was done with 
a questionnaire saying that, based on the individual religion, software piracy was stealing.  
 
                                                 
9 This dimension expresses the degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and expect that 
power is distributed unequally 
10 The uncertainty avoidance dimension expresses the degree to which the members of a society feel 
uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. 
11 The masculinity side of this dimension represents a preference in society for achievement, heroism, 
assertiveness and material reward for success. 
12 http://www.geerthofstede.nl/  
13 The long-term orientation dimension can be interpreted as dealing with society’s search for virtue. 
14 Indulgence stands for a society that allows relatively free gratification of basic and natural human drives 
related to enjoying life and having fun. 
15 These authors used collectivism, which is the opposite of individualism. The high side of this dimension, 
called Individualism, can be defined as a preference for a loosely-knit social framework in which individuals 
are expected to take care of themselves and their immediate families only. Its opposite, Collectivism, represents 
a preference for a tightly-knit framework in society in which individuals can expect their relatives or members 
of a particular in-group to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. A society's position on this 
dimension is reflected in whether people’s self-image is defined in terms of “I” or “we.” 
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 Educational dimensions 
 
Stylized fact 5: Overall level of Education affects negatively the levels of software 
piracy. 
 
Education plays an important factor in the construction of the perception of an 
individual towards using or not legal or illegal software. Several questions are raised with 
this respect: (i) more education can affect the levels of software piracy? ; (ii) education can 
bring an increase use of legal, illegal or both types of software? Several dimensions related 
to education can be used, from the literacy rate to the level of education attained. A challenge 
is posed on the availability of data for large group of countries. The World Bank, namely the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) has information on several dimensions related to 
education from the school enrolment ratio (primary, secondary, and tertiary), expenditure on 
education and years of primary and secondary schooling. The Eurostat provides a broader 
picture, introducing additional financial and not financial measures, but information is only 
available for a small group of countries (the European Union). 
In spite of a broad range of variables available in this dimension, but due to data 
restrictions, cross-sectional analysis has been implemented restricting the analysis. This 
dimension has been studied by Marron and Steel (2000) and Andrés (2006b) with the 
introduction of average years of secondary education of people with more than 25 years old 
(Barro & Lee, 2013). Their results show that more education reduces software piracy. Goel 
and Nelson (2009) and Andrés and Goel (2011) used literacy rate; this variable has a positive 
sign. The statistical significance of this variable in the first study was at most 5% but, in the 
second study, significance was not achieved. Literacy rate omits the level of education 
attained; a person can be literate and have a low level of education. It also omits the various 
ISCED (International Standard Classification of education) levels. Measures that reflect the 
specific level attained by person measured by the ISCED 1997 or ISCED 2011 classification, 
reflect the expenditure on education and can improve results. Other measure that has been 
studied by MacDonald and Fougere (2003) is the inclusion of the word “software piracy” in 
textbooks. For this purpose he analyzes the MIS textbooks. Software piracy is present on 
72% of the textbooks; Ethics is present in 67%, software license in 50%, copyright (50%) 
and Intellectual Property 39%. This is only an example of a particular field of knowledge; 
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introduction of additional fields of knowledge such as Management and Economics could 
improve results. 
 
 Technological dimensions 
 
Stylized fact 6: Types of software protection affects levels of software piracy. 
Choice of type of Internet access and associated services will depend on its price, 
availability and the utility given by additional services, which will affect the availability of 
software. 
 
Before the rise of the Internet, software piracy was made with the replication of the 
original software, from its original support, to several pirated CDs or floppy-disks; 
protection was both in the software itself in the form of serial keys, some with many digits, 
and requiring a special number that was provided by telephone as an additional protection 
barrier. The hardware protection in PC software is generally attached to the support (CD, 
Floppy, etc.) and not in the PC itself; functional copies were more difficult to produce. It is 
often hacked with more or less effort.  
There are different ways to protect software; some of these are License Keys and 
Product Activation16 (Anckaert, Sutter, & Bosschere, 2004).  Djekic and Loebbecke (2007) 
studies the influence of technical copy protections on application software piracy, following 
Ram D.  Gopal and Sanders (1997), Prasad and Mahajan (2003) and Anckaert et al. (2004), 
they distinguish between software-based and hardware-based technical copy protections. A 
survey is conducted using 219 professional users and an amateur group. Software based 
protection and hardware based protection are analyzed separately. 
Personal context variables are always significant and positive. This context is 
represented by income, requirements of usage in the workplace and the intensity of 
                                                 
16 One example is the Windows Genuine Advantage (WGA). It is an anti-piracy system created by Microsoft 
that enforces online validation of the licensing of several recent Microsoft Windows operating systems when 
accessing several services, such as Windows Update, and downloading Windows components from the 
Microsoft Download Center. In Windows 7, WGA is renamed Windows Activation Technology. WGA 
consists of two components: an installable component called WGA Notifications that hooks into Winlogon and 
validates the Windows license upon each logon and an ActiveX control that checks the validity of the Windows 
license when downloading certain updates from the Microsoft Download Center or Windows Update. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Genuine_Advantage 
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application software usage. These variables affect more the amateur group. Legal software 
use that is protected with license key or product activation is higher in the amateur group 
while software that is protected with hardware protection is higher in the professional group.  
This work shows that being able to work properly with software can affect their valuation of 
the software; the full capabilities and price of the software are understood. Some productivity 
tools like Photoshop® can be pirated by home users but the full capabilities are not used. 
This can be seen by the firm as a loss, but this might not be completely true if we consider 
an inexperienced user. On the other hand if this software is used illegally at the workplace 
this is not true; it is a loss, the worker knows how to use the software at its full. 
 
When the hardware protection and Software protection is overcome by hackers, the 
next step is to upload the software, which will depend on the type of Internet access and 
upload speeds. Hackers may use public Internet providers such as universities. Broadband 
Internet access plays an important role in the decisions to download legal or illegal software 
by potential pirates. One of the first studies in Europe that focuses on the demand for 
broadband Internet services in Austria focusing on residential consumers, was conducted by 
Cardona, Schwarz, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner (2009). Using 3000 households and analyzing 
four types of Internet access: narrowband, cable, DSL and mobile, they found that demand 
for DSL is elastic and cable networks are likely to be in the same market as DSL connections. 
This study must be contextualized; narrowband was the first to arrive and it is not an option 
anymore. The three remaining services will strongly depend on the development of the 
infrastructures. Since this study, Internet services have evolved. In A1, an Internet provider 
in Austria fixed the typical prices of Internet at speeds of 50MBPS and 100MBPS to 29,90€ 
and 44,90€ respectively. 
Choice of alternative types of Internet access will depend on price, availability, but 
also the utility that consumers give to this service. Some are willing to pay more for the same 
service. Using a large sample of individuals, Rosston, Savage, and Waldman (2010) study 
this phenomenon, comparing experience users to inexperience users. In their sample, 5799 
were experience users and 479 inexperience users. The willingness to pay is estimated which 
is represented by the marginal utility of changing from one service (Internet speed) to other 
service but with higher speeds. In this context an experienced user is a user that had used 
Internet more than twelve months. Several measures are included in their analysis; cost, 
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connection speed, reliability, use Internet away from home, watch high definition content, 
interaction with health specialists and being able to perform free videophone calls over the 
Internet. An experienced household is willing to pay 59$ for a basic service17, 85$ for a 
premium service18 and 98$ for a premium plus service19, while an inexperienced user is only 
willing to pay 31$, 59$ and 71$ respectively for an improvement on these services. These 
results show that being able to work with Internet will affect its utility and that the 
willingness to pay for additional services depend as well on his utility.  
These numbers reported here cannot be extended to countries in Europe; the 
willingness to pay in Europe would be far less than the reported by this study. Infrastructures 
in Europe allow smaller prices and higher speeds. Each country has several Internet 
providers that cover a small geographical area while the USA has the same geographical 
area as Europe, which can make difficult the development of infrastructures that allow higher 
Internet speeds.  Prices for a service of home phone & Internet cost 37$; home phone, 
Internet & Wireless cost 89.94$ and Home Phone, Internet & TV cost 93.94$ for an Internet 
speed of 30MBPS in AT&T20. VOO, a Internet provider in Belgium offers Internet, 
Telephone and Television for 62,41€ for Internet speeds of 50MBPS and 81.96€ for 
100MBPS21. With respect to mobile broadband Internet access, Portugal is ahead of 
countries such as the United States, both in speeds and prices. In the US, Verizon sells mobile 
broadband plans that range from 2GB-30$/Month to 10GB-80$/Month22. For the same 
Internet speeds, Internet providers in Europe offer a lower price than those in the USA. In 
the USA Internet speeds only reach 30MBPS while in Europe these speeds can reach 
50MBPS or 100MBPS. 
 
 
                                                 
17 “Basic” Internet service has fast speed and less reliable service 
18 “Premium” service has fast speed, very reliable service and the ability to designate some downloads as high 
priority 
19 “Premium Plus” service has fast speed, very reliable service plus all other activities bundled into the service 
20 
http://www.att.com/gen/general?pid=11623&CI=CJ_AFFILIATE&RI=CJ1&RD=37922269&source=ECdA
AT11600aff12A&CJPID=2432921  
21 http://www.voo.be/fr/pack/trio/  
22 http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/plan-information/?page=mobileBroadband  
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 Legal dimensions 
 
Stylized fact 7: Rule of Law affects levels of software piracy. 
 
Some of the World Governance Indicators (WGI) that analyze several dimensions 
like the effectiveness of the legal system were used both in cross-sectional and panel data. 
They represent six dimensions: Voice and Accountability23, Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence/Terrorism24, Government Effectiveness25, Regulatory Quality26, Rule of law and 
Control of Corruption27. The rule of Law reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence28. Rule of Law was used by Andrés (2006a); Goel and Nelson (2009); Png 
(2010) and Boyce (2011) having mixed signs. Introduction of additional measures such as 
the Government effectiveness could improve results.  
The use of the WGI have no significance if we consider homogeneous countries 
such as the European Union; small variations exist but they cannot explain this phenomenon. 
More recently Andrés and Goel (2011) analyze the impact that corruption has on the levels 
of software piracy. They construct a corruption perception index29 that measures the level of 
corruption in a country. This measure is different than those provided by the World Bank30; 
this index is not available for many countries of the European Union. More corruption 
resulted in more piracy. 
                                                 
23 Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free 
media. 
24 Political stability and absence of violence measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism 
25 Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
26 Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.  
27 Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests. 
28 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
29 This Index is measured as: ܥܲܫ௜௡ௗ௘௫  ൌ log ቀଵ଴ି஼௉ூ஼௉ூ ቁ െ higher values means higher corruption.  
30 They consulted the www.transparency.org webpage in order to make this alternative index. 
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Stylized fact 8: International organizations can prevent software piracy, enforcing 
copyright treaties, making pressure and improving software protection. 
 
Software is Copyright protected; unfortunately it is often pirated. This piracy can 
come in the form of commercial software, corporate piracy or softlifting, which occurs when 
a software is copied to computers, violating licensing agreement. Due to the high market that 
software has (computers, tables, smartphones, consoles), this industry have been subject of 
several campaigns (on the Internet, journal, etc.) to deter potential pirates. Nowadays 
Business Software Alliance serves as a group pressure to ensure property rights protection. 
These can come in the form of trade secrets, patents, licensing, copyright, civil liberties (they 
grant civil rights to software owners) and criminal liabilities. Unfortunately not all countries 
offers strong property rights protection. Examples of these are countries with piracy above 
80% that are present in the least developing countries (Africa, Latin America).  On the other 
end, there are countries that protect software such as the USA; the piracy rate is only 20%. 
(See Clifford and Jin (1997)). 
The exponential growth of the information society led to a necessity of protection 
of the owners of these advances (hardware industry and software industry). Countries must 
implement protection mechanisms. Shadlen, Schrank, and Kurtz (2005) study in what extend 
software protection is sufficient to deter piracy. Many Companies like Microsoft® have his 
headquarters in the US, but sell the products worldwide. At home they are protected by 
strong intellectual property rights laws; the problem arises when dealing with countries that 
don’t have this type of protection and do not signed international treaties or do not make part 
of international organizations. They analyze the direct pressures exerted by the US (US 
Special 30131), for the foreign countries to increase or to exert more efficiently intellectual 
property rights protection. Bilateral Political Pressures, TRIPS32 and Trade dependence on 
                                                 
31 The Special 301 Report is prepared annually by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
under Section 301 as amended of the Trade Act of 1974. The reports identify trade barriers to US companies 
and products due to the intellectual property laws, such as copyright, patents and trademarks, in other countries. 
Each year the USTR must identify countries which do not provide "adequate and effective" protection of 
intellectual property rights or "fair and equitable market access to United States persons that rely upon 
intellectual property rights". http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_301_Report 
32 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
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US can explain the levels of piracy in these countries. Software protection must be 
accompanied and legislated by international organizations. 
Countries which make part of international organization have power to propose 
actions to protect their domestic market. Andrés (2006a) constructed an index of copyright 
protection for the European Union that measures in what extend software is protected. 
Within the European Union each country must transpose Norms and Directives that deal 
with copyright laws, but some room is left for each country to legislate. It is difficult for an 
Index to capture all legal aspects; some cannot be quantified into numbers.  For the 
construction of this index the author used two proxy’s for the strength of software protection: 
i) membership in international copyright treaties - this variable includes the signatories of 
the Bern convention (1886), WIPO (1996) and TRIPs (1994) and ii) enforcement provisions 
which is a measure of severity of punishments (jail, fines) and how these laws are being 
applied (Ostergard, 2000; Samuelson, 1999). In the absence of theoretical background the 
author uses the same weight for each country. It is used a panel data analysis using 69 
observation for 1994, 1997 and 2000. Fixed effects model was adopted; the Index had 
negative effects, which means that a lack of protection can increase piracy. This index is 
constructed based on homogeneous countries that must obey to minimum rules set by the 
European Commission.  
International organizations are important to enforce Intellectual Property Rights; 
examples are the WTO (World Trade Organization) and WIPO (World Intellectual Property 
Organization). Dordi (2008) analyzes the improvements made, namely the road that resulted 
in the ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement)33. In the European Union, Regulation 
(1383/2003) and the Directive (2004/48/CE) provide a good level of enforcement of 
intellectual property rights. The final version was published on April of 2011, being not yet 
in force34. This treaty has a problem of not including developing countries. 
                                                 
33 The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is a multinational treaty for the purpose of establishing 
international standards for intellectual property rights enforcement. The agreement aims to establish an 
international legal framework for targeting counterfeit goods, generic medicines and copyright infringement 
on the Internet, and would create a new governing body outside existing forums, such as the World Trade 
Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, or the United Nations. 
34 The Negotiators where: Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, 
Korea, Singapore, Switzerland and the United States and the signatories where the United States, the European 
Union and 22 of its Member States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and South 
Korea. 
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When macroeconomic data is available on variables such as the type of legal system 
(Goel & Nelson, 2009), effectiveness of courts and legal implications, econometric methods 
such as OLS (ordinary least squares), FE (fixed effects) or RE (random effects) are used. 
However, these variables miss the behavior of each potential software consumer. To 
empirically analyze this behavior, a survey is implemented that allow a richer analysis. Using 
a sample of students at a leading college of business administration, summing 319 
observations, 190 females and 129 males, Al-Rafee and Rouibah (2010) studied the impact 
that religious factors, awareness factors and legal factors has in the decision to pirate.  The 
author splits the group into four treatment groups performing a pre and post questionnaire: 
(i) the control group that reflects the unchanged behavior, (ii) legal and (iii) awareness 
groups are supported, the (iv) religious group is rejected. Awareness and religion factors 
have impact on the decision to pirate; legal factors was not significant. More information on 
legal consequences of violating property rights will lower piracy. 
 These results support that our perception evolves over time, being the most 
important factor the awareness of penalties related to violation of property rights. In a cross 
sectional data the results that relate to awareness factors and legal factors can be 
implemented with the World Governance Indicators, namely the rule of law and government 
effectiveness.  
More recently Hashim, Kannan, and Wegener (2009) extending the model of Beck 
and Ajzen (1991) of the theory of planned behavior35 introduce an additional variable that is 
a message of anti-piracy. 
The model proposed by Ajzen (1991) assumes that the individual has behavioral 
beliefs, normative beliefs and control beliefs, that will affect its perception of the reality, the 
attitude towards the behavior, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control, 
respectively. Each individual gives different importance to these factors; these affect its 
intention and behavior. The perceived behavior control can predict the behavior. In this 
survey, pirates will be nudged by this message and will not undertake deviant behavior. A 
survey was made on 218 undergraduates students at a large university in the Midwest region 
                                                 
35 In psychology, the theory of planned behavior is a theory about the link between attitudes and behavior. The 
concept was proposed by Icek Ajzen to improve on the predictive power of the theory of reasoned action by 
including perceived behavioral control. For additional information see 
http://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpb.diag.html 
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of the United States. Out of these 218, 98 questionnaires presented a message of anti-piracy. 
They identify in witch circumstances an individual is susceptible to exogenous nudging from 
a software company. The anti-piracy message can affect the behavior of a software pirate.  
Chtouki (2008) addresses the effects on Government and Law of this crime; 
depending on the legal systems, punishments are different. Depending on the severity of the 
crime or the perception of the infringing, the penalty will be set accordingly. European Union 
sets the basic copyright principles but leaves the rest to the Member-States. United States 
are more severe with respect to this crime. Availability of software affects the choice to 
pirate or not Lau (2004). Some software is released simultaneously worldwide, such as an 
operating system. Other are that we must wait months until the official release in a country 
(video-games). 
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2.4 Conclusions 
Software firms face the problem of software piracy. With the global digitalization 
of content this phenomenon will only worsen. Firms suffering from this phenomenon will 
have difficulties promoting new jobs, profits are not taxed, etc. This will lead to an overall 
increase in software price in order to maintain the same revenue. On the other side the 
“shadow economy” in which illicit software is sold will bloom and create jobs. To combat 
this, Companies such as Microsoft® sell their Office suit at different prices that attract 
consumers with low valuation for their software. 
Nowadays the only methodology that covers a large group of countries over a large 
period of time is the one provided by the Business Software Alliance. Over the years this 
methodology was improved with the introduction of more countries and consumers in the 
analysis. These estimates were used in empirical studies analysis. Nevertheless, the studies 
relied on small samples (in-cross section) and in the panel data analysis; few years were 
studied. Further research must be implemented considering these five dimensions. Empirical 
works can be extended to allow a disaggregated analysis in the educational dimension; for 
instance, education can be divided into ISCED 1997 levels. This disaggregation will help 
policymakers to better implement policies. Additional, more indicators that reflect the 
effectiveness of Governments must be used to analyze the laws and the legal system. 
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 BSA Publications 
In this annex we will review the publications presented by the Business Software 
Alliance (BSA) over the years of 1994 to 2010. Among other studies, annually the BSA 
presents annual software piracy reports; these reports begun in 1994. They report the results 
of software piracy rates and losses for the previous year for a large group of countries. For 
example, the report presented in 2005 reports the results of piracy rates and losses of the 
previous year (2004). Unfortunately not all reports are available since the beginning, bearing 
this in mind we try to give a broad picture of the main findings of those that are available, 
summarizing the main findings.  
The “1998 Global Software Piracy Report” (BSA & SIIA, 1998) was the fourth in 
the series36; it was developed by IPRC (International Planning and Research Corporation) 
for the BSA and SIIA (Software & Information Industry Association). In this year the global 
piracy rates had dropped below 40% from 49% in 1994. It had a declining pattern over the 
years. The study presented six reasons for this decline, among other there was the reduction 
of software price but this relation may be weak, especially if we speak of reductions from a 
previously high value ( for example 4 000$ to 2 000$). The software becomes obsolete 
quickly. Economic recession brought lower losses to Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle 
East that would happen without a recession. Eastern Europe had the highest piracy rates, in 
part because of Russia. The lowest piracy rates were in North America and Western Europe. 
Latin America, El Salvador, Guatemala and Paraguay presented one of the highest piracy 
rates, but this was a systemic problem. The Unites States had a piracy rate of 25% but 
represented 28% of all losses. Western Europe represented 25%. These two markets 
represents approximately the same size. 
This methodology applied and developed by IPRC was a methodology that 
analyzed two data sets, the demand for new software application and the legal supply of new 
software applications. PC shipments were collected from proprietary and confidential data 
supplied by BSA member Companies. They had into account home vs. non home segments 
and replacements PCs vs. new units. They separated “Replacement Shipments” that replace 
old and obsolete Computers from “New Shipments”, this variable measured the growth of 
                                                 
36 Information on the previous reports is not available 
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the capacity installed. It also had into account the base PC capacity installed, namely which 
measure is taking into account “white-collar workers”. The level of penetration of PC was 
ranked into five magnitude scales. Software demand was developed from market research 
on the US market. They developed ratios for the amount of software installed on each PC. 
A weak point that must be referred here is the use exclusively of one market (US); it can 
happen that it is not representative of others, especially Europe and Asia. 
These ratios were calculated by the four shipments groups and for each of the five 
magnitude classes:  
1. Home - New shipments, 
2. Non-Home - New shipments, 
3. Home - Replacing Shipments, and 
4. Non-Home - Replacement Shipments. 
Piracy rates are not homogeneous for every type of product, because of that, IPRC 
estimated 3 tiers of applications; General Productivity Applications37, Professional 
Applications38, and Utilities39. One limitation is that they do not present separate piracy rates 
for different types of products, in the final reports. Each of these categories presented 
different challenges, if they were analyzed separately it could improve the knowledge of the 
problem. 
For the PC shipped they had taken into account four dimensions: 
1. Home vs. Non-Home,  
2. New PCs vs. Replacement PCs, 
3. Level of Technological Development, and 
4. Software Application Tier.  
This resulted of an estimate of total software installed both legal and illegal. This 
was the demand side! 
                                                 
37 1. Databases, 2. Presentations Graphics, 3. Project Management, 4.  Spreadsheets, 5. Word Processing. 
386. Accounting, 7. C.Languages, 8. Curricular, 9. Desktop Publishing, 10. Other Languages, 11. Professional 
Drawing and Painting, 12. Programming Tools. 
39 13. Application Utilities, 14. Calendar & Scheduling, 15. Clips, 16. Communications, 17. Education 
Administration & Productivity, 18. Electonic Mail, 19. Fonts, 20. Forms, 21. General Business, 22. Internet 
Access and Tools, 23. Personal and Business Productivity, 24. PIM’s, 25. System Utilities and 26. Training. 
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The supply side was given by the members of BSA that volunteered their 
proprietary shipments data. With this it was possible to estimate software shipments. This 
data was collected in each country and by each type of software. Only business software 
applications were used40. The data on Supply shipments didn’t covered all the Companies. 
For the rest, an uplift factor reflecting an estimate of shipments by Companies participating 
in the study as a percentage of software shipped by all US software Publishers was 
considered. One limitation of this methodology was that they only considered Business 
Applications, although referring this in their report, only a full knowledge of the market can 
have an impact on the actions that policymakers take to reduce the problem. 
To estimate the total shipments of the world, IPRC applied a second uplift factor 
that was: software shipped by US software publishers as a percent of software shipped by 
all software publishers. The difference between software application installed (demand) and 
applications legally shipped (supply) gave the amount of software pirated. Multiplying the 
average price of the software by the number of legal and illegal units gave the total market 
value. (BSA, 2002). 
The “SIIA’s Report on Global Software Piracy 2000” (BSA & SIIA, 2000) was the 
sixth annual report. In 1999 the worldwide revenue losses rose to 21.6 billion dollars, from 
around 11 billion in 1999, in part because of the massification of use of both Software and 
PC. Software & Information Industry Association (SIIA) presented some important ideas that 
were relevant, namely legal aspects. A strong intellectual property protection leads to higher 
investment in a country which encourages local software industries to compete with bigger 
multinational Companies, promoting employment. But for this benefits to have effects there 
must be laws, and these laws must met the requirements of the WTO (World Trade 
Organization), TRIPs (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights), WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) and Bern convention. But this is 
not enough, these laws must be effectively enforced, the legal system must work without 
much delays and the public opinion must be educated. These treaties provide a minimum of 
protection that must be enforced by all his participants, without exception. The United States 
in 1999 changed the law, with respect of pirated software, fixing fines that ranged from 200$ 
to 100 000$, and of course jail.  
                                                 
40 The following applications were excluded: Recreation, Home Creativity, Home Education, Integrated, 
Personal Finance, Reference Software and Tax Programs. 
35 
 
There are different types of software piracy: Softlifting41, Internet42, Software 
counterfeiting43, OEM unbundling44, Hard disk loading45 and Renting46. The most important 
is the Internet and Software counterfeiting. The Internet has been growing, being the place 
that people search for pirated software, but it has risks. Buying and selling illegal software 
to a person brings risks, depending on the country and legal system. But this type of software 
sometimes comes with virus; don’t have valuable support and documentation. SIIA set’s 
Benchmark for intellectual property rights, these are the minimum that the countries must 
enforce. Annually SIIA and the US government present the Special 301 Report47, in this 
report are the countries that must improve its protection.  
The “Seventh annual BSA Global Software Piracy Study” (BSA, 2002) was 
published in early 2002. There was a decline in losses by 6.7%, relative to 2000, 
corresponding to 10.7 billion dollars. In the year 2001 the dollar was strong relative to other 
currencies, the decline was only because of this. Additionally to this, the legal market for 
software decreased in 2001 because of the recession. This recession had a strong impact on 
technological spending. In this research they found that there exists a minimum piracy, 
similar to natural unemployment rate. It is impossible to reduce it to zero. IPRC found that 
there exists several factor for a continuous decline on piracy, like reduced price and increased 
government cooperation. Eastern Europe, North America and the Middle East/Africa 
assisted a decline in losses, while Asia/Pacific and Easter Europe an increase. North America 
and Eastern Europe were below the average global piracy rate but they represented 18% and 
24% of total losses, representing Asia a total of 43% of total losses.  
In the “Eight Annual BSA Global Software Piracy Study” (BSA, 2003), they 
analyzed the evolution of software piracy rates and losses from 1994 to 2002. In almost all 
regions the piracy losses increased, North America and Western Europe were below the 
mean piracy rate, but represented 41% of the losses. From 1994 to 2002 the piracy rates 
                                                 
41 purchasing a single licensed copy of software and loading the same copy onto several computers, contrary 
to the license terms 
42 making unauthorized copies of copyrighted software available to others electronically 
43 the illegal duplication and distribution of copyrighted software in a form designed to make it appear to be 
legitimate 
44 selling stand-alone software that was intended to be bundled with specific accompanying hardware 
45 installing unauthorized copies of software onto the hard disks of personal computers, often as an incentive 
for the end user to buy the hardware from that particular hardware dealer 
46 unauthorized rental of software for temporary use, like you would a video 
47 http://www.iipa.com/special301.html  
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declined, in Middle East dropped from 80% to 49%, Latin America dropped 23 percentage 
points (pp.), Western Europe 17 pp., Eastern Europe 14 pp., Asia/Pacific 13 pp. and North 
America 8 pp.. North America was the region that dropped less, this can result in the fact 
that in 1994 it already had a low piracy rate. When we reach piracy of 20% or 30% it is 
difficult to drop more, because there will be always someone pirating a software, this 
percentage don’t mean necessarily a bad future, sometimes a pirate user, likes and then 
purchases the software.  
The “First Annual BSA and IDC Global Software” (BSA, 2004), was the first 
report in which BSA changed its consultant to International Data Corporation (IDC). With 
this change, the methodology to calculate piracy rates and losses changed. IDC used its 
proprietary statistics for software and hardware shipments, and conducted more than 5600 
interviews in 1548 countries. IDC expanded the market of software, now including beyond 
business applications, operating systems, consumer-oriented software (games, personal 
finance and reference) and local-language software. Because of this the revenue losses 
increased in relation to the previous year. Eastern Europe had a piracy rate of 71% and 
US/Canada 23%, this differences comes because different prices, taxes, different levels of 
protection of intellectual property rights and cultural differences. Software piracy has several 
negative effects, the report presented some of them; local software industries crippled from 
competing with high-quality pirated software from abroad, loss of tax and jobs. A low piracy 
rate, depending of the size of the market can result in huge losses. Example of this is the 
US/Canada having 7 232 000 Million dollars of losses. From this year onward the measure 
of losses is in thousands (1000$=1$). 
The basic methodology implemented by IDC is:  
1) Determine how much packaged software was put into use in 2003;  
2) Determine how much packaged software has been paid for during the year;  
3) Subtract one from the other to get the amount of pirated software. 
One flaw of this methodology is because of the use of confidential information.  
The step-by-step process implemented by IDC is as follows: 
                                                 
48 The countries are: China Malaysia, Taiwan, Spain, Romania, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Kuwait and the United States 
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 PC Shipments; Quarterly, IDC collect data for more than 60 countries. For 
the 30+ countries the data were or collected in the countries or modeled. PC includes 
desktops, laptops and tablets. 
 PC installed base; this is captured though tracking exercises. 
 Software Revenue; they measure annually for 60+ countries, results from 
interviews. For the countries not covered by IDC the data were collected in-country or 
modeled regionally based on IDC’s “rest-of-region estimates”.  
 Software shipments (Legitimate); these result from average system values 
estimated country-by-country and regional analysis for five software categories 
(collaboration, office, security, operating system, others), they result from interviews and 
IDC’ pricing trackers. They adjusted for software sold OEM and sold separately. Software 
unit’s shipments were derived from taking revenues and dividing by the average system 
values. 
  Software Load is the amount of software units installed or pre-installed 
(OEM). IDC survey the 15 countries. These results serve to populate IDC’s input model for 
the other countries. In software load IDC takes into account some factors49.  
 Total Software base is the amount of software, legitimate and pirated installed 
during the year. It equals the number of PC getting new software multiplied by the average 
number of software package per PC. 
 Pirated software is the difference between paid-for and the total software 
base. –Piracy rate is the percentage of total packages that are pirated. 
 Regional piracy rate, this is the regional piracy rate taking into account 
software installed in the region. 
 Value of pirated Software is the retail value of pirated software. The value of 
Pirated software equals: Legitimate market over (1-piracy rate) minus Legitimate market. 
(Source: First Annual BSA an IDC piracy study) 
“Second Annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy study” (BSA, 2005), they 
found that the value of pirated software increased as a result of the fact that the global PC 
                                                 
49 Software running on new computers; New software running on existing computers, software obtained from 
retired computers, Software obtained for free as shareware or open source and Software running and non-
Windows OS 
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software industry grew over six percent, and the dollar fell against other currencies. Piracy 
rates decreased in 37 countries and increased in 34. The worldwide software piracy rate fell 
from 36% to 35%. IDC expanded its survey now including 38 countries (23 country increase 
and 7000 more interviews). With this, the data were more reliable. 
“Third annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study” (BSA, 2006), in this 
study they found that losses increased by over 1.6$ billion. In 51 countries piracy rates 
dropped and increased in only 19 countries. PC unit shipments grew 16 percent in the last 
year. The growth of the losses is due to the growth of the market. PC software piracy in the 
emerging countries is a problem that deserves special attention. In this year IDC introduced 
statistics for six new countries. IDC presented five steps to reduce software piracy: 
Implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty, Create Strong and Workable Enforcement 
Mechanisms as Required by TRIPS, Step up Enforcement with Dedicated Resources, 
Increase Public Education and Awareness and Lead by Example. It was found that countries 
with higher piracy rates had a lower software-to-hardware ratio. 
“Fourth annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study” (BSA, 2007), in this 
study they found that piracy rates dropped in 62 countries and increased in only 13. The size 
of the market grew considerably; losses from piracy rose by more than 5$ billion which is 
equivalent to a 15% increase. In half countries for every 1$ purchased legitimately 2$ worth 
was obtained illegally. The worldwide software piracy was 35%, the same as in the previous 
year. Three new countries were added, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. In 2005 the 
pirated value in the emerging countries was 18$ and in developed world was 22$; in 2006 
in the developed world, the paid for values were 58$ and in the emerging countries only 7$.  
“Fifth annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study” (BSA, 2008), in this 
year of the 108 countries analyzed, piracy rate dropped in 67 and increased only in 8. The 
PC market grew fast in the BRICS, because of this the worldwide software piracy rate 
increased to 38%. The size of the market grew significantly and the value of US$ dropped 
7% against other currencies; this led to an increase of losses by 8$ billion. Russia piracy rate 
dropped seven percentage points to 73%. The access of Broadband by the emerging 
countries led to an increase of supply of pirated software. The percentage of PC shipments 
in the emerging markets was 46%, and 17% of PC Software Market; in the BRICS, 24% of 
PC shipments, but they only had 7% of PC Software Market. In this year five new countries 
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were added, they were: Bangladesh, Iraq, Libya, Sri Lanka and Yemen. IDC identified 
several trends that can lead to a downward pressure or upward pressure50. 
“Sixth annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study” (BSA, 2009), in 2008 
PC software piracy dropped in 52% of the countries and remain the same in 35%. The 
worldwide piracy rate increased to 41% from 38% in 2007. The value of unlicensed software 
grew 11% to 53$ billion, but if we exclude the effect of exchange rate, it only grew 5% to 
50.2$ billion. The exchange rate played an important role. The emerging markets accounted 
for 45% of PC Hardware market, but only 20% of the PC software market. The lowest piracy 
rates were in US, Japan, New Zealand and Luxembourg while the highest were in Central 
and Easter Europe, with an average of 61%. The software can get in our home in different 
ways51, some of these not legal. The crisis didn’t had a significant impact on consumers, and 
on business users. IDC identified factors that can help lowering piracy52 and factors driving 
up piracy53. This year survey were a result of surveys in 24 different countries, with distinct 
realities. 
“Seventh annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study” (BSA, 2010b), in 
2009 the installation of unlicensed software dropped in 54 countries and rose in 19, it was 
good if this drop was in all, but because of the heterogeneity of countries this is not possible 
to achieve. The worldwide piracy rate dropped to 41%. PC shipments to consumers rose 
17% while in business dropped 15%. Software piracy was higher in the consumers than on 
business because in this sector they have audits to their software. As part of the input to 
determine software piracy rates, IDC takes into account several factors, some of these are: 
PC shipments growth, consumer vs. business ownership, broadband access, desktop-to-
laptop-mix, etc54. IDC takes into account freeware software, representing 12.22% of the 
market, which is low. Sometimes the quality of this software is better. IDC analyzed 
software-as-a-service (SaaS), but it had a weak impact. It is a good choice especially if the 
software needs continuously upgrades and training is necessary in a regular basis (because 
                                                 
50 For more details see page 8 of the “Fifth annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study” 
51 See page 2 of the “Sixth annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study” 
52 These factors are: Vendor legalization efforts, Vendor agreements with original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM), Technical advances, Software asset management (SAM), Government-led educational and 
enforcement, New distribution agreements, Public-private partnerships and Globalization. 
53 These factors are: Broadband, Faster grow in high piracy segments, emerging market growth, Economic 
slowdown 
54 For more details see page 5 of the report 
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of the complexity). In this year IDC analyzed a mix of 28 countries from various regions, 
conducting surveys on 6000 consumers and 4300 business users. 
“Eighth annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study” (BSA, 2011), in 2010 
the commercial value of software piracy grew fourteen percent, PC shipments to emerging 
economies was bigger than those on mature markets and in the emerging economies 
accounted for more than half of the software pirated. This year the BSA study covered a total 
of 116 countries, using a methodology that incorporates “182 discrete data inputs for each”. 
This year BSA counted with Ipsos Public Affairs to make surveys on PC users on 32 
countries. The commercial value of software pirated doubled since 2003. The piracy rate 
dropped in 51 economies and increased in only 15. BSA estimated that there are 1.4 billion 
PC installed worldwide. Consumers represented a total of 52% of installed PC compared to 
the 43% three years ago. The results of the surveys were important; 81% of PC user value 
legal software over illegal software, but 41% of PC users in emerging markets think that 
“acquiring” software downloaded from peer-to-peer networks in probably legal. This shows 
that a better education in this area must be done in these economies. This survey consisted 
of 15000 PC users both in Emerging markets55 and Mature markets56, these surveys were 
conducted online or in-person. Since 2003 the methodology were improved, introducing new 
elements. 
For the non-survey countries IDC uses proxies. To estimate software load in these 
countries, IDC uses correlations between the known software loads from survey countries 
and their scores on emerging market measures published by the International 
Telecommunication Union, called the ICT Developments Index. It also considers other 
correlations such as gross domestic product per capita, PC penetration and measures of 
institutional strength57.  
"Annually", BSA publishes studies referring the impact of lowering the piracy rate  
(BSA, 2010a). In the study they refer what are the benefits of lowering the piracy rate by 
ten-points from 2008-2011. In this report they used 42 countries that represented more than 
                                                 
55 These countries are: Argentina Republic (AR), Brazil (BR), China (CN), Chile (CL), Colombia (CO), Czech 
Republic (CZ), India (IN), Indonesia (ID), Republic of Korea (KR), Malaysia (MY), Mexico (MX), Nigeria 
(NG), Poland (PL), Russian Federation (RU), Saudi Arabia (SA), South Africa (ZA), Thailand (TH), Turkey 
(TR), Ukraine (UA), Vietnam (VN). 
56 These countries are: Australia (AU), Canada (CA), France (FR), Germany (DE), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), 
Netherlands (NL), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (GB), United States (US). 
57 see page 10 of the report “Eight annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study” 
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90% of the IT market. Globally, the reduction would lead to an increase in GDP (measure 
in millions) of 141 000$, a creation of 600000 jobs and tax revenue (measure in millions) of 
24 000$. Analyzing the Western Europe, this would mean an increase in GDP of 35 787$, a 
creation of jobs of 53878 and taxes of 9 322$. This increase of taxes is important in the Euro 
Countries because of the (<3% of GDP) budget deficit requirements. This increase in taxes 
would lead to a decrease in deficit or with the same deficit; improve the Economy, 
implementing expansionary policies to help the economies to growth.  
In the “2011 BSA global software piracy study” (BSA, 2012) it was conducted a 
survey with the main goal to view the attitudes of consumers towards the use of illicit 
software. This survey was conducted on 14700 computer users in a total of 33 
markets/countries that represent 82% of the global PC Market. This task was conducted by 
Ipsos Public Affairs on January and February of 2012. Results indicate that 57% of software 
users admit they pirate. Those that pirate often represent 31%, out of these; 5% say they 
pirate “all of the time”, 9% “most of the time” and 17% “occasionally”. In the group that 
says “most of the time” are the young and male individuals. 26% admit they pirate, but only 
“rarely”. Other important result is that 4 in 10 people (38% of the sample) say they “never” 
pirate. All of the time/ Most of the time or Occasionally software pirate users are the most 
voracious pirates; on their Computers, 55% of software is pirated. Other important 
conclusion is that pirates in Emerging economies install almost four times as many programs 
as those on mature markets. 
Globally, the software pirate rates are 42%. The commercial value of unlicensed 
software rose to 63.4$ billions in 2011. This high value of piracy is due to the large impact 
of the emerging economies, representing 56% of the world PC shipments in 2011. Piracy 
rate on Emerging markets is 68% and in Mature ones is only 24%. Two of the most big 
Economies in the World are the US and China, US as a piracy rate of 19% but losses of 10$ 
billion, China as a piracy rate of 77% and losses of 9$ billion. 
Although the market for PC is large, 1.5 billion personal computers with 32 billion 
software programs with a commercial value of 261$ billion; the market for Tables is slowly 
increasing, 80 million tablets in 2011 running 3.7 billion apps with a commercial value of 
7$ billion. 
Surveys to determine software piracy include 182 data inputs (provided by IDC), 
on 116 markets either online or in-person. To improve the methodology from this year 
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onward, 11 countries will be surveyed annually and 42 countries will be surveys at least once 
every two to three years. 
The “BSA Global Software survey” (BSA, 2014) of 2014 was published two years 
after its predecessor. This year it was conducted surveys on IT managers. Surveys were 
conducted in early 2014 on 20000 consumers and enterprises PC users in 34 
markets/countries and on 2000 IT managers in 20 countries. As in the previous report we 
have represented 116 markets. 
Less that 50% of IT managers are confident that their organizations are using legal 
software. Furthermore they have several concerns about Malware when using illicit 
software, namely: i) Loss of data (39%), ii) Data breaches (50%), iii) Time and cost do 
disinfect (39%) and iv) Loss of IP or proprietary information (38%). Other major finding is 
that only 35% of Companies have written policies regarding the use of legal software. In 
regard to consumer users, they do not use illicit software or because of unauthorized access 
by hackers (69%) or due to loss of data) (59%). 
Worldwide, 43% of software installed is pirated with a total value of unlicensed 
software of 62.7$ billion in 2013. This is a result of the growing popularity of the tablet PC; 
in emerging markets, PC are still dominant. Emerging markets represent 56% of PC in use 
and 73% of total unlicensed software. 
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3.1 Introduction 
In the past decades we have witnessed a huge development on hardware and 
software industries. Some examples of these developments were the “Windows®” and 
"Apple® Macintosh” operating systems with its friendly user interfaces. These operating 
systems are used in working environments, and the equipment in which they operate are very 
expensive. Both Mac OS and Windows® operating systems evolved over several releases. 
For example Windows® 8 evolved from its predecessor, the Windows® 7, bringing new 
features such as a new UI (user interface). As the personal computers became more powerful, 
it made possible to develop software to an increasing array of applications as, for instance, 
music and digital edition. 
With these developments it came also the need to improve the existing software to 
meet the requirements of consumers. These improvements came at a cost; continuous 
research and development are needed by companies in order to maintain quality and keep 
update with the changes in technology. The cost of these investments is passed to consumers 
in the form of a license; the consumer pays a license to use the software during a certain 
amount of time (normally annually and with updates granted within this period) or buys a 
perpetual license for that particular software (normally with reduced prices for future 
updates). This perpetual license is not really “perpetual” as software becomes obsolete 
quickly. Updates on operating systems and hardware are released within regular periods of 
time and, sometimes, these upgrades turn old software versions unusable (applications, 
drivers, system extensions, etc.). Investment on software must also be done into its hardware 
or software protections against piracy because software has the characteristic of being easily 
distributed with virtually no cost associated. 
The massive use of computers and the Internet made the problem of software piracy 
potentially more severe, as the pirated software can be uploaded in the Internet within 
increasingly shorter periods of time. Before the expansion of Internet usage, only hard copies 
were available which were easier to track. To prevent this phenomenon, companies must 
invest to avoid pirated software from being used in addition to the investment to meet the 
speciation of potential consumers. Pirated software starts its journey when the original 
program protection is bypassed by another program or action performed by hackers. The 
investment that the companies make must incorporate different layers of protection. 
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Unfortunately the software protections are often hacked. To cover these costs the companies 
must increase R&D, which increases the initial prices, but these prices sometimes take away 
potential buyers. In recent years, and due to the need of the information being available 
anywhere and anytime, many software products offer online services that replace the need 
of the software being installed in the computer. These software can be free of charge or, to 
access its full capabilities, may be necessary an user registration fee. Because each time the 
user uses the software, he must be identified and logged-in, the risk of piracy is reduced.  
Due to the increase importance of the software piracy phenomenon, previous 
research studied the determinants of software piracy resorting to the software piracy rates as 
the dependent variable58. However, official publications also report the software piracy 
losses and to our knowledge no empirical work conducted an analysis of this variable. 
Both piracy rates and losses measure the illicit behavior in a country. In the first 
case it measures the percentage of software that is being illegally used at a given time, but it 
omits the importance of the software industry in the economy. We can have a low piracy 
rate and huge losses; example of this is the USA. On the other side countries with piracy rate 
above 90% may represent little impact on this industry due to the small domestic software 
markets. Piracy losses measure the benefit to the economy national income in lowering 
piracy.  
Our contribution to the literature is as follows:  
(i) We will examine what are the determinants of software piracy losses 
along five dimensions: the technological development, the level of education, the 
correct functioning of institutions the availability of information and the structure 
of the labor force; 
(ii) We will use a panel methodology that provides consistent estimates 
when the dataset is persistent: the System-GMM proposed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  
The structure of the chapter is the following: section 3.1 presents a brief survey of 
the empirical literature on software piracy that used cross sectional and panel data analysis. 
Section 3.2 describes the piracy rates and losses presented by the Business Software 
                                                 
58 Due to data restrictions previous research used two main methodologies: cross-sectional and panel data using 
classical methods due to small time periods. 
47 
 
Alliance59 (BSA) since 1994 in different regions of the world; section 3.3 explains the 
various dimensions and possible effects. Section 3.4 describes the econometric specification 
and the results, and section 3.5 concludes. 
  
                                                 
59 Business Software Alliance is a group pressure that estimates annually the software piracy losses and rates 
across different groups of countries. 
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3.2 Evolution of the software piracy losses and rates over the 
years 
This section describes the evolution of the piracy rates and losses since 1994 for 
different regions of the world using the data provided by the BSA. 
Figure 3.1 presents the evolution of the piracy losses over the last 17 years measured 
at current prices (BSA, 2011) in millions of dollars. Piracy losses for each region are the 
result of the sum of the losses for all countries in that region60. The piracy rates and losses 
are annually published by the BSA, with the help of an external consultant. In the period of 
2002-2003, BSA changed its consultant from International Planning and Research 
Corporation (IPRC) to IDC and, consequently, the results were substantially different. 
Furthermore in 2002 BSA included other types of software such as operating system and 
games; as previously the reports only included business applications. This figure clearly 
shows this changed occurred in 2002 as there is a big jump from 2002 to 2003. 
 
Figure 3.1 Evolution of Software Piracy Losses 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 All estimations from countries take into account the exchange rate of the dollar against national currencies  
49 
 
In the majority of regions the amount of losses grew at exponentially rate since 
2002 with the exception of Asia Pacific, North America and Western Europe where losses 
grew rapidly. Some of this growth can be explained by the introduction of new countries in 
the sample, technological growth or the variations in the exchange rates.  
In addition to this graph we calculated the ܮ݋ݏݏ݁ݏ/ܩܦܲ in these regions (Figure 
3.2). Piracy losses per GDP was obtained as follows: piracy losses and GDP for each region 
is the simple average of all countries belonging to a region; then we divided Losses over 
GDP. As in Figure 3.1 there exists a break in the series in 2002, but now these losses in terms 
of GDP are higher in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe and Asia Pacific. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Losses / GDP on all regions 
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Figure 3.3 Evolution of Software Piracy Rates 
 
 
Figure 3.3  presents the evolution of the piracy rates. The relationship between the 
piracy rates and losses is not linear; losses increased over time while piracy rates fell. This 
decrease was not so drastic in 2002 compared to the losses increases. North America and 
Western Europe have the lowest piracy rates. These rates have been decreasing more rapidly 
until 2002 and, after this period, the rates had a smother pattern. In the case of Middle East 
and Africa, and Latin America, software piracy decreased rapidly until 2002, then increased 
slowly. Png (2010) found that when surveys are not applied, the software piracy rates are 
based on national income; it also found that the yearly rate of decrease of the piracy rates 
before 2003 were 2.0 (p.p), while the period after 2003 this rate of decrease fell to 1.1 (p.p) 
for the non-survey countries.  
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For a closer look, we also report the software piracy rates on three regions of the 
world: BRIC61, United States and European Union from 2003 until 2010 (Figure 3.4). The 
piracy rates in European Union and United States have been more or less constant over the 
last 8 years. In the BRICs piracy rates have been steadily falling slowly, but still represent 
over 70% of the software used. 
 
Figure 3.4 Software Piracy rates on selected regions 
 
 
 
The existence of low piracy rates don’t necessarily means lower losses. Figure 3.5 
and 3.6  shows the piracy losses on the three regions; piracy losses have been growing at a 
more or less constant rate on United States and European Union. The amount of losses almost 
tripled in eight years in the BRICs. When losses are analyzed as a proportion of GDP, the 
importance of the losses in the BRICs is even higher when compared with the EU and USA. 
This can represent the ineffective implementation of copyright laws. Anyway, the losses in 
terms of GDP have (in any of the three regions) been more or less constant during the 
analyzed period.  
 
 
                                                 
61Brazil, Russia, India and China 
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Figure 3.5 Software Piracy Losses on selected regions 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Losses / GDP on selected regions 
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3.3 Variables and possible effects 
This section describes some of the variables used in previous research, introducing 
new ones. We group them into five dimensions. Theoretical background exists but at the 
individual/firm level. See, for instance, (Bae & Choi, 2006; Lu & Poddar, 2012). In general, 
studies focus on the behavior of individuals towards piracy, modeling the benefits to 
software firms on improved software protection, awareness and the effects of the 
environment (network externalities). These benefits will affect the country economy on 
various levels, namely in how access to information is controlled and how better protection 
can be implemented.  
Literature at the macroeconomic level is still in its infancy. A measure of income 
(namely GDP) is used in many studies as a determinant of piracy (see for instance (Andrés, 
2006a).  Goel and Nelson (2009) provide some macroeconomic determinants using cross-
sectional data. The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an historical view of the 
problem using a panel data analysis. We can define piracy as a function of the various 
dimensions: Technological, Educational, Access to Information, Institutional Dimension 
and Labor force.  In the Labor force dimension we introduce new variables in the economic 
literature that affect piracy, namely the structure of the labor force and the education of active 
population. 
 
 Technological dimension 
Technological dimensions can affect levels of software piracy. Expenditure on 
research and development (R&D) has been found to affect negatively software piracy 
(Marron & Steel, 2000). As with Marron and Steel (2000) we introduce this variable that 
may also affect piracy losses. In our case this variable indicates investment that is made on 
software protection, namely software code. This variable also makes part of the educational 
dimension. 
Additional to this variable we introduce two variables that capture this dimension. 
To our knowledge no empirical work as studies these specific variables. They are the patent 
and the trademark applications done by residents and non-residents. 
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Patent applications are worldwide patent applications filed through the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty procedure or with a national patent office for exclusive rights for an 
invention (this can be a product or a process). The protection of this product can reach up to 
20 years. Patents can be filed by domestic or by foreign applicants. 
Trademark applications filed are application to register a trademark with a national 
or regional Intellectual Property (IP) office. A trademark is a distinctive sign that identifies 
certain goods or services as those produced or provided by a specific region, person or 
enterprise. A trademark provides protection to the owner of the mark by ensuring the 
exclusive right to use it to identify goods or services, or to authorize another to use it in 
exchange for a license or royalty. The period of protection varies. Direct resident trademark 
applications are those filed by domestic applicants directly at a given national IP office while 
those that are filed by applicants from abroad are called “direct nonresident trademark 
applications”. The registration of a patent or a trademark has costs for the firm, but these are 
necessary in order to protect their products.  
All these variables are expected to have a negative effect on piracy losses although 
the existence of a patent is not sufficient to prevent piracy; the enforcement trough strict 
regulation is also necessary. More technological advanced countries have more legal 
protection and, at the same time, firm’s owner of the technology are also more close to the 
market and can detect more easily illegal software. 
 
 Educational dimension  
In all countries there is a pre-determined number of years of schooling that a child 
needs to complete, and this number may vary from one country to another. During this 
period, children have specific subjects that require the usage of computers and Internet. This 
early introduction to new technologies will improve productivity of future workers. In some 
subjects, professors introduce the concept of illegal software and the risks associated with 
their use. The introduction of other concepts such as copyright can reduce the future use of 
illegal software. MacDonald and Fougere (2003) studied this effect analyzing MIS 
(Management Information Systems) textbooks. Previous research introduced the effective 
schooling years that students have (variables retrieved from the Barro and Lee (2013) 
dataset). Marron and Steel (2000) and Andrés (2006b) found that more schooling years 
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reduce piracy. This variable is not available annually, we will introduce a proxy variable that 
indicates years of schooling that a country offers. More years of schooling indicate that 
children understand and are aware about the consequence of using illegal software. This 
variable includes years of schooling of primary education based on the ISCED 199762 
(ISCED 1) and secondary education based on the ISCED 1997 (ISCED 2 and 3). This 
indicator reveals the total education that a country offers. This variable may or may not have 
a negative effect. 
Other variables could be used such as literacy rate (see Goel and Nelson (2009)) 
having a positive impact (increase) on piracy. But in this case, literacy rate omits the different 
levels of education; a person can be literate and lack the ability to use computers and 
software. 
No previous research focused on the financial effects that expenditure on education 
could have on piracy. A measure that reflects the expenditure that is made on education will 
be introduced. More public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP can reduce 
illegal software that students use; this will also result in more quality of education. This 
financial help can go both to public or private institutions. This variable is expected to affect 
negatively software piracy losses. 
 
 Access to information  
Technology has evolved over the years. Today it is difficult or even impossible to 
live without it. Hardware and software industry have profited with these developments but, 
with the dissemination of the Internet, it was also possible to download huge amounts of 
information, some of which not legal, such as pirated software. Authors such as Goel and 
Nelson (2009) analyzed the effects that internet and computer users have on piracy, results 
showed that more users of these devices reduces piracy. More recently Boyce (2011) found 
that broadband penetration rate and Internet access reduces piracy. Most modern mobile 
phones uses an operating system, some of which may even replace the computer (in some 
specific tasks - the case of smartphones).  
                                                 
62 International Standard Classification of Education 
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We will introduce four variables that measure the availability of information 
(telephone, fixed broadband Internet subscriber, Internet and mobile users). 
Telephone lines are physical and fixed lines that connect a subscriber's terminal 
equipment to the public switched telephone network and that have a port on a telephone 
exchange. Integrated services digital network channels and fixed wireless subscribers are 
included. Fixed broadband Internet subscribers are the number of broadband subscribers 
with a digital subscriber line, cable modem, or other high-speed technology. Internet users 
are people with access to the worldwide network.  Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions 
are subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service using cellular technology, which 
provide access to the public switched telephone network. Post-paid and prepaid 
subscriptions are included.  
All these variables affect the availability of software; more usage of these devises 
would lead to an increase in software piracy losses.  
 
 Institutional Dimensions 
Past literature has found that institutional factors play an important role on piracy (see 
(Knack & Keefer, 1995)). Following D. Banerjee, Khalid, and Sturm (2005) and Goel and 
Nelson (2009) we introduce four institutional factors that can explain levels of software 
piracy, they are business freedom, trade freedom, freedom from corruption and financial 
freedom. Better institutions are associated with lower piracy losses. 
Business freedom indicates if firms can be established easily with little bureaucracy. 
Trade freedom indicates if countries promote trade or not, for example putting high tariff 
rates on foreign products such as software or hardware products. Freedom from corruption 
can tell us how the legal system work, if officials are corrupt and if illegal activities such as 
piracy pass unpunished. Finally financial freedom measures banking efficiency and 
independence of government control. A correct functioning of the banking sector will 
promote credit to the economy, sometimes indispensable to purchase software in the case of 
expensive ones.   
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 Labor force dimension 
Computer skills are acquired at school or at the workplace; these can range from 
browsing the Internet, sending e-mails or working on business applications such as word 
processors or spreadsheets. Different jobs require different types of software; some include 
imaging suits, others productivity or econometric tools, etc. We will consider three variables 
that reflect the structure of the labor force of the population: employment in the primary 
sector (Agriculture), employment in the secondary sector (Industry) and employment in the 
tertiary sector (Service). 
In agriculture when the production is intensive, software helps to improve 
efficiency; e.g. controlling various elements of a greenhouse such as the temperature or 
humidity. In the industrial sector, the use of specialized software is “normal”, as it comes 
with the machine and, in many situations, is developed and used by the firms internally, thus 
is not for sale. The software cannot be used outside of the environment that was intended to 
work. Big firms develop the software, or commission its development (outsource) to a 
specialized company (due to smaller costs). The services sector uses specialized software of 
accounting, taxation and productivity. Depending on the different needs, the software can 
cost thousands of dollars, but it comes with technical support, extremely valuable in order 
to maintain productivity and prevent failures. The costs associated with the acquisition of 
these types of software can be deduced during a certain amount of time, reducing taxable 
profits. 
Employment in these sectors may have impact on software piracy losses. Firms 
want to maximize profit; in some cases, due to budgetary restrictions, employers can 
introduce some illicit software that will benefit both employers and employees. The 
introduction of illicit software has associated risks that are, for instance, the result from 
external audits that can impose severe fines. In spite of this, some firms may be willing to 
take them. Certain types of jobs, namely in the service sector, can be done from home, as in 
market research. In many cases workers wanting to do their jobs at home due to reduced 
costs may seek illicit software to implement their research. In this case there is only a residual 
risk of internal audits finding illicit software. This may lead an increase of software piracy 
losses.   
Additional to these variables we introduce the education of the labor force. We will 
consider labor force with primary, secondary and tertiary education. The labor force of a 
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country plays an important role on the growth of the economy (Barro, 2013a). If it is 
constituted by labor force with low education, this will lead to low productivity and, 
consequently, to small economic growth. Also, if the labor force is constituted by highly 
qualified people, this will lead to increased productivity which improves the standards of 
living. These highly qualified employees will use computers and software. More education 
of the labor force characterizes a double-edged sword context: on one side there are more 
users of computers and software but, at the same time, some of the consumers will use illicit 
software63.  
Chen, Chen, and Yeh (2010) found that unemployment has a negative effect 
(reduce) on software piracy rates. Their sample was small and reflected a small group of 
homogeneous countries where the psychological aspects could be determinant.  
Another measure that reflects both an income dimension and social dimension is 
the unemployment. We will use the total and youth unemployment that reflects people within 
15-24 years without work and the total unemployment rate. Both variables are expected to 
have a positive effect on piracy losses. An unemployed person has less disposable income 
and spends more time at home. Sometimes it is necessary to use certain software to start 
working (in the case of self-employment), but the lack of money can shift consumers from 
legal to illegal copies to fill their needs.  
 
 General Econometric Model 
These five dimensions interfere with each other as, for example, education in a 
country will affect the type of jobs of workers, more service-orientated or more for the 
industry. In addition, employment levels will be affected by the type of education. More 
technologically advanced countries that rely on high R&D promote more effectively the 
protection of invents and the level of education of workers. Access to information can be 
seen as affecting all dimensions at the same time because more information in the form of 
knowledge will affect education levels and its quality, will permit access to innovations 
patented or not, and will also affect productivity of workers and access to employment 
                                                 
63 We should note that the education of the labor force represents both a labor force dimension and educational 
dimension. 
 
59 
 
opportunities advertised on the different Media. Institutional dimension also affect all 
dimensions at the same time, free countries have better education, technology, better access 
to information and qualified labor force.  
Figure 3.7 also show the relation between variables. Piracy is affecting all 
dimensions but also being influenced by them. Furthermore, all dimensions are linked 
together influencing each other. 
 
Figure 3.7 Relationship between variables 
 
 
Equation 3.1 shows the general econometric model.  
 
ܲ݅ݎܽܿݕ ൌ
݂ሺܮܾܽ݋ݎ ܨ݋ݎܿ݁, ݄ܶ݁ܿ݊݋݈݋݈݃݅ܿܽ, ܧ݀ݑܿܽݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ, ܣܿܿ݁ݏݏ ݐ݋ ܫ݂݊݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊, ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽሻ   
(3.1) 
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3.4 Empirical evidence 
 Data, econometric specification and summary statistics 
Previous econometric studies relied on cross-section or panel data analysis. In the 
panel data models periods of study were relatively short. To our knowledge, this work is the 
first to introduce a large time span in the analysis. Figure 3.1 shows that software piracy 
losses are highly persistent over time and that its value follows closely the GDP (see Figure 
3.2); its value is always increasing over time. Soto (2009) examined the properties of System 
GMM when the sample is small and the series is persistent, which is applicable to our dataset. 
This estimator was found to have lower bias and higher efficiency than the OLS or the fixed-
effects estimator and, furthermore, the gain in efficiency from the two-step estimator is 
almost inexistent; both the one and two-step distributions are virtually the same. Based on 
these results we will report the one-step System GMM.    
Our dataset is constituted by macroeconomic variables retrieved from the World 
Development Indicators and the Heritage Foundation64 available for the countries present in 
the publications provided by the BSA and comprising 81 countries from 1994 until 2010. 
Variables were chosen based on their relevance and suitability and in their availability 
through all the period in the analysis. Due to the persistence of the piracy losses, we will use 
a dynamic panel data analysis, namely the Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) estimator. This estimator was developed because the lagged-level instruments of the 
original Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator become weak when the autoregressive process 
becomes too persistent or when the ratio of the variance of the panel-level effects and the 
variance of the idiosyncratic error becomes too large. The System GMM uses both level and 
first-difference of the lagged dependent variable as instruments.  
The dependent variable is the piracy losses due to pirated software, and it’s 
measured in millions of dollars. The independent variables measure various dimensions of a 
country: Technological dimensions, Educational dimension, Access to Information, 
Institutional Dimension and Labor Force dimension. In our analysis we will use the nominal 
GDP (GDP)65 as a control variable.  
                                                 
64 www.heritage.org 
65 GDP is measured in current US dollars - this variable will be considered as endogenous and used to control 
the market dimension. 
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The estimator used poses some problems, namely in the case of too many 
instruments. When the instrument count is high they may fail to expunge their endogenous 
components and biasing coefficient estimates toward those from non-instrumenting 
estimators as discussed by Roodman (2009b). With the limitation of lags we overcome this 
problem, e.g. the number of instruments higher than the number of countries. In the end of 
each regression we report the number of instruments used and also, through our analysis, the 
number of instruments will be smaller than the number of countries following Roodman 
(2009a).  
The econometric specification is given in equation 3.2 as follows: 
 
݈݊ ሺܮ݋ݏݏ݁ݏሻ௜௧ ൌ ߚ௜௧ ൅ ߠଵ݈݊ሺܮ݋ݏݏ݁ݏሻ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଵ݈݊ሺܩܦܲሻ௜௧ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ߙ௑ ൅ ௜ܻ௧ߙ௒
൅ ܼ௜௧ߙ௓ ൅ ௜ܹ௧ߙௐ൅ߙ଺ܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁௧ ൅ ߭௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
(3.2)
                                  
                i =1,…,81  represents the countries and t =1994,…,2010 the time periods 
The variable Losses is the piracy losses measured in millions of dollars and GDP is 
the Gross Domestic Product at current prices. Additional to this we could also consider 
௟௡ሺ௟௢௦௦௘௦ሻ
௟௡ ሺீ஽௉ሻ  as a dependent variable that represents the relative importance of the piracy losses 
in relation to GDP66.  
௜ܺ௧ is a vector of labor force. It reflects the labor force dimension and it’s constituted 
by the labor force, type of employment and unemployment. 
 
௜ܺ௧ᇱ ൌ ሾܮܾܽ݌௜௧ ܮܾܽݏ௜௧ ܮܾܽݐ௜௧ ܧ݉݌ܽ݃ݎ݅௜௧ ܧ݉݌݅݊݀௜௧ ܧ݉݌ݏ݁ݎݒ௜௧ ܷ݊݁݉ݕ݋ݑݐ݄௜௧ሿ 
(3.3) 
 
were Labp is the labor force with primary education, Labs is the labor force with 
secondary education, Labt is the labor force with tertiary education, Empagri is the 
                                                 
66 To assess the validity of both assumptions we performed regressions. In both cases the variables maintain 
the same coefficient, being the only difference the magnitude of these. We opted by the absolute value of 
Losses as it provided best estimates, maintaining significance.  
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employment in agriculture, Empind is the employment in industry, Empserv is the 
employment in the services sector. Unempyouth is the unemployment of people from 15 to 
24 years old, we also introduce Unemp that is the total unemployment. 
 ௜ܻ௧ is a vector that represents the technological dimension and it’s constituted by 
patents, trademarks and the research and development.  
 
௜ܻ௧ᇱ ൌ ሾܴ&ܦ௜௧ ݈݊ሺܲܽݐݎ݁ݏሻ௜௧ ݈݊ሺܲܽݐ݊݋݊ሻ௜௧ ݈݊ሺܶݎܽ݀ݎ݁ݏሻ௜௧ ݈݊ሺܶݎܽ݀݊݋݊ሻ௜௧ሿ (3.4) 
 
R&D represents the research and development expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 
Patres are the patent applications done by residents, Patnon are the patent applications done 
by nonresidents. Tradres is the trademark applications done directly by residents and the 
Tradnon is the trademark applications done directly by nonresident. Both patents and 
trademarks are in logarithms.  
ܼ௜௧ is a vector of the education dimensions. It combines years of schooling and 
public expenditure in the different levels of education (primary, secondary and tertiary) as a 
percentage of GDP.  
 
ܼ௜௧ ൌ ሾܻݏ݄ܿ݋݋݈݌ݎ݅௜௧ ܻݏ݄ܿ݋݋݈ݏ݁ܿ௜௧ ܧݔ݌݌ݎ݅௜௧ ܧݔ݌ݏ݁ܿ௜௧ ܧݔ݌ݐ݁ݎ௜௧ ܲݑܾ݁ݔ݌௜௧ሿ    (3.5) 
   
ܻݏ݄ܿ݋݋݈݌ݎ݅ is the duration in years of primary education, Yschoolsec  is the 
duration in years of secondary education. Exppri, Expsec and Expter is expenditure on 
primary, secondary and tertiary education as a share of GDP. Pubexp represents public 
expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP. 
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The vector ܹ ௜௧ represents the various variables that represent access to information.   
 
௜ܹ௧ ൌ ሾ݈݊ሺܨܾ݅ݏሻ ௜௧ ݈݊ሺܯ݋ܾ݈݅݁ሻ௜௧ ݈݊ሺ݄ܲ݋݊݁ሻ௜௧ ݈݊ሺܰ݁ݐሻ௜௧ሿ               (3.6)
 
Fbis is fixed broadband Internet subscribers, Mobile is mobile cellular 
subscriptions, ݄ܲ݋݊݁ is the phone lines and Net is the access to the Internet. These variables 
are measured per 100 people. We introduce logarithms in this dimension. 
Vector ܫ௜௧ represents the institutional dimension. 
 
 ܫ௜௧ ൌ ሾܤݑݏܨݎ݁݁݀௜௧ ܶݎܽ݀ܨݎ݁݁݀௜௧ ܥ݋ݎݎܨݎ݁݁݀௜௧ܨ݅݊ܨݎ݁݁݀௜௧ሿ               (3.7)
 
Variables are business freedom (BusFreed), trade freedom (TradFreed), freedom 
from corruption (CorrFreed)  and financial freedom (FinFreed) 
Additional to these variables, a dummy variable (Change) will be introduced that 
reflects the change in methodology provided by the BSA. Before 2003 it will have a value 
of 0 and of 1 afterwards. We will also introduce a set of time dummies. 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the various dimensions. In 2010 data 
for software piracy losses was available for 81 countries. Every year the BSA improves its 
estimates performing more surveys; initially surveys were made on 15 countries67 (BSA, 
2003); in 2010, surveys were made on 3268 countries (BSA, 2010b), a total of 15000 
computer users were inquired. Since 1994 a total of 1217 observations are available.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Guatemala; Kuwait; Malaysia; 
Mexico; Romania; Spain; Taiwan and the United States. 
68 Emerging markets include: Argentina; Brazil; China; Chile; Colombia; Czech Republic; India; Indonesia; 
Korea, Republic of; Malaysia; Mexico; Nigeria; Poland; Russian Federation; Saudi Arabia; South Africa; 
Thailand; Turkey; Ukraine; Vietnam. Mature markets include: Australia; Canada; France; Germany; Italy; 
Japan; Netherlands; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; United Kingdom; United States. 
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics 
Variables  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Losses  1217 353.80 929.37 0.902 9515 
Losses/GDP 1217 0.00082 0.00088 0.000088 0.016 
GDP 1373 478804.7 1400089 1170.785 1.44e+07 
Labor Force dimension 
Empagri 1176 15.81 15.90 .2 72.2 
Empind 1177 24.78 6.24 6.5 43.1 
Empserv 1177 58.79 14.42 13.3 87.4 
Labp 781 29.92 17.68 0 89 
Labs 775 43.13 16.89 2.9 80.2 
Labt 781 23.94 10.68 0 66.1 
Unempyouth 1006 17.43 9.33 2.2 629 
Unemp 1200 8.49 5.04 0.9 36.4 
Technological dimension 
Patres 1186 12211.37 49331.09 2 384201 
Patnon  1196 6987.64 21961.23 1 248249 
Tradres  1174 23936.59 64011.48 1 973460 
Tradnon  1177 6356.59 7613.16 33 67838 
R&D 862 1.12 .98 .02 4.8 
Educational dimension 
Pubexp 726 4.81 1.42 2.20e-06 9.51 
Yschoolpri 1375 5.43 .99 3 8 
Yschoolsec  1130 6.54 1.01 4 9 
Access to Information dimension 
Net 1341 23.41 25.73 0.00 95.63 
Fbis  928 7.11 9.77 0.00 38.10 
Phone  1366 29.39 19.51 0.61 74.69 
Mobile  1367 48.56 45.15 0.00 195.57 
Institutional dimension 
BusFreed 1256 50.59 24.53 10 100 
TradFreed 1256 70.62 13.37 36.3 100 
CorrFreed 1256 72.08 13.23 0 95 
FinFreed 1256 59.19 18.02 10 90 
Notes: Std. Dev. represents the standard deviation; Min the minimum and Max the maximum. 
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 Empirical application 
This section presents the empirical results for the various dimensions. Some of our 
variables in education don’t vary over time and, consequently, the fixed effect was not the 
best choice as it omits invariant regressors. Based on the Hausman test, Andrés (2006a), 
Chen et al. (2010) and Boyce (2011) found that the fixed effect was more appropriated in 
panel data analysis. Traditional methods such as fixed effects or random effects produce 
inconsistent estimates when the lagged dependent variable enters as a regressor. Due to the 
nature of our dataset (extremely unbalanced when considering certain dimensions), we will 
split our analysis into 15 regressions in the dynamic model. In all of them there will be 
control variables for each dimension. Our results will be conducted using the one-step 
System GMM69.  
For the System GMM to be applicable there must be no evidence of second order 
autocorrelation AR(2). Additional to this, instrument must be valid. To test this we report 
the Hansen test for validity of instruments (Hansen, 1982). This test assumes, under the null 
hypothesis, that instruments are valid and it’s a robust version of the Sargan test70; one 
problem that may occur is that it can be weakened by a proliferation of instruments. We also 
report the number of instruments following Roodman (2009a). 
Table 3.2, Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 presents the regressions within each dimension. 
All of the regressions include control variables for the remaining dimensions. The control 
variable in the educational dimension is the result of the sum of primary and secondary 
schooling years, “School”. In the Technological dimension, variables were constructed 
providing the best estimates; the sum of patents from residents and nonresidents, 
“ln(Patents)”; the sum of trademark from residents and nonresidents, “ln(Trademark)”. 
When necessary, we also summed the total patents and trademarks, “ln(Legal)”; this variable 
give us a general idea of the overall demand for this kind of protection.  
Columns 1 through 5 summarize the results from the labor force. From these results 
we conclude that the higher the share of people working in the services sector the lower will 
be the piracy losses. This can be seen in columns 1, 2 and 4 where the base sector (omitted 
                                                 
69 The two-step System GMM is presented in Annex because the gains from the one-step to the two-step System 
GMM are marginal Soto (2009). In the two-step System GMM we take into account the corrected covariance 
matrix proposed by Windmeijer (2005).  
70 This test is also reported. It´s not affected by the proliferation of instruments, but it’s not robust. 
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variable)71 was the share of people working in the agriculture sector or in the industrial 
sector. In either case the share of people working in the services sector has a negative 
significant impact in the piracy losses. If we use the services sector as the base sector 
(column 3 or 5) the industrial and agricultural sectors have positive and significant impact 
(although the significance of the agricultural sector is not robust across specifications) 
pointing to the same conclusion: the higher the share in these sectors (and lower in the service 
sector) the higher will be the losses due to software piracy. This result was unexpected. 
As for the labor qualifications referred above, we have to omit one of the education 
variables and use it as the base case. In this case the higher the share of workers with tertiary 
education the higher will be the losses due to piracy.  Furthermore, the results indicate that 
is the division between the share of the workers with the tertiary education and the others 
that matters. This can be seen in columns 1 and 2 when we consider the share with primary 
education; the estimated coefficient of the share with secondary education is close to zero 
and non-significant. The same result is obtained in column 4 when we use the secondary 
education share as the base and analyze the estimate of the share with primary of education.  
This result is in line with what we expected. 
Another important variable present in the labor force is the youth unemployment. 
This variable combined with the level of education of the labor force and access to 
technology will determine the use of software at home. This variable has always a positive 
impact, but it was significant only in regressions 1 through 5 in which labor force and type 
of employment were present. There are other types of unemployment. Some examples are 
the long-run unemployment and total unemployment. The first variable was not suited as the 
reduced number of observations made difficult to estimate with this methodology. As an 
additional robustness check we included total unemployment; significance was not present, 
nevertheless it maintains the positive coefficient. 
 
 
 
                                                 
71 We should note that the sum of the three sectors adds up to 1, so we cannot have the three variables 
simultaneously in the regression due to multicolinarity. In this case we consider one sector as the base one (and 
omit it from the regression) and the coefficients of the others sectors are the differential impacts between each 
sector and the base sector. 
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Table 3.2 Dynamic model using one-step System GMM 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
L.ln(losses) 0.572*** 0.513*** 0.586*** 0.579*** 0.460*** 
 (6.930) (5.121) (6.310) (7.081) (4.072) 
ln(GDP) 0.282** 0.308*** 0.326*** 0.274** 0.404** 
 (2.524) (3.009) (3.397) (2.563) (2.312) 
ln(Mobile) -0.005 -0.025    
 (-0.124) (-0.627)    
ln(Mobile)*Change  0.348**    
  (2.168)    
ln(Phone)   0.148 0.054  
   (0.701) (0.347)  
ln(Phone)*Change   0.018 -0.102  
   (0.098) (-0.600)  
ln(Fbis)     0.026 
     (0.731) 
ln(Fbis)*Change     0.066 
     (1.014) 
Empagric   0.016* -0.021 0.019** 
   (1.720) (-1.473) (2.368) 
Empind 0.021* 0.016 0.026**  0.028** 
 (1.727) (1.410) (2.344)  (2.523) 
Empserv -0.012** -0.013**  -0.033***  
 (-2.159) (-1.972)  (-3.029)  
Labp   -0.014* 0.004 -0.015* 
   (-1.734) (0.685) (-1.729) 
Labs -0.004 -0.004 -0.014*  -0.013* 
 (-0.756) (-0.604) (-1.753)  (-1.839) 
Labt 0.016** 0.009  0.021**  
 (2.009) (0.821)  (2.328)  
Unempyouth 0.013** 0.014** 0.012** 0.013** 0.010** 
 (2.279) (2.522) (2.158) (2.241) (2.182) 
ln(Patents) -0.006 0.001 -0.022 -0.007 -0.001 
 (-0.199) (0.022) (-0.535) (-0.200) (-0.049) 
ln(Trademarks) 0.071 0.090** 0.048 0.069 0.054 
 (1.481) (2.042) (0.718) (1.195) (0.797) 
School 0.021 0.048 -0.153 -0.011 -0.034 
 (0.220) (0.464) (-1.161) (-0.119) (-0.248) 
TradFreed 0.009   0.009 0.001 
 (1.410)   (1.222) (0.070) 
BusFreed  0.002 0.008   
  (0.643) (1.587)   
Change 0.413*** -1.000* 0.351 0.749 0.359** 
 (4.124) (-1.657) (0.497) (1.161) (2.349) 
Constant -7.755*** -8.072*** -6.466*** -5.597** -8.861*** 
 (-2.993) (-3.034) (-2.695) (-2.243) (-2.880) 
Observations 501 501 501 507 415 
Countries 61 61 61 61 59 
AR1 -4.596 -4.334 -4.489 -4.591 -3.587 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
AR2 -0.0340 0.417 -0.441 -0.339 0.300 
p-value [0.973] [0.677] [0.659] [0.735] [0.764] 
Instruments 53 53 53 53 51 
Sargan 80.39 78.18 78.64 73.51 79.39 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Hansen 42.47 37.52 40.84 37.26 42.20 
p-value [0.180] [0.311] [0.195] [0.321] [0.107] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(losses). Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** represent statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. L.ln(losses) and L.ln(GDP) were considered as two endogenous instruments. Only one 
lag was used as instrument. 
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Columns 6 through 10 show the different variables in the Technological dimension. 
Patents and trademarks offer protection for those who innovate; this protection can be done 
by residents or by non-residents that will protect their product.  In columns 9 and 10 
ln(Patents) has a significant positive impact on the losses, as ln(Trademarks) is non-
significant. When a disaggregated analysis is made on the origin of patents and trademarks 
applicants (columns 6 to 8) the trademarks continue to not have a significant impact in losses. 
In terms of the number of patents is the number of patents done by residents that have a 
significant impact on losses. A final variable that was found to have a strong effect in 
deterring software piracy losses was R&D, which has always a negative coefficient. This can 
indicates that investment is being implemented correctly, namely in writing software code 
that protects software from hackers. 
The positive coefficient of patents and the negative coefficient of R&D at first may 
appear odd, but it can be explained as follows: a company makes a breakthrough after many 
years of research, what will allow increased productivity, efficiency and protection for 
different components of the company products. This can also be extended to other products 
from other companies. In order to protect this discovery, the company will file a patent of 
the discovery that will allow some level of protection from other companies and from 
potential pirates. The existence of the patent by itself it’s not synonym of protection; national 
Intellectual Property offices must also be able to enforce and protect them. The positive 
coefficient can be explained by the existence of patents that are the result of research, but 
the lack of power exerted by national IP offices will not prevent piracy in spite of the 
existence of patents. 
 All regressions control for institutional dimensions. Tests were performed using 
variables that represent institutional factors, the reported ones provide the best estimates. 
Only Freedom from Corruption Index (CorrFreed) (column 8) presented significance. This 
index ranges from 0, high corruption, to 100, no corruption. Results show that low levels of 
corruption leads to less piracy losses. Goel and Nelson (2009) and Andrés and Goel (2011) 
also found that in more corrupt nations, software piracy was higher.  
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Table 3.3 Dynamic model using one-step System GMM (cont.) 
Variables 6 7 8 9 10 
L.ln(losses) 0.514*** 0.610*** 0.552*** 0.544*** 0.541*** 
 (5.457) (6.410) (5.570) (5.028) (4.909) 
ln(GDP) 0.347*** 0.294** 0.448*** 0.387*** 0.387*** 
 (3.033) (2.143) (2.706) (2.843) (2.788) 
ln(Mobile) -0.013 0.075 0.076 0.169** 0.148 
 (-0.145) (0.679) (0.674) (2.166) (1.642) 
ln(Mobile)*Change 0.267* 0.009 -0.025  0.097 
 (1.802) (0.054) (-0.156)  (0.621) 
ln(Fbis) 0.002 -0.016 -0.004 0.003 0.005 
 (0.044) (-0.617) (-0.177) (0.101) (0.174) 
Unemp 0.000 -0.019 -0.013   
 (0.011) (-1.245) (-0.854)   
Unempyouth    0.011 0.011 
    (1.268) (1.316) 
School 0.079 -0.062 0.032 0.058 0.067 
 (0.985) (-0.614) (0.334) (0.553) (0.636) 
R&D -0.307*** -0.134* -0.021 -0.260** -0.265** 
 (-3.188) (-1.901) (-0.290) (-2.396) (-2.500) 
ln(Patres) 0.131**     
 (2.571)     
ln(Patnon) 0.017     
 (0.491)     
ln(Tradres)  0.123 -0.052   
  (1.505) (-0.433)   
ln(Tradnon)  -0.082 0.006   
  (-1.429) (0.098)   
ln(Patents)    0.056** 0.058** 
    (2.009) (2.163) 
ln(Trademarks)    -0.036 -0.037 
    (-0.665) (-0.668) 
CorrFreed   -0.008**   
   (-2.000)   
TradFreed -0.004   0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.586)   (0.127) (-0.141) 
Change -0.664 0.311 0.459 0.345*** -0.062 
 (-1.134) (0.498) (0.719) (2.855) (-0.099) 
Constant -8.148*** -5.597** -9.336*** -9.481*** -9.339*** 
 (-3.327) (-2.561) (-3.267) (-3.377) (-3.313) 
Observations 478 473 472 411 411 
Countries 75 75 75 66 66 
AR1 -3.035 -3.277 -3.345 -3.606 -3.583 
p-value [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
AR2 0.499 0.195 0.309 -0.200 -0.142 
p-value [0.618] [0.846] [0.757] [0.842] [0.887] 
Instruments 51 51 51 51 51 
Sargan 62.12 70.54 67.59 58.87 58.80 
p-value [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.007] [0.005] 
Hansen 35.78 44.43 42.84 33.86 33.36 
p-value [0.385] [0.132] [0.142] [0.523] [0.499] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(losses). Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** represent statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. L.ln(losses) and L.ln(GDP) were considered as two endogenous instruments. Only one 
lag was used as instrument. 
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Regarding education we included financial and non-financial measures. The first 
perspective was never considered in previous studies and, in the second case, variables used 
on previous research were literacy rate and the average years of schooling of people age 25 
and over (Barro & Lee, 2013). Both of these variables have the problem of data availability. 
To overcome this problem we will introduce a proxy variable that indicates the years of 
schooling of both primary and secondary education offered by the educational system of a 
country. This variable is not perfect as it omits the education attained, but it offers us a 
benchmark. Additional to this, we will introduce a variable that indicates spending on 
education. Columns 11 through 15 show the results.  
Columns 11 through 13 present the years of schooling. As in the labor force 
dimension, we include the education of the labor force; results are robust. An increase of 
years of primary and secondary education appears to have a negative impact on piracy losses, 
but only in the first case this variable is significant across all regressions with a coefficient 
of around -0.250.  
The financial aspects of education are presented in columns 14 and 15. Public 
spending on education can go both to public or private institutions and depending on the 
different levels of education different resources are allocated. Public expenditure on 
education has a positive effect and is significant at 1% (column 15). This public spending 
can also go directly to students through direct help in the form of scholarships. There are 
many ways a student can use this help. Some examples are: acquisition of computer, 
software, access to the Internet, etc. This will increase the availability to digital content such 
as music, software and movies. We were expecting a negative impact; nevertheless this may 
indicate that more access to digital content can also increase the availability of illegal 
software. Only with increase awareness this problem can be mitigated.   
Several alternative hypotheses were considered with different variables within the 
dimension that reflect the access to information.  The access to Internet – ln(Net) – has a 
negative and significant effect on losses (columns 14 and 15), while the access to a 
broadband connection has no impact on losses (columns 5 through 10). This is clearly 
unexpected, but seems that access to Internet reduces the losses because of increased 
awareness of the problem by the consumers, because countries with a higher share of people 
connected to the Internet are able to track those who use illicit software, or simply because 
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you can download and buy the software directly from the original company and not from 
local intermediaries - many of them may be selling pirated software. These results are in 
accordance with the findings of Boyce (2011). 
To assess the validity of our findings we also performed regressions in which the 
dependent variable was a fraction of GDP, ln(Losses/GDP) (see Annex III). In these 
regressions only the dimension related to the labor force was statistically significant being 
robust across all regressions. In the technological dimension, patents applicants from 
residents maintained significance. Variable that represents access to information, namely 
Internet users, and mobile subscriptions, maintained statistical significance.  
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Table 3.4 Dynamic model using one-step System GMM (cont.) 
Variables 11 12 13 14 15 
L.ln(losses) 0.555*** 0.551*** 0.541*** 0.577*** 0.617*** 
 (6.908) (7.951) (7.338) (6.213) (6.180) 
ln(GDP) 0.450*** 0.360*** 0.382*** 0.387*** 0.297*** 
 (5.051) (4.260) (4.743) (3.816) (2.914) 
ln(Mobile) -0.019 -0.022 -0.012  0.029 
 (-0.548) (-0.689) (-0.349)  (0.427) 
ln(Mobile)*Change     0.356*** 
     (2.690) 
ln(Net)    -0.100* -0.158* 
    (-1.886) (-1.806) 
R&D    -0.143* -0.181** 
    (-1.785) (-2.123) 
Yschoolpri -0.242* -0.236*** -0.259***   
 (-1.830) (-3.343) (-3.522)   
Yschoolsec -0.037 -0.112 -0.026   
 (-0.272) (-1.267) (-0.245)   
Pubexp    0.150** 0.180*** 
    (2.382) (2.771) 
Labp -0.016** 0.002    
 (-2.473) (0.438)    
Labs -0.021***  -0.010*   
 (-2.576)  (-1.847)   
Labt  0.011* 0.014***   
  (1.890) (2.580)   
Unemp 0.001 -0.010 -0.005 -0.010 0.003 
 (0.054) (-1.014) (-0.484) (-0.682) (0.153) 
ln(Legal) -0.035* -0.005 -0.010 0.010 0.042 
 (-1.788) (-0.207) (-0.363) (0.543) (1.657) 
CorrFreed -0.002   -0.004  
 (-0.655)   (-0.922)  
TradFreed  0.001 0.002   
  (0.190) (0.381)   
FinFreed     -0.002 
     (-0.468) 
Change 0.379*** 0.426*** 0.411*** 0.478*** -1.008* 
 (4.357) (5.414) (4.636) (4.650) (-1.917) 
Constant -6.049*** -5.552*** -6.225*** -8.355*** -6.948*** 
 (-2.988) (-3.414) (-3.764) (-3.992) (-3.381) 
Observations 515 521 515 441 441 
Countries 64 64 64 66 66 
AR1 -4.290 -4.281 -4.145 -3.740 -3.824 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
AR2 -0.387 -0.469 -0.275 -0.552 0.126 
p-value [0.699] [0.639] [0.783] [0.581] [0.900] 
Instruments 55 55 55 47 47 
Sargan 73.64 93.63 80.82 73.21 51.85 
p-value [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.011] 
Hansen 41.64 46.05 44.08 43.78 35.21 
p-value [0.357] [0.203] [0.265] [0.099] [0.276] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(losses). Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** represent statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. L.ln(losses) and L.ln(GDP) were considered as two endogenous 
instruments. Only one lag was used as instrument. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the impact of several dimensions that might explain the 
phenomenon of software piracy losses. Due to the nature of our dataset and the availability 
of information we opted to use a dynamic panel data analysis that could track the growth of 
piracy losses over time. We found that several dimensions could explain this growth; Labor 
Force, Technological, Educational, Access to Information and Institutional.  
The labor force was one of the dimensions considered. Higher levels of education 
resulted in more losses, but a higher share of employment in the service sector has a negative 
impact on losses. This is a result of more access to information by employees with higher 
education and the capability to track illicit content through internal audits in the service 
sector. 
In the technological dimensions, patents and trademarks were analyzed as one of 
the explanations of software piracy. Patents were significant and positive; they grant a 
protection for those who innovate but other factors must be considered (that could explain 
the positive sign) such as the effectiveness of this protection and the punishment for those 
who infringe the law. Our findings suggest that more protection in the form of trademarks 
or patents can in some cases reduce losses. Another variable introduced was R&D, which 
was found to have a negative effect on software piracy losses. 
The results from the education dimensions show that more years of schooling have 
a deterrent effect on piracy. When our analysis turns to financial aspects of education, more 
spending means more piracy losses.  
More Access to information has mixed results on piracy losses. This can be 
explained by the nature of the different devices used to access digital content, for example 
through the Internet.  
The correct functioning of institutions can reduce piracy. Our results show that less 
corruption is associated with lower piracy losses. 
BSA provide some blueprints in order to reduce piracy, namely to “modernize IP Laws 
to account for new innovations”, these innovations that are patented both at home and 
abroad, have different results. Better attention should be given on the origin of patents and 
trademarks, providing better protection. In 2012, the ninth edition of the BSA (2012) global 
piracy study presented some “blueprints” to reduce, or at least mitigate piracy. One of these 
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solutions is the increase of public education and awareness. Results show that more 
education reduces piracy although special attention must be made on educational 
expenditure. Better attention must be done on the different sectors of activity that are the 
building blocks of the economy of a country. 
Although this chapter had provided new insights on the major macroeconomic 
determinants of losses caused by piracy, lack of data on some dimensions reduced the 
number of observations and weakened the possible conclusions. Further analysis using panel 
data and introducing large time span should be followed. Using small group of countries 
such as the European Union, or an in deep analysis of the various dimensions, could provide 
valuable tools for policymakers as changes in education can only be viewed in the long-run. 
Further research introducing additional variables such as taxation must be followed. 
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 Methodology used by the BSA 
To determine the software piracy rates and losses the Business Software Alliance 
has at his disposal huge amounts of information, being able to conduct extensive surveys in 
the population. In the estimates of 2010, presented in the eighth annual BSA study, the BSA 
relied on Ipsos Public Affairs that conducted more than 15000 surveys on business and 
consumer PC users. A brief description of the methodology is presented in the report and 
reproduced here.  
The methodology was the following to obtain piracy rates: 
ܲ݅ݎܽܿݕ ݎܽݐ݁ ൌ ௨௡௟௜௖௘௡௦௘ௗ ௦௢௙௧௪௔௥௘ ௨௡௜௧௦௧௢௧௔௟ ௦௢௙௧௪௔௥௘ ௨௡௜௧௦ ௜௡௦௧௔௟௟௘ௗ                                  (II.3.1) 
 
To obtain the total software units installed it was used the following: 
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܵ݋݂ݐݓܽݎ݁ ܷ݊݅ݐݏ ܫ݊ݏݐ݈݈ܽ݁݀ ൌ #ܲܥݏ ܩ݁ݐݐ݅݊݃ ܵ݋݂ݐݓܽݎ݁ ൈ ܵ݋݂ݐݓܽݎ݁ ܷ݊݅ݐݏ ݌݁ݎܲܥ 
(II.3.2) 
 
The legitimate software units and the unlicensed software units are given by the 
following expressions: 
ܮ݁݃݅ݐ݅݉ܽݐ݁ ܵ݋݂ݐݓܽݎ݁ ܷ݊݅ݐݏ ൌ ௌ௢௙௧௪௔௥௘ ெ௔௥௞௘௧ ௏௔௟௨௘௦஺௩௘௥௔௚௘ ௌ௢௙௧௪௔௥௘ ௎௡௜௧ ௉௥௜௖௘                     (II.3.3) 
ܷ݈݊݅ܿ݁݊ݏ݁݀ ܵ݋݂ݐݓܽݎ݁ ܷ݊݅ݐݏ ൌ ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܵ݋݂ݐݓܽݎ݁ ݑ݊݅ݐݏ ܫ݊ݏݐ݈݈ܽ݁݀ െ
ܮ݁݃݅ݐ݅݉ܽݐ݁ ܵ݋݂ݐݓܽݎ݁ ܷ݊݅ݐݏ                                                                   (II.3.4) 
 
Finally the commercial value of unlicensed software is given by: 
ܥ݋݉݉݁ݎ݈ܿ݅ܽ ܸ݈ܽݑ݁ ൌ #ܷ݈݊݅ܿ݁݊݀ ܵ݋݂ݐݓܽݎ݁ ܷ݊݅ݐݏ ൈ ܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ ܵ݋݂ݐݓܽݎ݁ ܷ݊݅ݐ ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ 
(II.3.5) 
Business Software Alliance uses confidential information to achieve these results; it does 
provide us, in their annually reports, the basic methodology, omitting many variables that 
are used. 
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 Additional regressions 
Table 3.5 Two-step System GMM 
Variables 16 17 18 19 20 
L.ln(losses) 0.598*** 0.475*** 0.538*** 0.583*** 0.442*** 
 (7.044) (3.965) (4.599) (6.395) (2.972) 
ln(GDP) 0.294** 0.333*** 0.386*** 0.301** 0.412** 
 (2.417) (3.323) (2.814) (2.362) (2.221) 
ln(Mobile) -0.008 -0.047    
 (-0.223) (-1.345)    
ln(Mobile)*Change  0.410**    
  (2.095)    
ln(Phone)   0.017 -0.104  
   (0.080) (-0.795)  
ln(Phone)*Change   -0.080 -0.094  
   (-0.340) (-0.579)  
ln(Fbis)     0.040 
     (0.833) 
ln(Fbis)*Change     0.091 
     (1.277) 
Empagric   0.009 -0.030* 0.020* 
   (0.825) (-1.652) (1.651) 
Empind 0.022 0.012 0.021  0.019 
 (1.583) (0.930) (1.196)  (1.420) 
Empserv -0.015* -0.012  -0.040***  
 (-1.806) (-1.552)  (-2.815)  
Labp   -0.010 0.005 -0.006 
   (-0.939) (0.654) (-0.565) 
Labs -0.004 -0.003 -0.012  -0.007 
 (-0.608) (-0.487) (-1.244)  (-0.885) 
Labt 0.021* 0.007  0.024***  
 (1.852) (0.498)  (2.921)  
Unempyouth 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.009 0.012** 0.008* 
 (2.634) (3.164) (1.630) (2.460) (1.806) 
ln(Patents) -0.012 -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 -0.001 
 (-0.305) (-0.150) (-0.212) (-0.079) (-0.026) 
ln(Trademarks) 0.071 0.115** 0.018 0.060 0.050 
 (1.284) (2.257) (0.250) (0.875) (0.681) 
School 0.052 0.093 -0.189 0.048 -0.107 
 (0.389) (1.111) (-0.986) (0.386) (-0.741) 
TradFreed 0.007   0.007 -0.003 
 (0.921)   (1.006) (-0.242) 
BusFreed  0.000 0.005   
  (0.088) (0.827)   
Change 0.370*** -1.209* 0.732 0.676 0.322* 
 (3.091) (-1.709) (0.852) (1.120) (1.896) 
Constant -8.225*** -9.212*** -6.338* -5.908** -8.046*** 
 (-2.864) (-4.066) (-1.934) (-2.338) (-2.803) 
Observations 501 501 501 507 415 
Countries 61 61 61 61 59 
AR1 -3.464 -3.115 -3.391 -3.325 -2.389 
p-value [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.017] 
AR2 -0.0700 0.472 -0.717 -0.468 0.0549 
p-value [0.944] [0.637] [0.474] [0.640] [0.956] 
Instruments 53 53 53 53 51 
Sargan 80.39 78.18 78.64 73.51 79.39 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Hansen 42.47 37.52 40.84 37.26 42.20 
p-value [0.180] [0.311] [0.195] [0.321] [0.107] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(losses). Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** represent statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. L.ln(losses) and L.ln(GDP) were considered as two endogenous 
instruments. Only one lag was used as instrument 
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Table 3.6 Two-step System GMM (cont.) 
Variables 21 22 23 24 25 
L.ln(losses) 0.502*** 0.603*** 0.575*** 0.564*** 0.560*** 
 (4.620) (5.889) (5.418) (4.021) (4.117) 
ln(GDP) 0.365** 0.273* 0.396** 0.385** 0.395** 
 (2.527) (1.761) (2.529) (2.045) (2.197) 
ln(Mobile) -0.042 0.047 0.102 0.082 0.043 
 (-0.441) (0.345) (0.825) (0.802) (0.403) 
ln(Mobile)*Change 0.277* 0.032 -0.022  0.098 
 (1.899) (0.170) (-0.153)  (0.570) 
ln(Fbis) 0.008 -0.027 -0.007 0.008 0.012 
 (0.181) (-0.798) (-0.187) (0.185) (0.284) 
Unemp -0.003 -0.020 -0.004   
 (-0.121) (-1.162) (-0.203)   
Unempyouth    0.012 0.012 
    (0.968) (0.934) 
School 0.146 -0.049 0.053 0.113 0.120 
 (1.475) (-0.415) (0.433) (0.540) (0.566) 
R&D -0.353** -0.091 0.050 -0.320* -0.328* 
 (-2.561) (-0.881) (0.406) (-1.893) (-1.920) 
ln(Patres) 0.148***     
 (2.741)     
ln(Patnon) 0.011     
 (0.273)     
ln(Tradres)  0.150 -0.045   
  (1.346) (-0.345)   
ln(Tradnon)  -0.108 0.035   
  (-1.558) (0.465)   
ln(Patents)    0.057* 0.060* 
    (1.830) (1.808) 
ln(Trademarks)    -0.032 -0.035 
    (-0.417) (-0.464) 
CorrFreed   -0.009*   
   (-1.667)   
TradFreed -0.006   0.004 0.001 
 (-0.648)   (0.360) (0.116) 
Change -0.680 0.251 0.446 0.359** -0.046 
 (-1.087) (0.344) (0.827) (2.480) (-0.064) 
Constant -9.117*** -5.173* -8.861*** -10.085*** -10.052*** 
 (-2.611) (-1.764) (-2.636) (-3.525) (-3.739) 
Observations 478 473 472 411 411 
Countries 75 75 75 66 66 
AR1 -2.790 -2.704 -2.900 -2.385 -2.375 
p-value [0.005] [0.007] [0.004] [0.017] [0.018] 
AR2 0.378 0.0593 0.212 -0.153 -0.0864 
p-value [0.705] [0.953] [0.832] [0.878] [0.931] 
Instruments 51 51 51 51 51 
Sargan 62.12 70.54 67.59 58.87 58.80 
p-value [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.007] [0.005] 
Hansen 35.78 44.43 42.84 33.86 33.36 
p-value [0.385] [0.132] [0.142] [0.523] [0.499] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(losses). Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** represent statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. L.ln(losses) and L.ln(GDP) were considered as two endogenous 
instruments. Only one lag was used as instrument. 
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Table 3.7 Two-step System GMM (cont.) 
Variables 26 27 28 29 30 
L.ln(losses) 0.565*** 0.578*** 0.575*** 0.580*** 0.535*** 
 (5.289) (5.904) (5.429) (4.903) (3.997) 
ln(GDP) 0.422*** 0.291*** 0.339*** 0.384** 0.350** 
 (3.410) (2.904) (2.825) (2.537) (2.275) 
ln(Mobile) -0.001 -0.022 -0.007  -0.040 
 (-0.026) (-0.589) (-0.159)  (-0.574) 
ln(Mobile)*Change     0.415** 
     (2.515) 
ln(Net)    -0.088 -0.064 
    (-1.656) (-0.728) 
R&D    -0.175* -0.226** 
    (-1.842) (-2.466) 
Yschoolpri -0.305** -0.239*** -0.245***   
 (-2.004) (-2.773) (-3.273)   
Yschoolsec -0.040 -0.090 0.013   
 (-0.254) (-0.754) (0.089)   
Pubexp    0.144* 0.198** 
    (1.799) (2.520) 
Labp -0.015** 0.004    
 (-2.417) (0.520)    
Labs -0.024***  -0.012   
 (-2.687)  (-1.628)   
Labt  0.012 0.013**   
  (1.254) (2.036)   
Unemp 0.001 -0.010 -0.004 -0.013 0.007 
 (0.072) (-0.864) (-0.374) (-0.739) (0.383) 
ln(Legal) -0.025 0.019 -0.002 0.006 0.051 
 (-1.108) (0.544) (-0.034) (0.267) (1.390) 
CorrFreed -0.000   -0.002  
 (-0.103)   (-0.405)  
TradFreed  0.005 0.003   
  (0.645) (0.319)   
FinFreed     -0.004 
     (-0.486) 
Change 0.377*** 0.429*** 0.395*** 0.450*** -1.225* 
 (3.713) (4.524) (3.386) (4.562) (-1.833) 
Constant -5.255** -4.801** -5.646** -8.248*** -8.122*** 
 (-2.155) (-2.588) (-2.457) (-2.745) (-2.759) 
Observations 515 521 515 441 441 
Countries 64 64 64 66 66 
AR1 -3.510 -3.497 -3.388 -2.891 -2.374 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.004] [0.018] 
AR2 -0.370 -0.273 -0.189 -0.749 -0.418 
p-value [0.712] [0.785] [0.850] [0.454] [0.676] 
Instruments 55 55 55 47 47 
Sargan 73.64 93.63 80.82 73.21 51.85 
p-value [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.011] 
Hansen 41.64 46.05 44.08 43.78 35.21 
p-value [0.357] [0.203] [0.265] [0.099] [0.276] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(losses). Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** represent statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. L.ln(losses) and L.ln(GDP) were considered as two endogenous 
instruments. Only one lag was used as instrument. 
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Table 3.8 One-Step System GMM for Losses per GDP 
Variables 31 32 33 34 35 
L.ln(Losses/GDP) 0.657*** 0.627*** 0.605*** 0.670*** 0.594*** 
 (5.925) (5.571) (6.148) (7.723) (3.753) 
ln(Mobile) -0.013 -0.027    
 (-0.306) (-0.635)    
ln(Mobile)*Change  0.167    
  (1.378)    
ln(Phone)   -0.131 -0.174  
   (-0.308) (-0.507)  
ln(Phone)*Change   0.070 0.040  
   (0.300) (0.179)  
ln(Fbis)     -0.010 
     (-0.203) 
ln(Fbis)*Change     0.018 
     (0.278) 
Empagric   0.013 -0.003 0.012 
   (0.932) (-0.140) (0.984) 
Empind -0.005 -0.013 0.021  0.026 
 (-0.233) (-0.531) (1.161)  (1.361) 
Empserv -0.014** -0.017**  -0.013  
 (-2.236) (-2.436)  (-0.813)  
Labp   -0.011 0.006 -0.019** 
   (-1.065) (0.879) (-2.304) 
Labs -0.006 -0.004 -0.016*  -0.023*** 
 (-1.021) (-0.552) (-1.760)  (-2.686) 
Labt 0.010 0.008  0.020**  
 (1.213) (0.902)  (2.169)  
Unempyouth 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 
 (2.883) (2.680) (3.619) (3.003) (3.409) 
School -0.075 -0.111 -0.057 0.071 0.218 
 (-0.370) (-0.527) (-0.267) (0.413) (0.949) 
ln(Patents) 0.033 0.027 0.047 0.018 0.014 
 (0.909) (0.707) (0.880) (0.367) (0.337) 
ln(Trademarks) -0.044 -0.025 -0.061 -0.026 -0.016 
 (-0.832) (-0.502) (-0.760) (-0.310) (-0.181) 
TradFreed 0.001   -0.003 0.010 
 (0.220)   (-0.451) (0.957) 
BusFreed  0.003 0.011*   
  (0.439) (1.793)   
Change 0.305*** -0.406 0.060 0.082 0.282 
 (2.887) (-0.808) (0.068) (0.100) (1.461) 
Constant -0.935 -0.704 -2.506 -2.593 -6.274 
 (-0.326) (-0.238) (-1.043) (-0.971) (-1.638) 
Observations 501 501 501 507 415 
Countries 61 61 61 61 59 
AR1 -4.032 -4.118 -4.079 -3.975 -3.205 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
AR2 -0.479 -0.246 -0.570 -0.484 0.520 
p-value [0.632] [0.806] [0.569] [0.628] [0.603] 
Instruments 51 51 51 51 50 
Sargan 75.79 74.86 63.56 73.20 61.96 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Hansen 35.39 35.21 35.49 36.49 35.64 
p-value [0.402] [0.364] [0.352] [0.310] [0.301] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(losses/GDP). Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** represent 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. L.ln(Losses/GDP) was considered as an endogenous 
instruments. Lags 1 through 3 were used (columns 31 to 34).  
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Table 3.9 One-Step System GMM for Losses per GDP (cont.) 
Variables 36 37 38 39 40 
L.ln(Losses/GDP) 0.649*** 0.687*** 0.616*** 0.611*** 0.611*** 
 (7.595) (9.005) (9.024) (5.304) (5.237) 
ln(Mobile) 0.045 0.114 0.097 0.291* 0.278 
 (0.500) (0.944) (0.634) (1.690) (1.530) 
ln(Mobile)*Change 0.128 0.049 0.067  0.033 
 (0.893) (0.401) (0.536)  (0.176) 
ln(Fbis) -0.023 -0.046** -0.037 -0.036 -0.035 
 (-0.682) (-2.054) (-1.450) (-0.846) (-0.830) 
Unemp 0.009 -0.002 0.008   
 (0.501) (-0.121) (0.328)   
Unempyouth    0.016* 0.016* 
    (1.901) (1.936) 
School -0.011 -0.074 -0.026 0.013 0.008 
 (-0.127) (-0.938) (-0.288) (0.096) (0.056) 
R&D -0.163** -0.053 0.059 -0.181* -0.186 
 (-2.568) (-0.798) (0.562) (-1.714) (-1.641) 
ln(Patres) 0.053     
 (1.613)     
ln(Patnon) -0.004     
 (-0.201)     
ln(Tradres)  0.057 -0.019   
  (1.333) (-0.252)   
ln(Tradnon)  -0.040 0.007   
  (-0.817) (0.107)   
ln(Patents)    0.047 0.049 
    (1.623) (1.510) 
ln(Trademarks)    -0.048 -0.049 
    (-1.049) (-1.038) 
TradFreed -0.003   0.001 0.001 
 (-0.344)   (0.126) (0.093) 
CorrFreed   -0.005   
   (-1.389)   
Change -0.253 0.060 0.036 0.239* 0.101 
 (-0.421) (0.122) (0.069) (1.717) (0.133) 
Constant -2.818** -2.134* -2.801* -4.282** -4.162* 
 (-2.256) (-1.785) (-1.921) (-2.061) (-1.900) 
Observations 478 473 472 411 411 
Countries 75 75 75 66 66 
AR1 -3.929 -4.168 -3.959 -3.179 -3.128 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
AR2 0.499 0.259 0.329 -0.0575 -0.0327 
p-value [0.617] [0.796] [0.742] [0.954] [0.974] 
Instruments 50 61 61 50 50 
Sargan 75.71 91.85 88.29 57.51 57.90 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Hansen 46.08 54.98 50.35 38.83 38.20 
p-value [0.081] [0.171] [0.270] [0.301] [0.284] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(losses/GDP). Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** represent 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. L.ln(Losses/GDP) was considered as an endogenous 
instruments. Lags 1 through 3 were used (column 36, 39 and 40) and lags 1 through 4 were used in column 37 
and 38. 
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Table 3.10 One-Step System GMM for Losses per GDP (cont.) 
Variables 41 42 43 44 45 
L.ln(Losses/GDP) 0.540*** 0.595*** 0.530*** 0.656*** 0.686*** 
 (4.456) (5.514) (4.427) (6.100) (6.139) 
ln(Mobile) -0.006 -0.035 -0.018  0.019 
 (-0.150) (-1.209) (-0.501)  (0.170) 
ln(Mobile)*Change     0.283** 
     (2.364) 
ln(Net)    -0.114** -0.154 
    (-2.428) (-1.375) 
R&D    -0.019 -0.097 
    (-0.267) (-1.289) 
Yschoolpri -0.244 -0.045 -0.196   
 (-1.104) (-0.312) (-1.069)   
Yschoolsec 0.029 0.104 0.074   
 (0.168) (0.794) (0.447)   
Pubexp    0.167 0.177 
    (1.640) (1.478) 
Labp -0.013 0.004    
 (-1.420) (0.786)    
Labs -0.023**  -0.011**   
 (-2.301)  (-1.963)   
Labt  0.016** 0.013*   
  (2.272) (1.716)   
Unemp 0.029** 0.017 0.025* 0.013 0.021 
 (2.010) (1.539) (1.881) (0.885) (1.212) 
ln(Legal) 0.003 -0.004 0.002 0.022 0.030 
 (0.137) (-0.211) (0.088) (1.155) (1.498) 
CorrFreed 0.002   -0.002  
 (0.268)   (-0.655)  
TradFreed  -0.004 -0.000   
  (-0.894) (-0.039)   
FinFreed     -0.003 
     (-0.531) 
Change 0.377*** 0.334*** 0.380*** 0.378*** -0.824* 
 (3.354) (3.452) (3.464) (3.258) (-1.682) 
Constant -1.451 -3.740** -3.073* -3.528*** -3.344*** 
 (-0.874) (-2.474) (-1.789) (-3.575) (-3.553) 
Observations 515 521 515 441 441 
Countries 64 64 64 66 66 
AR1 -4.479 -4.682 -4.276 -4.216 -3.814 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
AR2 -0.459 -0.360 -0.325 -1.040 -0.575 
p-value [0.646] [0.719] [0.746] [0.298] [0.565] 
Instruments 53 53 53 57 46 
Sargan 79.42 93.71 84.29 63.31 46.60 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 0.0297 0.0357 
Hansen 47.10 44.32 43.84 53.65 40.73 
p-value [0.148] [0.222] [0.238] [0.151] [0.113] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(losses/GDP). Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** represent 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. L.ln(Losses/GDP) was considered as an endogenous 
instruments. Lags 1 through 3 were used (columns 41, 42, 43 and 45) and lags 1 through 4 (column 44).  
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Table 3.11 Two-Step System GMM for Losses per GDP 
Variables 46 47 48 49 50 
L.ln(Losses/GDP) 0.649*** 0.660*** 0.640*** 0.679*** 0.632*** 
 (6.044) (6.334) (6.812) (6.613) (4.543) 
ln(Mobile) -0.007 -0.018    
 (-0.204) (-0.430)    
ln(Mobile)*Change  0.162    
  (1.421)    
ln(Phone)   -0.196 -0.193  
   (-0.406) (-0.452)  
ln(Phone)*Change   0.069 -0.046  
   (0.280) (-0.196)  
ln(Fbis)     0.002 
     (0.026) 
ln(Fbis)*Change     -0.025 
     (-0.517) 
Empagric   0.011 -0.000 0.011 
   (0.842) (-0.018) (1.083) 
Empind -0.014** -0.018**  -0.008  
 (-2.209) (-2.170)  (-0.445)  
Empserv -0.011 -0.016 0.015  0.010 
 (-0.481) (-0.744) (0.631)  (0.419) 
Labp   -0.012 0.005 -0.020***
   (-1.222) (0.875) (-2.824) 
Labs -0.006 -0.006 -0.018**  -0.020** 
 (-1.122) (-0.810) (-2.215)  (-2.309) 
Labt 0.010 0.009  0.015  
 (1.000) (1.151)  (1.355)  
Unempyouth 0.024** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.023** 
 (2.479) (2.737) (2.778) (2.718) (2.662) 
School -0.127 -0.159 -0.017 0.032 0.117 
 (-0.622) (-1.241) (-0.072) (0.202) (0.547) 
ln(Patents) 0.033 0.035 0.048 0.028 0.021 
 (0.699) (0.634) (0.753) (0.619) (0.681) 
ln(Trademarks) -0.039 -0.041 -0.052 -0.035 -0.016 
 (-0.716) (-0.688) (-0.714) (-0.465) (-0.186) 
BusFreed  0.001 0.008   
  (0.142) (1.025)   
TradFreed 0.003   0.001 0.012 
 (0.453)   (0.082) (0.830) 
Change 0.278*** -0.417 0.011 0.363 0.321 
 (3.008) (-0.887) (0.012) (0.419) (1.567) 
Constant -0.335 0.652 -2.093 -2.336 -4.506 
 (-0.109) (0.252) (-0.741) (-0.733) (-1.172) 
Observations 501 501 501 507 415 
Countries 61 61 61 61 59 
AR1 -3.509 -3.696 -3.543 -3.348 -2.680 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
AR2 -0.630 -0.335 -0.615 -0.719 0.162 
p-value [0.529] [0.738] [0.539] [0.472] [0.871] 
Instruments 51 51 51 51 50 
Sargan 75.79 74.86 63.56 73.20 61.96 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Hansen 35.39 35.21 35.49 36.49 35.64 
p-value [0.402] [0.364] [0.352] [0.310] [0.301] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(losses/GDP). Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** represent 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. L.ln(Losses/GDP) was considered as an endogenous 
instruments. . Lags 1 through 3 were used (columns 46 to 50).  
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Table 3.12 Two-Step System GMM for Losses per GDP (cont.) 
Variables 51 52 53 54 55 
L.ln(Losses/GDP) 0.644*** 0.680*** 0.571*** 0.614*** 0.612*** 
 (6.213) (7.534) (5.959) (4.504) (4.489) 
ln(Mobile) 0.028 0.155 0.180 0.224 0.202 
 (0.213) (1.329) (1.078) (1.005) (0.968) 
ln(Mobile)*Change 0.094 0.016 0.069  0.061 
 (0.534) (0.109) (0.602)  (0.334) 
ln(Fbis) -0.025 -0.052* -0.057* -0.025 -0.020 
 (-0.617) (-1.757) (-1.843) (-0.535) (-0.409) 
Unemp 0.004 0.001 0.017   
 (0.160) (0.051) (0.892)   
Unempyouth    0.016 0.016 
    (1.521) (1.548) 
School 0.005 -0.066 -0.033 -0.047 -0.061 
 (0.052) (-0.799) (-0.322) (-0.266) (-0.350) 
R&D -0.152* -0.034 0.067 -0.208 -0.221 
 (-1.853) (-0.393) (0.476) (-1.627) (-1.539) 
ln(Patres) 0.052     
 (1.569)     
ln(Patnon) 0.001     
 (0.062)     
ln(Tradres)  0.054 0.009   
  (0.972) (0.116)   
ln(Tradnon)  -0.038 0.005   
  (-0.589) (0.057)   
ln(Patents)    0.047 0.049 
    (1.588) (1.613) 
ln(Trademarks)    -0.047 -0.051 
    (-1.137) (-1.215) 
TradFreed -0.000   0.002 0.001 
 (-0.005)   (0.193) (0.079) 
CorrFreed   -0.005   
   (-1.048)   
Change -0.125 0.200 0.083 0.218 -0.042 
 (-0.180) (0.332) (0.181) (1.588) (-0.054) 
Constant -3.141** -2.487 -3.740** -3.286 -2.911 
 (-1.986) (-1.597) (-2.076) (-1.406) (-1.284) 
Observations 478 473 472 411 411 
Countries 75 75 75 66 66 
AR1 -3.193 -3.516 -3.279 -2.495 -2.465 
p-value [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.013] [0.014] 
AR2 0.344 0.314 0.480 -0.219 -0.224 
p-value [0.731] [0.753] [0.631] [0.827] [0.823] 
Instruments 50 61 61 50 50 
Sargan 75.71 91.85 88.29 57.51 57.90 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Hansen 46.08 54.98 50.35 38.83 38.20 
p-value [0.081] [0.171] [0.270] [0.301] [0.284] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(losses/GDP). Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** represent 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. L.ln(Losses/GDP) was considered as an endogenous 
instruments. Lags 1 through 3 were used (column 51, 54 and 55) and lags 1 through 4 were used in column 52 
and 53. 
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Table 3.13 Two-Step System GMM for Losses per GDP (Cont.) 
Variables 56 57 58 59 60 
L.ln(Losses/GDP) 0.593*** 0.609*** 0.538*** 0.644*** 0.694*** 
 (4.012) (4.887) (4.375) (4.835) (5.021) 
ln(Mobile) -0.006 -0.031 -0.024  0.036 
 (-0.156) (-0.833) (-0.536)  (0.209) 
ln(Mobile)*Change     0.339* 
     (1.726) 
ln(Net)    -0.098** -0.192 
    (-2.328) (-1.218) 
R&D    -0.011 -0.125 
    (-0.103) (-1.204) 
Yschoolpri -0.176 -0.001 -0.129   
 (-0.754) (-0.009) (-0.686)   
Yschoolsec 0.072 0.153 0.151   
 (0.364) (0.915) (0.710)   
Pubexp    0.139 0.174 
    (1.618) (1.227) 
Labp -0.013 0.003    
 (-1.356) (0.505)    
Labs -0.023**  -0.011   
 (-2.111)  (-1.589)   
Labt  0.015 0.013   
  (1.518) (1.228)   
Unemp 0.030** 0.020* 0.025** 0.015 0.031 
 (2.233) (1.666) (2.035) (0.885) (1.409) 
ln(Legal) 0.013 0.012 0.025 0.012 0.030 
 (0.455) (0.473) (0.745) (0.533) (0.923) 
CorrFreed 0.002   -0.003  
 (0.375)   (-0.739)  
TradFreed  -0.002 0.004   
  (-0.222) (0.373)   
FinFreed     -0.003 
     (-0.433) 
Change 0.354*** 0.310*** 0.364*** 0.364*** -1.028 
 (2.650) (3.027) (3.053) (3.016) (-1.280) 
Constant -1.904 -4.642* -4.550* -3.301*** -3.286*** 
 (-1.000) (-1.930) (-1.713) (-3.380) (-3.585) 
Observations 515 521 515 441 441 
Countries 64 64 64 66 66 
AR1 -3.261 -3.282 -3.229 -3.166 -2.736 
p-value [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.006] 
AR2 -0.313 -0.338 -0.305 -1.058 -0.694 
p-value [0.755] [0.735] [0.760] [0.290] [0.488] 
Instruments 53 53 53 57 46 
Sargan 79.42 93.71 84.29 63.31 46.60 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.030] [0.036] 
Hansen 47.10 44.32 43.84 53.65 40.73 
p-value [0.148] [0.222] [0.238] [0.151] [0.113] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(losses/GDP). Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** represent 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. L.ln(Losses/GDP) was considered as an endogenous 
instruments. Lags 1 through 3 were used (columns 56, 57, 58 and 60) and lags 1 through 4 (column 59).  
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 List of countries in the sample 
 
Table 3.14 List of countries in the sample 
Western Europe Eastern Europe America Middle East and Africa Asia Pacific 
Austria Albania Argentina Algeria Australia 
Belgium Armenia Bolivia Egypt China 
Denmark Azerbaijan Brazil Israel Hong Kong 
Finland Bosnia and Herzegovina Canada Jordan India 
France Bulgaria Chile South Africa Indonesia 
Germany Croatia Colombia Morocco Japan 
Greece Czech Republic Costa Rica Tunisia New Zealand 
Iceland Estonia Ecuador Turkey The Philippines
Ireland Hungary Guatemala Mauritius Saudi Arabia 
Italy Romania Panama  Vietnam 
Norway Russia Paraguay  South Korea 
The Netherlands Latvia Peru  Pakistan 
Poland Lithuania United States  Singapore 
Portugal Slovakia Nicaragua  Sri Lanka 
Cyprus Slovenia Uruguay  Thailand 
Malta Ukraine Mexico  Malaysia 
Luxembourg Kazakhstan    
Spain Serbia    
United Kingdom Moldova    
Sweden     
Switzerland     
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Chapter 4  Effects of taxation on software piracy 
across the European Union 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*A first version of this chapter was presented at the 16th annual Infer Conference, Pescara, 
May 28-31, 2014.  
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4.1 Introduction 
European Union is characterized by a high level of personal taxation and, at the same 
time, countries in the Euro Area face budgetary restrictions that prevent lowering this tax. 
Taxation will affect household disposable income. This will reflect in its purchase decision 
towards the acquisition of consumer goods such as software. Due to this we will analyze the 
impact that personal income tax (PIT) has on software piracy levels, as household taxation 
can contribute to the shadow economy (Schneider, Buehn, & Montenegro, 2010).  
Being able to disaggregate the different taxation levels among different incomes that 
represent households we try to answer the following questions: 
i) Reducing taxation can prevent the software piracy phenomenon? 
ii) If yes, how to implement this reduction on the different households that 
represent potential software buyers. 
iii) Finally we will try to ask if this reduction must be differentiated based on the 
different EU regions that also represent different levels of development.     
The personal income tax is very heterogeneous among countries; it is progressive and 
in some cases can exceed 50% of annual income.  
Levels of household income can affect their purchasing decisions; as their incomes 
increase non-essential goods such as video games will be sought. On the other side we have 
households with low income that cannot afford these types of goods. Being the personal 
income tax progressive, households with higher income will be more affected by taxes. With 
the disposable income that remains after taxes, they will face the decision on what type of 
goods to purchase. It can happen that more taxes will shift the consumption from legal to 
illicit software. 
Up to our knowledge the effects of taxation on software piracy were not studied on 
previous empirical research. This work attempts to see the relationship between the level of 
taxation of workers and the level of software piracy in a country. Additionally, other taxes 
will be considered, reflecting indirect taxation and social security contributions made by 
households. We will use Eurostat data which provides estimates from different levels of 
income that represent different types of households. With this division it’s possible to 
measure thirteen types of households that vary according to marital status and number of 
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children’s. Households represent potential buyers or pirates of software. Our sample is 
constituted by the European Union over the period of 1996 to 2010.  
The level of personal income tax in a country is an aggregated variable, measuring 
only the overall tax rate, e.g. the rates applied. This variable is aggregated and, to understand 
better the effects of taxation on households, we introduce the effective levels of direct 
taxation on these households that include both the personal income tax and social security 
contributions. Another important variable introduced was the relative importance of these 
taxes on total taxation72. 
We found that the weight of taxation on GDP, namely the taxes on consumption, 
increase piracy. The results suggest that there is room to increase the importance of corporate 
taxation, while an increase on indirect taxation leads to more piracy.  
Section 4.2 describes the structure of taxes in the European Union and briefly describes 
the personal income tax, value added tax and corporate income tax. Section 4.3 describes the 
variables used and presents some summary statistics. In section 4.4 we test the presence of 
unit roots of the variables; we provide the econometric specification and present the effects 
of taxation on the different types of households. Furthermore we also consider the relative 
importance of the three main taxes analyzed in section 4.2 as a share of total taxation. Finally, 
section 4.5 concludes. 
  
                                                 
72 We also compared the different regions of the European Union, namely the New Countries and Countries 
outside the Euro Zone and the results were maintained and were significant. 
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4.2 The structure of taxes in the European Union  
This section describes the general tax policy of the European Union focusing 
essentially on three taxes; value added tax (VAT), corporate income tax (CIT) and personal 
income tax (PIT). This tax policy derives from the treaty establishing the European 
Community, namely, the article 3, which eliminates “Customs duties (…) and of all other 
measures having equivalent effect” between Member States, and try to “ensuring that 
competition in the common market is not distorted”; article 93 which deals with indirect 
taxation; other taxes have their base legislation on articles 94, 96 and 97, which includes 
corporate income tax and personal income tax. 
The Community pursues general objectives due to the creation of the single market 
and the monetary union. These are:  (i) preventing huge differences in indirect taxation to 
prevent distorting competition within the single market; (ii) to fill the gaps in the legislation 
that sometimes permit tax evasion and to prevent or mitigate double taxation; (iii) to prevent 
the harmful effect of tax competition, namely the migration of both firms and persons to 
countries with lower taxation. 
The final objective of this tax policy is to not distort competition among Member 
States and, at the same time, promote financial sustainability. The Maastricht treaty 
introduced some important aspects, such as the limitation of Government’s ability to finance 
public expenditure by borrowing.  
The Stability and Growth Pact imposes to the participating Member States of the 
European Union a budget deficit lower than 3% of GDP. During the process of integration 
towards the Euro, countries had to prevent movements above 2.25% relative to ECU73 
(European Currency Unit) which was a fictional currency composed by the currencies of the 
Member States. Later on, in 1993, the bandwidth increased to 15% as a result of the 1992 
crisis of the European Monetary System. Another important rule is that the annual average 
inflation should be no more than 1.5% above than the verified in the three EU Member States 
with the lowest inflation rate. Public debt must be lower than 60% or presenting a declining 
pattern. The final criteria stated that the long-term interest rates should not be more than 
                                                 
73Europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/introducing_euro_practical_aspects/I25
007_pt.htm  
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2.0% above than the average of the 3 EU Member States with the lowest ones. The next 
subsections describe these taxes in detail. 
 
 The Value Added Tax in the EU  
In May 2001 the Commission published the “Tax policy in the European Union - 
Priorities for the years ahead”. The main conclusion of the report is that a “high degree of 
harmonization is essential in the indirect tax field”. The transitory system of VAT was 
“complicated susceptible to fraud and out of date”. 
The treaty establishing the European Community, art 93, provides the basis for the 
harmonization of indirect taxation (VAT). In 11 April of 1967 was published the first 
directive of VAT, which stated that all Member States must replace their whole indirect 
taxation by a common system. The goal of this publication was of “de-taxing” of exports 
and “re-taxing” of imports. 
More recently, in 2006, was published the VAT directive (see Council Directive 
(2006/112/EC)). This directive amended the sixth VAT directive of 1977 (see Sixth Council 
Directive (77/388/EEC)) of 17 May, combining in a single document all the relevant 
legislation that was previously scattered. 
With respect to the rate of VAT, Member States must apply rates within a 
predetermined band. The minimum standard rate is 15%, subject to review every two years. 
Member States have the option to apply one or two rates called “reduced rates” that must be 
over 5%; the goods in which the reduced rates are applied are listed in Annex H of the 
amended sixth VAT directive.  
Member States must abolish “luxury” or higher rates. Due to the fact that we are in 
a transitional system of VAT, there exist derogations for certain Member States; they can 
apply a “zero rate”, a “super-reduced” rate or a “parking” rate. The maximum standard rate 
allowed is 25%, which is in vigor on Denmark and Sweden (see COM (331)). Table 4.1 
presents the Standard VAT rate. Overall, small variations on VAT are verified, being the 
minimum standard rate applied in Luxembourg. On average in the European Union, the 
average VAT rate is around 21%.  
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Table 4.1 Standard VAT rate applied in 2012 
Country VAT  
Belgium 21 
Bulgaria 20 
Czech Republic 20 
Denmark 25 
Cyprus 17 
Germany 19 
Estonia 20 
Ireland 23 
Greece 23 
Spain 18 
France 21.2 
Italy 21 
Latvia 22 
Lithuania 21 
Luxembourg 15 
Hungary 27 
Malta 18 
Netherlands 19 
Austria 20 
Poland 23 
Portugal 23 
Romania 24 
Slovenia 20 
Slovakia 20 
Finland 23 
Sweden 25 
UK 17.5 
EU Average 21,08 
Notes: Standard tax rate is reported. Results are based on Taxation trends in European Union 2012 edition. EU 
Average is a simple mean of the European Union Countries. 
 
 
 
 Corporate Income Tax in the EU 
Taxation of Companies is generally described in art. 94. The treaty doesn’t impose 
rules directly. Instead, there are bilateral tax treaties involving both Member States and third 
countries that fill this gap in legislation. The main goal of this legislation is to prevent tax 
evasion and elimination of double taxation. In 1990 it was published the “Guidelines for 
company taxation” (SEC (90) 601, 1990) which focused on the mergers directive (see 
Council Directive (90/434/EEC)), the parent companies and subsidiaries directive (see 
Corrigendum to Council Directive (90/435/EEC)) and the arbitration procedure convention 
(90/436/EEC). 
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Over the years it was proposed that the rates were placed within a band. Initially, in 
1975, the Commission published a draft in which the rates were placed between 45% and 
55%. In 1999 the “Report of the Committee of independent Experts on Company Taxation” 
recommended a harmonization of corporate taxation, being the rates between 30% and 40%. 
Table 4.2 presents the corporate income tax (CIT) applied to firms’ profits. The CIT 
correspond in many countries to one quarter of the taxable profit. We also have that on 
average 20% of profits are taxed. 
 
Table 4.2 Corporate Income Tax rate applied in 2012 
Country CIT 
Belgium 33.99 
Bulgaria 10 
Czech Republic 19 
Denmark 25 
Cyprus 10 
Germany 15 
Estonia 21 
Ireland 12.5 
Greece 20 
Spain 20 
France 33.33 
Italy 27.5 
Latvia 15 
Lithuania 15 
Luxembourg 28.8 
Hungary 19 
Malta 35 
Netherlands 25 
Austria 25 
Poland 19 
Portugal 25 
Romania 16 
Slovenia 20 
Slovakia 19 
Finland 24.5 
Sweden 26.3 
UK 24 
EU Average 19,85 
Notes: Nominal tax applied to CIT. Results based on Taxation trends in European Union 2012 edition. EU 
Average is a simple mean of the European Union Countries. 
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 The Personal Income Tax in the EU 
Personal income tax was left to the Member States to legislate, even in the situation 
of full integration74. Nevertheless, this tax policy established some actions, namely 
elimination of tax obstacles to cross-border activities (e.g. elimination or at least mitigation 
of double taxation). In the absence of harmonization, the European Court of Justice stated 
that the fundamental Treaty principles must be respected on the free movement of workers, 
services and capital, and the freedom of establishment (Articles 39, 43, 49 and 56 of the EC 
Treaty). Discrimination on the basis of nationality is forbidden. The treaty also states that 
every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States (Article 18 of the Treaty). The personal income tax is legislated by each 
country central authority (Central Governments), and in some cases such as in Germany, the 
local authorities receive a large share of this tax (the federal government and Länder 
Government receives 45% each and municipalities receives 15% of total taxation). Due to 
the large heterogeneity of legislation and rates applied across the European Union, we will 
only discuss some important aspects of this tax. 
We can classify the personal income tax on three groups75 on the basis on the tax 
complexity. The first group of countries has a flat tax rate (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden). The 
second group of countries is where the top rate is 50% or more (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Sweden and UK). Finally the third group of countries is characterized by a 
large number of brackets or “special cases” (Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland and Cyprus).  
In the third group referred, an important characteristic of this tax is the amount of 
taxable income within each bracket. Sometimes the difference of taxable income between 
the lowest tax rate and the highest tax bracket is high, like, for instance in France. In Belgium 
this gap is lower. Another feature of this tax is the taxable income within each bracket. To 
understand these characteristics we provide some examples for 2010.  
France had 5 brackets; in the fourth, the applicable rate was 30% for an income that 
range from 26 420 to 70 829 euros; a total amount of 44 409 euros was taxed at this rate. 
                                                 
74 See "Tax Policy in the European Union - Priorities for the years ahead" (COM, 2001 (260) 260) of 23 May 
2001 
75 This classification was based on “Taxation trends in the European Union” 2011 edition 
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Portugal had 8 brackets; the equivalent one was the fourth at 35,5% from an income ranging 
from 18 375 to 42 259 euros; a total of 23 884 euros was taxed at this rate.  In Belgium, with 
5 brackets, the equivalent one was the second at 30%; it ranged from 7 900 to 11 240 euros; 
only 3 340 euros were taxed at this rate. From these three examples it can be seen that taxes 
are heterogeneous. For Belgium a rate of 50% was applicable to income higher than 34 330€. 
France had a tax of 41% applicable to income more than 70 830€ and Portugal had a tax of 
46,5% for income higher than 153 300€.  
 
 
4.2.3.1 The Effective taxation level on households 
Although the taxes shown until now appear to be high, the final tax that households 
pay also includes the social security contribution. Higher levels of taxation can also mean 
higher social protection, so people are willing to accept such fact and obey social norms. To 
the personal income tax we must sum the contributions to social security that are mandatory; 
they can range from 10% in case of employees, to more than 20% in the case of employers 
but also we must subtract deductions that the different tax legal systems allow. This will 
result in the effective taxation levels of households that will be used in the empirical analysis.  
Contributions to social security vary greatly among countries. In some situations employees 
must pay more than 20% related to contributions to social security systems; Germany, 
Slovenia and Slovakia are some examples76. Rates paid by employers are even bigger, 
accounting to more than 30%, in Slovakia, Czech Republic and Estonia. 
Deductions play an important role in order to mitigate the levels of taxation; they 
differ across countries. Some of these deductions include education and health care 
expenses, and they can represent a percentage spend within a certain limit or a fixed value. 
Information on deductions are only available since 200077.  
Table 4.3 shows the average wage in the European Union. It shows that having 
childrens affect the level of taxes and social security contributions. These values are a simple 
mean of all countries; they hide huge differences among them. To show these differences 
table 4.4 presents the net earnings for each type of household and for each country in 2010. 
                                                 
76 This information was based on the “Taxation Trends in The European Union, 2011 edition”. 
77 Information was obtained from http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/tedb/taxSearch.html  
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Among the countries with the highest net earnings, for single parent with 100% of 
the average wage, are Denmark (31 043€), Luxembourg (35 738€), Finland (27 257€) and 
UK (30 565€).  When Portugal and Slovenia are compared, differences on net earnings are 
small, for the case of single parent with 100% of average wage; in Portugal the net earning 
is (13 528€) and in Slovenia (11 078€). Differences in income from the newly entered 
countries are big when compared with the 15 European Countries. 
 
Table 4.3 Average earnings on the EU in 2010 
 children Av. wage Taxes Social Security Net Earn. 
Si
ng
le
 p
ar
en
t 
0 50% 1 071€ 1 475€ 10 024€ 
0 67% 2 019€ 2 113€ 12 612€ 
0 80% 2 862€ 2 502€ 14 721€ 
0 100% 4 253€ 3 064€ 17787€ 
0 125% 6 320€ 3 704€ 21 347€ 
0 167% 10 256€ 4 577€ 27 002€ 
2 67% 1 111€ 1 988€ 16 027€ 
C
ou
pl
es
 
2 100%0% 2 736€ 3 004€ 21 225€ 
2 100%33% 3 815€ 3 943€ 27 482€ 
2 100%67% 5 630€ 5 174€ 32 838€ 
2 100%100% 7 927€ 6 128€ 37 957€ 
0 100%33% 4 391€ 3 968€ 25 195€ 
0 100%100% 8 460€ 6 149€ 35 733€ 
Notes: Source Eurostat. In column 1 of table 3 are the types of households, column 2 the number of children’s 
and in column 3 the percentage of the average wage earned (for the case of couples the first percentage is 
referring to the head of the household and the second to the other household). For example a couple that earn 
100%67% means that the head of the household earn 100% and the other earns 67% of the average wage. 
Table 4.3 shows the average value of taxes in column 4, social security contributions in column 5 and net 
earnings for the different types of households in column 6 for 2010. Unfortunately data was not available for 
Cyprus.   
 
Net incomes in households in which both men and woman earn 100% of the average 
wage are higher in Luxembourg (80 719€), Ireland (65 500€), Denmark (65 392€) and UK 
(63 179€). Among the 15 European Countries, Portugal (28 023€), Greece (33 630€) and 
Spain (39 238€) have the lowest net earnings.  
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 Brief Summary 
In conclusion, although the EU Commission have provided tools for the 
harmonization of taxes, there are still huge discrepancies in their respective levels. We have 
covered only three taxes, but there are others equally important. There exist 27 Member 
States; from these, 17 are in the Euro Area. There are 27 different legislations. Commission 
has provided basic tools for harmonization, but seeing the current level of indirect taxes, 
personal and corporate income tax, “Richer” economies like Germany have a lower or equal 
level of taxation on personal income tax that some “poor” economies like Portugal.    
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Table 4.4 Net earnings in 2010 
 Single Parent Couple 
# Children’s None Two None Two 
Average wage 50% 67% 80% 100% 125% 167% 67% 100%33% 100%100% 100% 100%33% 100%67% 100%100% 
Belgium 15 298€ 17 837€ 20 256€ 23 989€ 28 254€ 35 229€ 23 000€ 36 074€ 48 006€ 32 460€ 40 745€ 46 447€ 52 678€ 
Bulgaria 1 536€ 2 058€ 2 458€ 3 072€ 3 840€ 5 130€ 2 488€ 4 086€ 6 144€ 3 502€ 4 515€ 5 560€ 6 574€ 
Czech Republic 4 913€ 6 223€ 7 272€ 8 844€ 10 809€ 14 085€ 8 590€ 12 229€ 17 688€ 12 042€ 14 189€ 16 726€ 19 185€ 
Denmark 16 282€ 21 237€ 25 201€ 31 043€ 37 323€ 46 533€ 29 856€ 42 369€ 62 085€ 36 673€ 45 676€ 55 587€ 65 392€ 
Germany 14 533€ 18 315€ 21 227€ 25 381€ 30 614€ 39 119€ 23 349€ 36 631€ 50 762€ 33 564€ 41 351€ 48 636€ 55 697€ 
Estonia 3 984€ 5 192€ 6 157€ 7 606€ 9 417€ 12 435€ 6 474€ 10 383€ 15 212€ 8 429€ 11 206€ 13 620€ 16 035€ 
Ireland 18 559€ 22 383€ 26 075€ 30 950€ 35 795€ 43 871€ 31 981€ 45 820€ 61 900€ 37 942€ 49 420€ 57 596€ 65 500€ 
Greece 7 360€ 9 813€ 11 776€ 14 231€ 17 104€ 21 715€ 10 795€ 20 823€ 30 852€ 17 085€ 22 973€ 28 861€ 33 630€ 
Spain 11 102€ 13 460€ 15 778€ 19 154€ 23 270€ 30 003€ 15 062€ 26 777€ 38 307€ 21 000€ 27 242€ 33 544€ 39 238€ 
France 13 818€ 16 739€ 19 823€ 24 449€ 29 524€ 37 668€ 19 294€ 33 479€ 48 899€ 27 930€ 36 986€ 43 995€ 51 705€ 
Italy 10 968€ 13 816€ 16 092€ 19 527€ 23 388€ 29 321€ 17 842€ 27 643€ 39 054€ 23 068€ 29 807€ 35 496€ 40 905€ 
Latvia 2 919€ 3 860€ 4 579€ 5 685€ 7 067€ 9 390€ 4 685€ 7 664€ 11 369€ 6 788€ 8 489€ 10 370€ 12 195€ 
Lithuania 2 798€ 3 638€ 4 280€ 5 268€ 6 503€ 8 589€ 5 511€ 7 210€ 10 537€ 5 786€ 7 367€ 9 063€ 10 693€ 
Luxembourg 20 581€ 26 188€ 30 276€ 35 738€ 42 173€ 52 879€ 35 971€ 53 426€ 73 197€ 48 078€ 60 948€ 71 404€ 80 719€ 
Hungary 3 383€ 4 292€ 5 018€ 6 109€ 7 169€ 8 989€ 5 581€ 8 564€ 12 217€ 7 267€ 9 723€ 11 559€ 13 376€ 
Malta 8 224€ 10 587€ 12 394€ 14 914€ 17 986€ 22 885€ 12 634€ 20 389€ 29 828€ 16 639€ 20 889€ 26 001€ 30 328€ 
Netherlands 17 527€ 21 618€ 24 981€ 30 130€ 36 579€ 45 864€ 28 042€ 42 950€ 60 260€ 34 297€ 45 785€ 54 583€ 63 095€ 
Austria 15 693€ 19 435€ 22 429€ 26 789€ 31 946€ 41 529€ 25 236€ 38 176€ 53 578€ 32 619€ 43 337€ 51 406€ 58 777€ 
Poland 3 656€ 4 809€ 5 731€ 7 113€ 8 842€ 11 723€ 5 165€ 9 617€ 14 227€ 7 748€ 10 174€ 12 479€ 14 784€ 
Portugal 7 556€ 9 729€ 11 249€ 13 528€ 16 377€ 20 351€ 11 358€ 19 458€ 27 056€ 15 882€ 20 528€ 24 224€ 28 023€ 
Romania 2 068€ 2 719€ 3 209€ 3 972€ 4 918€ 6 527€ 3 264€ 5 246€ 7 945€ 4 451€ 5 576€ 7 008€ 8 229€ 
Slovenia 6 395€ 7 884€ 9 161€ 11 078€ 13 431€ 16 886€ 11 296€ 15 375€ 22 155€ 14 911€ 17 889€ 21 216€ 23 986€ 
Slovakia 3 973€ 5 042€ 5 898€ 7 182€ 8 786€ 11 483€ 6 051€ 10 243€ 14 364€ 8 930€ 112 501€ 13 233€ 15 372€ 
Finland 15 701€ 19 949€ 22 895€ 27 257€ 32 354€ 40 767€ 23 593€ 38 463€ 54 514€ 29 783€ 40 989€ 49 732€ 57 040€ 
Sweden 15 399€ 19 969€ 23 625€ 28 893€ 33 935€ 41 350€ 22 800€ 39 722€ 57 786€ 31 724€ 42 553€ 51 694€ 60 617€ 
UK 16 404€ 21 124€ 24 901€ 30 565€ 37 629€ 47 720€ 26 797€ 42 248€ 61 130€ 33 252€ 44 935€ 53 738€ 63 179€ 
Notes: Cyprus was missing. Source Eurostat. Line 1 of table 4.4 shows the type of households, line 2 shows the number of children’s and line 3 the average wage. 
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4.3 Data and description of the variables 
Our dataset was constructed using the official publications provided by the Business 
Software Alliance and the Eurostat. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable is the software piracy losses at current prices78 from 1996 to 
2010 BSA (2012). Software piracy can be defined as the unauthorized use of software that 
is protected by nationals or international Intellectual Property Rights. Some of this use can 
be a result of lack of enforcement of these laws. The software piracy losses measures the 
commercial value of the software that is currently being used trough illicit means and is a 
result of extensive surveys done over the years by the Business Software Alliance (BSA) 
with the help of International Data Corporation (IDC) and IPSOS BSA (2012). A total of 33 
observations were missing for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Luxembourg. Png (2010) 
found that when surveys are not applied, the software piracy rates are based on national 
income; it also found that the yearly rate of decrease of the piracy rates before 2003 were 
2.0 (p.p), while the period after 2003 this rate of decrease fell to 1.1 (p.p) for the non-survey 
countries. With this in mind we will introduce a variable that will reflect this change79. More 
formally, software piracy can be defined as the unauthorized use of software that is protected 
by nationals or international Intellectual Property Rights. Some of this use can be a result of 
lack of enforcement of these laws. 
 
 Economic Dimension 
Following Goel and Nelson (2009) and Andrés and Goel (2011) we will use the 
logarithm of real GDPpc80 as a measure of national income. GDP measures the income of a 
                                                 
78 We will introduce a variable, the HICP that reflects the change in prices of products at current prices 
79 Piracy rates have a decreasing pattern while the piracy losses are increasing over the years. This dummy 
variable reflects the break in the series, as the Business Software alliance change its consultant and 
methodology in this period. 
80 GDPpc takes into account Purchasing Power Parity and is measured at current prices.  
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country and also the ability to purchase goods such as software products. The higher the 
GDP, the higher households have the ability to purchase consumer goods. This is a control 
variable and is expected to have a negative effect as a result of increased disposable income 
that allows to purchase goods. 
 
 HICPH as a proxy of software price 
Software’s prices can affect the decisions to purchase or to use illegal software. A good 
choice would be based upon the prices of both hardware and software. Unfortunately that 
information can be misleading as in certain cases, such as the Microsoft Office or the prices 
of computers are almost the same across the countries. We used the Harmonized indices of 
consumer prices (HICPH) as a proxy for these prices but also due to the fact that piracy 
losses are at current prices. We will introduce three measures that reflect the overall costs of 
living; i) costs of communications - examples of these costs are the price of phone calls and 
prices of telephones (HICPHgcomm); ii) costs of cultural services - examples are price of 
music, films, games, books and newspapers (HICPHgculture81) and iii) overall costs of 
products (HICPHgall). Harmonized indices of consumer prices (HICPHs) give comparable 
measures of inflation for the countries and country groups where they are produced. They 
are economic indicators that measure the change over time of the prices of consumer goods 
and services acquired by households. These variables are expected to have a positive impact 
(increase piracy) as a result of increase of price on goods, in which software is included. 
 
 Tax dimension 
4.3.4.1 Household taxation 
Labor costs include several dimensions such as social security contributions and 
family allowances that are captured by this variable. One of the independent variables will 
be the different tax rates applied to different types of households. It represents only one 
                                                 
81 These variables were retrieved in the official web site of the Eurostat and describe the rate of change from 
one year to another. 
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variable that can be decomposed into several tax levels. We will consider several hypotheses 
that vary according to the marital status, the existence of children in the constitution of the 
household and the percentage of the average wage that is earned. Several alternative types 
of households will be analyzed as independent variables: 
 Single person with no children and 50%, 67%, 80%, 100%, 125% and 167% of the 
average wage (AW) respectively; 
 Single person with two children and 67% of the AW; 
 Married couple with two children and the following levels of the AW: husband 
100% / wife 0%, husband 100% / wife 33%, husband 100% / wife 67% and husband 
100% / wife 100%; 
 Married couple with no children and 100% of the AW for the husband and 33% for 
the wife and husband 100% / wife 100%; 
Hereafter we will use “SP” to denote single parent, “C” to denote couples; the number 
of children’s will be “t” for two children’s and “n” for no children’s. SPn67 represents a 
single parent household that earns 67% of the average wage and do not have children, SPt67 
represents a similar household with the same income but with two children.  Another 
example is Cn10033, where 100% represents the income that the head of the household earn 
and 33% represents the income that the other member of the household earns in comparison 
to the average wage - they do not have children; Ct100100 represents couples that have two 
children and both households earn 100% of the average wage.  
On each of these dimensions (representative households) we will consider the average 
tax rate that is defined as the income tax on gross wage earnings plus the employee's social 
security contributions, less universal cash benefits, expressed as a percentage of gross wage 
earnings82. We expect that this variable will increase software piracy, although with the 
harmonization that the European Union has set over the years, this positive impact may 
become marginal.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/EN/earn_net_esms.htm  
103 
 
4.3.4.2 Relative importance of taxes 
We will introduce the relative importance of taxes on labor and consumption relative 
to GDP83. The impact of these taxes is expected to be positive, although they do not measure 
the direct level of taxation, e.g., they do not measure the actual rate but the importance of 
the tax on the economy.  
 
 Summary Statistics 
Table 4.5 presents the summary statistics for each variable that will be analyzed. These 
results show that, in some circumstances, some households don’t pay any type of tax, as in 
the case of SPt67 and Ct100. Family allowances in these households is higher than the actual 
tax, which explains this negative impact. The negative value of taxes on SPt67 and Ct100 
indicates that these households not only do not pay taxes but receive a net subsidy from the 
Government. Higher values of taxes are present when there are no children’s. Additional to 
these statistics we also provide the graphs of software piracy rates and losses for each 
country. The maximum piracy rate of 98% was in 1997 in Bulgaria. Since then, these rates 
have been decreasing in all countries. Figure 4.1 presents this decrease on all European 
Union Countries. Figure 4.2 presents the evolution of software piracy losses. 
  
                                                 
83 They comprise detailed tax and social contribution receipts for the general government sector as a share of 
GDP or as a share of total taxation (we have information on VAT, labor and capital taxes) 
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Table 4.5 Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Losses  372 318.86 575.03 0.97 3191 
SPn50   402 19.72 7.58 0.15 39.26 
SPn100 402 27.20 8.00 6.30 44.95 
SPn125  402 29.67 8.26 8.46 48.37 
SPn167        402 32.60 8.56 12.67 52.58 
SPt67     402 5.29 10.24 -21.56 24.69 
SPn67       402 23.04 7.81 3.52 41.39 
SPn80 402 24.90 7.94 4.8 43.17 
Cn100100         402 27.20 7.92 6.3 44.95 
Cn10033        402 23.84 7.59 5.68 41.39 
Ct100   402 14.83 8.58 -8.6 31.11 
Ct100100         402 23.15 7.52 0.46 41.68 
Ct10033         402 17.44 7.59 0.6 36.48 
Ct10067         402 20.41 7.63 5.4 39.6 
lGDPpc 405 9.77 0.52 8.37 11.15 
GDPg 378 4.26 5.82 -18.49 15.91 
HICPHall  405 94.55 16.63 5.01 139.62 
HICPHgall 377 4.25 9.50 -1.7 154.8 
HICPHcommu  404 100.24 21.72 1.81 206.34 
HICPHgcommu 377 2.04 18.25 -14 237.5 
HICPHculture  404 95.72 12.52 5.74 120.09 
HICPHgculture 377 2.83 9.71 -4.9 146.6 
Itaxcons 401 21.05 4.47 11.1 34.2 
Itaxlab 401 34.66 6.74 18.8 49.3 
TaxconsGDP  405 12 1.66 7.3 17.2 
TaxconsTotal 405 33.63 6.09 22.8 54 
TaxlabGDP 405 17.44 5.31 9 32 
TaxlabTotal 405 46.99 7.89 27 62.5 
TaxcapTotal 405 19.51 6.71 5.2 35 
Notes: Std. Dev. represents the standard deviation; Min the minimum and Max the maximum. 
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Figure 4.1 Evolution of Software Piracy rates on the European Union 
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Figure 4.2 Evolution of Software Piracy Losses on the European Union 
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4.4 Empirical Study 
When dealing with a panel-data analysis, we must choose the appropriate estimator 
but also ensure that our variables produce the best results. One problem that can occur in a 
panel of countries is the existence of one or more non-stationary variables. The existence of 
such variables can be problematic resulting in spurious regressions (Granger & Newbold, 
1974). We start by testing the stationarity of the variables using unit-root tests. Next we 
empirically estimate our model using the fixed effect model  following Andrés (2006a); 
Chen et al. (2010) and Boyce (2011), that showed that based on Hausman tests (Hausman, 
1978) the fixed effect was the most  appropriate for the analysis. 
 
 Testing the presence of unit roots  
To check if our series are stationary we implemented a procedure proposed by Im, 
Pesaran, and Shin (2003), henceforth IPS. Other tests are available but rely on balanced 
panels which is not the case. Equation 4.1 shows a model with a first order autoregressive 
component: 
Δݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜௧ ൅  ߶௜ݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅  ߳௜௧                                                 (4.1) 
where ݅ ൌ 1, … , ܰ represents the Member States; ݐ ൌ 1, … , ௜ܶ indexes time; ݕ௜௧ is 
the variables that we want to test; ߳௜௧ is independently distributed normal for all i and t and 
has heterogeneous variance ߪ௜ଶ. This test assumes that all the panel dataset is non-stationary 
under the null hypothesis ܪ଴: ߶௜ ൌ 0 against the alternative hypothesis that some panels are 
stationary ܪ௔: ߶௜ ൏ 0. To be able to get significance it is necessary at least 10 observations 
per country, which is not the case on software piracy losses. In this variable we performed 
the Fisher type tests I. Choi (2001) that has the same assumption of the IPS test. In this 
framework four tests are available: Inverse chi-squared; Inverse normal; Inverse logit and 
Modified inverse chi-squared. Based on I. Choi (2001) simulations results, the inverse 
normal Z statistic offers the best trade-off between size and power. The IPS test is performed 
on the independent variables.  
Table 4.6 presents the result of these tests for each variable. It can be seen that 
almost all the variables seem to be stationary or integrated of order zero I(0). The exception 
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goes to the natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita at Purchasing Power 
Parity and the Harmonized indices of consumer prices that may be considered as having unit 
roots. To prevent this problem we introduce the real GDP growth and the inflation rate 
(HICPHg). Both variables are stationary. 
After establishing that our regressors are stationary, we can proceed with the fixed 
effect model. 
 
Table 4.6  IPS and Fisher type Unit root tests 
 Level  1stdifference 
Dependent Variable   
ln(Losses) -1.336* -12.105***
Independent Variables   
SPn50  -3.871*** - 
SPn67  -3.584*** - 
SPn80  -4.015*** - 
SPn100  -3.349*** - 
SPn125  -3.525*** - 
SPn167  -3.456*** - 
SPt67  -4.637*** - 
Cn10033  -3.165*** - 
Cn100100  -3.694*** - 
Ct100  -4.060*** - 
Ct10033  -3.817*** - 
Ct10067  -3.428*** - 
Ct100100  -3.654*** - 
lGDPpc  -0.278  -6.628*** 
Itaxlab  -3.313*** - 
Itaxcons  -3.588*** - 
HICPH  0.731  -4.826*** 
HICPHg -6.783*** - 
HICPHcomm  1.7637 -6.388*** 
HICPHgcomm -4.455***  
HICPHculture  2.3157 -4.853*** 
HICPHgculture -4.498*** - 
TaxconsGDP -3.620*** - 
TaxconsTotal -3.725*** - 
TaxlabGDP -2.770*** - 
TaxlabTotal -3.786*** - 
TaxcapTotal -4.333*** - 
Notes: In the dependent variable we performed the Fisher type test presenting the inverse normal Z statistic. In 
the Independent variables the IPS test is used and the ܼ௧ሚି௕௔௥  statistics is presented. It was included a trend 
and subtracted cross-sectional mean. It was tested under the null hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots 
against the alternative that some panels are stationary. *** and * corresponds to a significance level of 1% and 
10% respectively. 
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 Empirical results 
4.4.2.1 Effects of taxation on software piracy losses  
We start our analysis by introducing the different tax rates on labor applied to 
households as well as the importance of direct and indirect taxes as a share of GDP. The 
different regions of Europe will be analyzed when they present significance.  
We can specify our dependent variable, software piracy losses ln(Losses) as a 
function of: i) the importance of taxation on labor as a share of GDP (TaxlabGDP); ii) the 
importance of taxation on consumption as a share of GDP (TaxconsGDP); iii) the growth 
rate of harmonized index of consumer prices index for all products (HICPHg); iv) growth of 
real gross domestic product per capita (GDPg); and v) the variable tax will assume thirteen 
different types of households. ݐܽݔሺ݄௟ሻ will assume the different levels of taxation that each 
of these households incur. ݄ ௟ ൌ 1, … ,13 represents the different types of households that are: 
SPn50, SPn67, SPn80, SPn100, SPn125, SPn167, SPt67, Cn10033, Cn100100, Ct100, 
Ct10033, Ct10067, Ct100100. Additional to this we include a dummy variable that reflects 
the change in methodology used by the Business software alliance occurred in 2002 
(change). The dependent variable is in natural logarithms. 
Equation 4.2 and 4.3 summarizes the estimated model 
lnሺܮ݋ݏݏ݁ݏሻ ൌ ߠ଴௜ ൅ ߠଵ௧ܩܦܲ݃௜௧ ൅ ߠଶ௧ܪܫܥܲܪ݃௜௧ ൅ ߠଷ௧ܶܽݔܿ݋݊ݏܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ ൅
ߠସ௧ܶܽݔ݈ܾܽܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ൅ߠହݐܽݔሺ݄௟ሻ௜௧൅ߠ଺݄ܿܽ݊݃݁௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧                                   (4.2) 
 
where 
ܪܫܥܲܪ ௜݃௧ ൌ ߠଶଵ௧ܪܫܥܲܪ݈݈݃ܽ௜௧ ൅ ߠଶଶ௧ܪܫܥܲܪ݃ܿ݋݉݉௜௧ ൅
ߠଶଷ௧ܪܫܥܲܪ݃ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݁௜௧                           (4.3) 
 
where i=1,…27 represents the Member States, t=1996,…,2010 represents the time, 
ߝ௜௧ represents the error term. HICPHgall is the growth of all the prices, HICPHgcomm is the 
growth of prices in telecommunications and HICPHgculture is the growth of prices in 
products such as movies, culture or books. 
Estimates of the piracy rates are projected from national income in the non-survey 
countries. Initially, the surveys only covered 15 countries. From these, only one country of 
the European Union was present: Spain (First Annual BSA and IDC Global Software). In 
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the report of 2010, 32 countries were present in the surveys. From those countries, Czech 
Republic, Poland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom 
make part of the European Union (Eight annual BSA and IDC global software piracy study).  
In each of the regressions reported we present the Hansen-test statistic that is a 
robust version of the Hausman test (Schaffer & Stillman, 2010). The Hausman test assumes 
under the null hypothesis that the random effect (RE) estimates is consistent. The fixed 
effects estimator uses the orthogonally conditions that the regressors are uncorrelated with 
the idiosyncratic error. Furthermore, one of the assumptions of the random effect is that it 
uses the additional orthogonally conditions that the regressors are uncorrelated with the 
group-specific error; the Hansen-test84 treats this assumption as additional orthogonally 
conditions (it is a test of over identifying restrictions). Rejecting the null hypothesis favors 
the fixed effect model. 
Table 4.7 presents the results for the entire sample (EU27). The impact of prices is 
similar in the different categories of products; we only report the results for the inflation of 
overall products (In Annex VI we report the remaining possibilities). We dropped taxation 
of households that were not significant (in Annex VII we report the remaining cases). 
Column 2 through 5 shows the estimates for the different types of households, as with 
previous studies (Chen et al., 2010); the GDPg is not significant in the majority of 
regressions.  
We can observe a negative and marginal impact of inflation on overall products. 
Many software prices, such as productivity suits, are constant over the years, not suffering 
with the inflation of a Country. In fact some software prices decreases over the years; 
examples are games and movies. In many software products, Companies internalize the 
value of VAT, making software prices almost the same across European Countries. These 
variables were always significant at 1%. 
                                                 
84 These additional orthogonality conditions are overidentifying restrictions.  The test is implemented by 
xtoverid using the artificial regression approach described by Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge (2010, pp. 290-
291), in which a random effects equation is reestimated, augmented with additional variables consisting of the 
original regressors transformed into deviations-from-mean form.  The test statistic is a Wald test of the 
significance of these additional regressors. Under conditional homoskedasticity, this test statistic is 
asymptotically equivalent to the usual Hausman fixed-vs-random effects test; with a balanced panel, the 
artificial regression and Hausman test statistics are numerically equal.  See Arellano (1993) for an exact 
statement. 
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Another important variable introduced was the relative importance of taxes; the 
positive effect of TaxconsGDP indicates that all the different types of indirect taxation play 
an important role in explaining software piracy. Changing these taxes determines the 
behavior of consumers when facing choices of purchasing goods. This variable was 
significant, which indicates that reducing indirect taxation could be beneficial for reducing 
piracy, because more disposable income is available to households to spend on goods.  
 
Table 4.7 Tax rate on labor on different households in EU27 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
GDPg 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010* 0.008 
 (1.386) (1.421) (1.419) (1.904) (1.366) 
TaxconsGDP 0.065** 0.056** 0.059** 0.068*** 0.071** 
 (2.402) (2.303) (2.304) (2.628) (2.514) 
HICPHgall -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-3.756) (-3.333) (-3.111) (-3.735) (-3.541) 
SPn50  0.021**    
  (2.070)    
SPn67   0.021*   
   (1.876)   
SPn80    0.019*  
    (1.671)  
Cn10033     0.018* 
     (1.680) 
Change 0.991*** 1.000*** 0.995*** 1.056*** 0.952*** 
 (14.113) (14.028) (13.870) (15.061) (14.538) 
Constant 2.914*** 2.628*** 2.515*** 2.455*** 2.484*** 
 (8.796) (6.448) (5.381) (4.936) (4.738) 
Observations 349 346 346 346 346 
ܴଶ 0.880 0.882 0.881 0.875 0.877 
തܴଶ 0.875 0.877 0.876 0.871 0.872 
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 
Hansen-Test 4.9e+04 1543.99 628.96 606.66 471.79 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Losses). All regressions were estimates with time dummies. Robust t-statistics 
are in parentheses. Degrees of freedom of t-distribution for n>120 are: critical values at 10% are 1.645; at 5% 
is 1.960 and at 1% are 2.576. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All EU 
represent the 27 Member states of the European Union  
 
The additional variables that represent taxation of the different households have the 
expected positive impact, which indicates that they affect negatively the final disposable 
income that will be used to purchase these types of products. Only on those households that 
do not have children and earn less than 100% of the average wage are positively and 
significantly affected.  
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The positive effect of taxation on Single parents is more severe on households that 
earn less and this positive value decreases as households earn more. This result indicates that 
households can allocate more of their disposable income on digital content as their income 
increases (Shin et al., 2004). The same pattern applies to Couples that do not have children; 
only on households that earn less than 100% of the average wage, significance is present.  
Knowing the main results including the EU27, we provide additional regressions in 
which we compare “Euro” and “Not Euro” zone, and the 15 original countries of the EU 
(“Old”) and the “New Countries”. Results on household taxation were only significant on 
“Not Euro” and “New” countries85. Table 5.8 presents the results. 
In these regions we also observe the lack of significance of GDPg across many 
regressions. One of the main differences resides in the significance of household taxation 
across the different regions. In the countries not belonging to the Euro Zone household 
taxation has a strong coefficient, being significant (column 7 to 10). When the “Euro” Zone 
is examined (see Annex D), the coefficients are marginal and close to zero. This can be a 
result of the fact that countries in the sample belongs to the North of Europe that is 
characterized by a high level of taxation. 
 
 
Table 4.8, columns 12 to 15 shows the “New” countries; many of these countries 
have a low flat rate (Bulgaria and Estonia are some examples). Since 2008 Bulgaria has a 
10% flat rate tax system  (Commission, 2012, p. 66). The region that represents the “Old” 
countries doesn’t have significance, although with similar coefficient sizes (see Annex VIII).  
In all regressions the Hansen-test favors the fixed effect model with a significance 
of 1%. The dummy variable that represented the change in methodology is positive which 
indicates that software piracy losses have increased over the years. Also as Figure 4.2 
presented, a dramatic change occurred in 2002/2003, which was captures by this variable. 
 
                                                 
85 The remaining regions are reported in annex. 
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Table 4.8 Tax rates on NOT EURO VS NEW Countries 
 NOT EURO NEW 
Variables 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
GDPg 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.009* 0.009 0.008 0.011** 0.010* 
 (1.361) (0.868) (0.710) (1.194) (1.184) (1.656) (1.634) (1.578) (2.025) (1.912) 
TaxconsGDP 0.099** 0.051* 0.058* 0.058 0.073 0.067** 0.060** 0.063** 0.071** 0.074** 
 (2.554) (1.725) (1.712) (1.509) (1.552) (2.303) (2.196) (2.281) (2.287) (2.113) 
HICPHgall -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004***
 (-2.871) (-4.100) (-3.524) (-3.471) (-3.395) (-4.818) (-5.317) (-4.965) (-3.933) (-3.823) 
SPn50  0.025**     0.025**    
  (2.408)     (2.685)    
SPn67   0.023*     0.020*   
   (1.818)     (1.720)   
SPn80    0.022*     0.013  
    (1.694)     (0.951)  
Cn10033     0.022*     0.013 
     (1.908)     (0.969) 
Change 1.240*** 0.948*** 0.951*** 1.084*** 1.078*** 0.809*** 0.790*** 0.783*** 0.891*** 0.924*** 
 (16.673) (8.011) (7.906) (12.227) (13.106) (12.585) (12.459) (12.548) (12.358) (11.877) 
Constant 2.403*** 2.557*** 2.446*** 2.364*** 2.198** 1.747*** 1.440*** 1.449*** 1.434** 1.355* 
 (5.153) (5.135) (3.814) (3.331) (2.691) (5.261) (3.871) (3.169) (2.426) (2.064) 
Observations 131 131 131 131 131 155 152 152 152 152 
ܴଶ 0.895 0.929 0.925 0.922 0.923 0.902 0.908 0.903 0.898 0.896 
തܴଶ 0.885 0.919 0.916 0.913 0.914 0.893 0.898 0.893 0.888 0.886 
Countries 10 10 10 10 10 12 12 12 12 12 
Hansen-Test 1039.47 5.7e+08 2605.19 3178.44 2015.02 753.247 8257.18 8283.31 78.65 227.09 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Losses). All regressions were estimates with time dummies. Robust  t-statistics are in parentheses. “Not Euro” represents the countries 
that are outside the Euro Area. “NEW” represents the 10 countries that recently entered in 2004 and 2007. 
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4.4.2.2 Additional Results 
After establishing that both indirect and direct taxation on households affect 
positively software piracy, we examine if the relative importance in the Economy of these 
taxes can also affect this phenomenon. The relative importance of these taxes can be 
measured as a percentage of total taxation. In many countries, the importance of Capital, 
Labor and Consumption taxes accounts for almost one hundred percent of all taxes existing 
in a country. 
Equation 4.4 describes the general econometric specification that will be used 
 
lnሺܮ݋ݏݏ݁ݏሻ௜௧ ൌ    ߠ଴௜ ൅ ߠଵܩܦܲ݃௜௧ ൅ ߠଶܪܫܥܲܪ݈݈݃ܽ௜௧ ൅ ߠଷܶܽݔܿܽ݌ܶ݋ݐ௜௧ ൅
ߠସܶܽݔ݈ܾܽܶ݋ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߠହܶܽݔܿ݋݊ݏܶ݋ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߠ଺݄ܿܽ݊݃݁ ൅ ߝ௜௧                                      (4.4) 
 
where TaxcapTot, TaxlabTot and TaxconsTot  are the importance of taxes on 
capital, labor and consumption respectively as a share of total taxation. These three variables 
cannot be present at the same time as the sum of them represents almost 100% of total 
taxation.  
So as: 
ܶܽݔܿܽ݌ܶ݋ݐ௜௧ ൅ ܶܽݔ݈ܾܽܶ݋ݐ௜௧ ൅ ܶܽݔܿ݋݊ݏܶ݋ݐ௜௧ ≅ 1                        (4.5) 
 
To prevent a high level of multicolinearity we omit one variable at a time that will 
serve as a base tax level. For instance if we omit the ܶܽݔܿ݋݊ݏܶ݋ݐ௜௧, solving the above 
equation relatively to that variable and replacing in equation 5.4 we get: 
 
lnሺܮ݋ݏݏ݁ݏሻ௜௧ ൌ    ሺߠ଴௜ ൅ ߠହሻ ൅ ߠଵܩܦܲ݃௜௧ ൅ ߠଶܪܫܥܲܪ݈݈݃ܽ௜௧ ൅ ሺߠଷ െ
ߠହሻܶܽݔܿܽ݌ܶ݋ݐ௜௧ ൅ ሺߠସ െ ߠହሻܶܽݔ݈ܾܽܶ݋ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߠ଺݄ܿܽ݊݃݁ ൅ ߝ௜௧                                 (4.6) 
 
From equation (4.6) is easy to check the interpretation of the coefficient as a 1 pp. 
increase in the share of the respective tax with an associate decrease of 1 pp. in the share of 
the Consumption Tax (the base case). 
Anyway, we report all possible combinations in the regressions that serve as a 
robustness check. With this omission we can interpret the coefficients of the remaining taxes 
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as the differential impact between a specific tax and the base one. The control variables 
(GDPg and HICPHgall) maintained the coefficients. 
 Table 4.9 presents the results for the entire sample. Columns 16 to 18 show the 
different combinations of these taxes. Significance on the variables that represent the 
importance of taxes was only present when taxation of labor and capital were considered 
together (column 16); the negative impact of TaxcapTot86 indicates that an increase of the 
relative importance of capital taxation and a reduction of consumption taxation, will lead to 
less piracy (substitution effect). In spite of this statistical significance, column 18 shows that 
this result is not strong, which can be a result of the complex tax systems and the difficulty 
in reducing direct taxation.  
 
Table 4.9 Relative importance of taxation in the EU27 
Variables 16 17 18 
GDPg 0.012* 0.013* 0.013* 
 (1.646) (1.685) (1.657) 
HICHgall -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**
 (-2.595) (-2.530) (-2.558) 
TaxcapTot -0.027* 0.003  
 (-1.667) (0.172)  
TaxlabTot -0.030  -0.004 
 (-1.556)  (-0.229) 
TaxconsTot  0.029 0.026 
  (1.508) (1.599) 
Change 1.265*** 1.266*** 1.266*** 
 (20.785) (20.889) (20.833) 
Constant 5.592*** 2.615*** 2.942*** 
 (4.836) (3.128) (2.845) 
Observations 349 349 349 
ܴଶ 0.845 0.845 0.845 
തܴଶ 0.840 0.840 0.840 
Countries 27 27 27 
Hansen-Test 3.5e+04 1.1e+04 9853.72 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Losses). All regressions were estimates with time dummies. Robust  t-statistics 
are in parentheses.  
  
                                                 
86 In the European Union, this tax represents on average 19.51% of total taxation. The personal taxation 
represents, on average, 47% of total taxation, which indicates that the rates applied are high. On the other side, 
the rates applied to capital are relatively low. 
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Table 4.10 presents the results for the different EU regions that were significant; 
the “Not Euro” and “Euro” zone. 
 
Table 4.10. Relative importance of taxation in the Not Euro and EURO Countries 
 NOT EURO EURO 
VARIABLES 19 20 21 22 23 24 
GDPg 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 
 (0.047) (0.172) (0.064) (2.142) (2.149) (2.137) 
HICHgall -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** 
 (-3.985) (-3.922) (-4.107) (-2.680) (-2.660) (-2.629) 
TaxcapTot -0.013 0.041  -0.032* -0.023  
 (-0.614) (1.579)  (-1.775) (-1.209)  
TaxlabTot -0.054**  -0.044* -0.010  0.022 
 (-2.447)  (-1.707) (-0.485)  (1.196) 
TaxconsTot  0.052** 0.010  0.009 0.031* 
  (2.299) (0.495)  (0.434) (1.710) 
Change 1.214*** 1.220*** 1.214*** 1.201*** 1.202*** 1.203*** 
 (13.781) (13.972) (13.864) (12.948) (12.970) (12.935) 
Constant 6.567*** 1.181 5.488** 4.840*** 3.904*** 1.670 
 (5.186) (1.092) (3.144) (4.042) (4.243) (1.343) 
Observations 131 131 131 218 218 218 
ܴଶ 0.894 0.893 0.894 0.835 0.835 0.835 
തܴଶ 0.884 0.883 0.884 17 17 17 
Countries 10 10 10 0.827 0.826 0.826 
Hansen-Test 1095.60 862.59 828.46 904.727 1072.968 1150.520 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Losses). All regressions were estimates with time dummies. Robust  t-statistics are in 
parentheses. “Not Euro” represents the countries that are outside the Euro Area.  
 
 
Columns 19 to 21 present the results for the “Not Euro” Zone. TaxlabTot is 
significant at 5% with a negative impact on piracy which indicates that if we increase the 
importance of this tax and at the same time decrease the importance of consumption tax 
(base tax), this will decrease piracy. If we consider the capital tax as the base tax, we observe 
that TaxlabTot maintains its coefficient, being significant at 10%. In this case an increase of 
labor tax and, at the same time, a decrease of capital taxation (the base tax) will also lead to 
less piracy. TaxconsTot is significant at 5% with a positive impact (increases piracy) when 
we omit labor tax. In this case an increase of consumption tax and a decrease of labor tax 
(base tax) will increase piracy although this result is not robust. 
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Columns 22 to 24 shows the “Euro” Zone; in this situation TaxlabTot loses 
significance. This is an unexpected result as in the Euro Zone the importance of this tax is 
smaller than those outside the Euro Zone, although this difference is marginal87.  
Table 4.11 presents the results for the “New” and “Old” countries. Columns 25 to 
27 presents the “New” Countries. When we consider the consumption tax as the base one, 
we can observe that it is possible to reduce piracy choosing capital or labor tax. Both 
variables are significant with a negative impact. If we increase TaxlabTot and reduce 
consumption taxation (base tax), this will decrease piracy; we can also, in alternative, 
increase TaxcapToT and reduce consumption tax. Although this will depend of the 
advantages and disadvantages of changing one of these taxes. 
When we consider both TaxcapTot and TaxconTot, TaxconTot is positive and 
significant which indicates that if we increase this tax and decrease the base tax (labor tax), 
this will increase piracy. Also when the base tax is the capital tax, TaxconsTot maintain the 
significance with a positive impact; an increase of this tax and a decrease of capital tax (the 
base tax) will increase piracy. Columns 28 to 30 shows the “Old” countries; in this case none 
of the variables are significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
87 On average in the Euro Zone this tax represents 47.7% of total taxation while on the remaining countries this 
value is of 46.6%. 
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Table 4.11 Relative importance of taxation in the New and Old Countries 
 NEW OLD 
Variables 25 26 27 28 29 30 
GDPg -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.026* 0.026* 0.026* 
 (-0.088) (0.052) (-0.029) (1.836) (1.842) (1.832) 
HICHgall -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.054* -0.053 -0.053* 
 (-3.097) (-2.985) (-3.061) (-1.671) (-1.636) (-1.653) 
TaxcapTot -0.036*** 0.019  -0.016 -0.022  
 (-3.130) (0.846)  (-0.455) (-0.844)  
TaxlabTot -0.056**  -0.022 0.006  0.021 
 (-2.496)  (-0.974) (0.204)  (0.821) 
TaxconsTot  0.054** 0.034***  -0.008 0.014 
  (2.316) (2.794)  (-0.267) (0.395) 
Change 1.216*** 1.223*** 1.216*** 1.225*** 1.225*** 1.227*** 
 (12.265) (12.186) (12.077) (13.372) (13.498) (13.540) 
Constant 5.657*** 0.122 2.204 4.716** 5.391*** 3.256 
 (4.840) (0.106) (1.768) (2.337) (4.681) (1.627) 
Observations 155 155 155 194 194 194 
ܴଶ 0.871 0.870 0.871 0.858 0.858 0.858 
തܴଶ 0.861 0.860 0.861 15 15 15 
Countries 12 12 12 0.850 0.850 0.849 
Hansen-Test 703.36 567.91 587.98 1054.141 1061.812 1201.264 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Losses). All regressions were estimates with time dummies. Robust  t-statistics are in 
parentheses. “New” represents the 10 countries that recently entered in 2004 and 2007. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed the impact that levels of taxation have on software piracy. 
Previous econometric studies have relied on cross-sectional and panel data studies. Our 
contribution to the empirical literature is in the fact that we introduce a new analysis that 
studies the effect of taxation on different households types as well as introducing a large 
panel dataset for the European Union and its different regions. Results are valuable for 
policymakers, especially within the common market of the European Union. 
Results indicate that personal taxation affects differently the households. An 
increase in taxation on households that have smaller income appears to increase piracy, being 
this impact more pronounced on these households than those that earn more. These results 
were also founded when the different regions of the EU were considered, although only 
significant on “Not Euro” and the “New” countries. Having more access to digital content 
combined with reduced incomes may result on using illegal software, for example 
downloading illegal music instead of purchasing them. 
Further analysis was conducted with the relative importance of personal tax, capital 
tax and consumption tax as a share of total taxation. Results showed that even if its not 
possible to reduce the number of taxes or the actual rates applied, there appear to be some 
benefit in reducing the impact of taxation on consumption. These results were heterogeneous 
among the different regions. To promote effective measures to prevent piracy, effective 
policies are necessary targeting each group of countries and the different tax types (PIT, CIT 
and CIT). 
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 Additional Summary Statistics 
 
Table 4.12 Detailed summary statistics for Euro and Non Euro Zone 
 Euro Area Not Euro Area 
Variable Obs. Mean S. D. Min Max Obs. Mean S. D. Min Max 
Losses   232 371.22 647.08 0.969 3191 140 232.10 417.77 4.843 2181 
SPn50   252 18.10 7.39 4.62 36.66 150 22.46 7.11 0.15 39.26 
SPn100 252 26.58 8.69 6.3 43.37 150 28.23 6.55 8.83 44.95 
SPn125  252 29.36 8.73 8.46 47.71 150 30.17 7.40 11.37 48.37 
SPn167        252 32.66 8.69 12.67 50.03 150 32.51 8.34 14.36 52.58 
SPt67     252 4.32 9.92 -21.28 24 150 6.92 10.57 -21.56 24.69 
SPn67       252 21.86 8.25 4.5 36.92 150 25.01 6.56 3.52 41.39 
SPn80 252 23.97 8.61 4.8 42.28 150 26.44 6.39 6.12 43.17 
Cn100100         252 26.63 8.56 6.30 44.28 150 28.16 6.61 12.93 44.95 
Cn100333        252 22.74 7.97 5.68 38.09 150 25.69 6.53 9.35 41.39 
Ct100   252 13.35 7.99 -8.6 28.05 150 17.32 8.98 -6.91 31.11 
Ct100100         252 22.57 7.84 0.46 38.66 150 24.12 6.87 7.31 41.68 
Ct10033         252 16.40 7.43 0.6 31.03 150 19.18 7.55 4.79 36.48 
Ct10067         252 19.60 7.77 5.4 35.28 150 21.77 7.22 5.62 39.6 
lGDPpc 255 9.95 0.39 8.67 11.15 150 9.47 0.57 8.37 10.35 
HICPHall  255 94.87 12.30 53.71 126.95 150 93.99 22.17 5.01 139.62 
HICPHgall 238 2.76 2.01 -1.7 12.2 139 6.82 15.11 -1.2 154.8 
HICPHcultture  255 96.53 8.14 60.23 112.56 149 94.34 17.60 5.74 120.09 
HICPHgcultute 238 1.46 2.17 -2.6 12.4 139 5.17 15.49 -4.9 146.6 
HICPHcomm  255 104.37 21.30 38.86 206.34 149 93.17 20.63 1.81 124.6 
HICPHgcomm 238 -.67 5.66 -14 41.4 139 6.69 28.61 -10.7 237.5 
Itaxcons 251 20.66 3.84 11.1 29.3 150 21.71 5.30 11.7 34.2 
Itaxlab 251 34.09 7.22 18.8 45.3 150 35.63 5.81 34.4 49.3 
TaxlabGDP 255 17.47 5.00 9.4 26 150 17.39 5.83 9 32 
TaxlabTotT 255 46.58 8.21 27 60.7 150 47.71 7.28 30.2 62.5 
TaxlconsGDP 255 11.69 1.40 7.3 15.2 150 12.53 1.93 8.5 17.2 
TaxconsTotT 255 32.34 5.82 22.8 44 150 35.81 5.94 24 54 
TaxcapTotT 255 21.22 6.56 5.2 35 150 16.62 5.95 6.9 32.9 
Notes: S.D represents the standard deviation, Min. the minimum and Max. the maximum. 
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Table 4.13 Detailed Summary Statistics for Old and New Countries 
 Old Countries New Countries 
Variable Obs. Mean S. D. Min Max Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Losses 207 519.27 703.61 16 3191 165 67.44 108.90 0.969 648 
SPn50   225 20.91 7.85 4.62 39.26 177 18.22 6.95 0.15 31.31 
SPn100 225 29.73 7.79 16.49 44.95 177 23.97 7.04 6.3 38.81 
SPn125  225 32.63 7.93 18.76 48.37 177 25.90 7.07 8.46 42.52 
SPn167        225 36.15 8 21.47 52.58 177 28.09 6.97 12.67 45.14 
SPt67     225 7.79 8.87 -21.28 21.41 177 2.12 10.98 -21.56 24.69 
SPn67       225 25.01 7.79 11.47 41.39 177 20.53 7.09 3.52 32.32 
SPn80 225 27.20 7.94 13.89 43.17 177 21.95 6.91 4.8 32.82 
Cn100100         225 29.68 7.80 17.43 44.95 177 24.05 6.88 6.3 38.81 
Cn100333        225 25.52 7.82 10.45 41.39 177 21.71 6.73 5.68 34.25 
Ct100   225 17.23 7.64 -2.17 31.11 177 11.78 8.75 -8.6 28.97 
Ct100100         225 25.63 7.42 11.14 41.68 177 19.99 6.40 0.46 31.74 
Ct10033         225 19.50 7.79 2.02 36.48 177 14.82 6.44 0.6 27.8 
Ct10067         225 22.77 7.77 6.23 39.6 177 17.41 6.29 5.4 30.84 
lGDPpc 225 10.11 0.29 9.38 11.15 180 9.36 0.42 8.37 10.11 
HICPHall  225 96.17 9.47 72.68 117.68 180 92.52 22.47 5.01 139.62 
HICPHgall 210 2.21 1.13 -1.7 5.4 167 6.95 13.77 -1.2 154.8 
HICPHcultture  225 97.90 5.55 76.84 109.43 179 93.00 17.39 5.74 120.09 
HICPHgcultute 210 0.83 1.47 -2.6 6.5 167 5.34 14.12 -4.9 146.6 
HICPHcomm  225 106.43 12.98 83.84 156.36 179 92.47 27.32 1.81 206.34 
HICPHgcomm 210 -1.93 3.11 -14 7.1 167 7.05 26.41 -13.6 237.5 
Itaxcons 221 22.10 4.86 12.6 34.2 180 19.77 3.54 11.1 28.2 
Itaxlab 221 35.69 7.02 21.6 49.3 180 33.40 6.23 18.8 42.6 
TaxlabGDP 225 19.59 5.60 9.7 32 180 14.74 3.38 9 20.8 
TaxlabTotT 225 48.50 7.86 32.5 62.5 180 45.12 7.53 27 57.2 
TaxlconsGDP 225 11.71 1.57 7.3 16.4 180 12.36 1.71 8.5 17.2 
TaxconsTotT 225 29.99 4.66 22.8 41.3 180 38.17 4.38 27.9 54 
TaxcapTotT 225 21.68 5.78 10.9 34.9 180 16.81 6.83 5.2 35 
Notes: S.D represents the standard deviation, Min. the minimum and Max. the maximum. 
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 Additional regressions with different inflations 
Table 4.14 Regressions with the different inflation types 
Variables 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
GDPg 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009* 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.009* 0.006 
 (1.259) (1.279) (1.270) (1.777) (1.241) (1.273) (1.187) (1.195) (1.645) (1.130) 
TaxconsGDP 0.065** 0.055** 0.058** 0.068*** 0.070** 0.065** 0.054** 0.058** 0.067*** 0.070*** 
 (2.369) (2.232) (2.234) (2.579) (2.466) (2.485) (2.298) (2.324) (2.711) (2.590) 
HICPHgculture -0.005*** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**      
 (-2.927) (-2.366) (-2.454) (-2.549) (-2.544)      
HICPHgcomm      -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003***
      (-4.944) (-5.207) (-4.845) (-4.275) (-4.738) 
SPn50  0.021**     0.022**    
  (2.043)     (2.216)    
SPn67   0.021*     0.022**   
   (1.862)     (2.019)   
SPn80    0.019*     0.019*  
    (1.658)     (1.781)  
Cn10033     0.018*     0.019* 
     (1.663)     (1.857) 
Change 0.981*** 0.991*** 0.984*** 1.048*** 0.942*** 0.982*** 0.988*** 0.982*** 1.050*** 0.940*** 
 (13.673) (13.426) (13.287) (14.775) (14.135) (13.733) (13.746) (13.606) (14.847) (14.093) 
Constant 2.926*** 2.647*** 2.536*** 2.469*** 2.503*** 2.918*** 2.640*** 2.522*** 2.452*** 2.479*** 
 (8.664) (6.333) (5.323) (4.890) (4.708) (9.436) (6.982) (5.841) (5.302) (5.124) 
Observations 349 346 346 346 346 349 346 346 346 346 
ܴଶ 0.880 0.883 0.882 0.875 0.878 0.880 0.883 0.882 0.876 0.878 
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
തܴଶ 0.875 0.877 0.876 0.871 0.873 0.875 0.878 0.877 0.871 0.873 
Hansen-Test 4.9e+04 1642.431 596.044 629.708 464.450 7.3e+04 1412.206 590.781 586.600 479.283 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Losses). All regressions were estimates with time dummies. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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 Regressions with the remaining households types 
Table 4.15 Remaining households for EU 27 
Variables 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 
GDPg 0.011* 0.014** -0.013*** 0.013** 0.015** 0.015** 0.014** 0.015** 0.015** 
 (1.817) (2.440) (-2.759) (2.055) (2.403) (2.422) (2.430) (2.421) (2.432) 
TaxconsGDP 0.065** 0.065** 0.062* 0.062** 0.084*** 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.082*** 0.086***
 (2.252) (2.157) (1.717) (2.044) (2.948) (3.058) (3.220) (3.034) (2.991) 
HICPHgall -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003* -0.003** 
 (-4.139) (-4.160) (-8.192) (-3.433) (-2.370) (-2.857) (-2.594) (-2.031) (-2.144) 
SPn100 0.007         
 (0.589)         
SPn125  0.000        
  (0.033)        
SPn167   0.001       
   (0.063)       
SPt67    -0.001      
    (-0.180)      
Cn100100     0.012     
     (1.116)     
Ct100      0.003    
      (0.418)    
Ct10033       0.009   
       (1.011)   
Ct10067        0.011  
        (1.072)  
Ct100100         0.012 
         (1.152) 
Change 1.234*** 1.259*** 1.102*** 1.286*** 1.135*** 1.134*** 1.140*** 1.134*** 1.141***
 (20.537) (21.341) (20.553) (21.783) (18.888) (18.887) (18.665) (19.009) (18.692) 
Constant 2.781*** 2.938*** 3.091*** 2.961*** 2.336*** 2.697*** 2.593*** 2.449*** 2.357***
 (4.801) (4.978) (4.284) (7.933) (4.060) (7.522) (7.009) (5.024) (4.401) 
Observations 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 
ܴଶ 0.851 0.850 0.861 0.854 0.866 0.866 0.867 0.867 0.867 
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
തܴଶ 0.846 0.845 0.855 0.848 0.862 0.861 0.861 0.862 0.862 
Hansen-Test 1182.253 1108.583 1244.960 2.4e+04 251.157 1257.545 914.464 408.865 380.457 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Losses). All regressions were estimates with time dummies. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.16 Remaining households for the countries outside the EURO Zone 
Variables 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 
GDPg 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 
 (1.009) (0.877) (0.719) (0.602) (1.224) (1.144) (1.177) (1.182) (1.193) 
TaxconsGDP 0.071** 0.074* 0.074* 0.076* 0.083* 0.077* 0.070* 0.085* 0.088* 
 (1.961) (1.808) (1.667) (1.724) (1.730) (1.794) (1.756) (1.820) (1.818) 
HICPHgall -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (-3.016) (-3.465) (-4.065) (-3.478) (-2.693) (-3.136) (-3.166) (-2.120) (-2.027) 
SPn100 0.015         
 (1.162)         
SPn125  0.007        
  (0.620)        
SPn167   -0.002       
   (-0.213)       
SPt67    0.004      
    (0.583)      
Cn100100     0.014     
     (1.018)     
Ct100      0.009    
      (0.904)    
Ct10033       0.012   
       (1.260)   
Ct10067        0.013  
        (1.120)  
Ct100100         0.014 
         (1.026) 
Change 1.126*** 1.117*** 1.112*** 1.113*** 1.147*** 1.128*** 1.130*** 1.140*** 1.143***
 (10.767) (11.051) (11.227) (11.343) (18.085) (16.799) (17.156) (17.440) (17.977) 
Constant 2.345*** 2.546*** 2.854*** 2.715*** 2.252** 2.569*** 2.556*** 2.315*** 2.223** 
 (3.053) (3.184) (3.452) (4.490) (2.499) (4.478) (4.939) (3.024) (2.615) 
Observations 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 
ܴଶ 0.918 0.917 0.916 0.917 0.914 0.914 0.915 0.915 0.915 
Countries 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
തܴଶ 0.909 0.906 0.906 0.907 0.905 0.905 0.906 0.906 0.905 
Hansen-Test 3130.502 1.3e+07 3.9e+05 1191.196 6665.099 419.068 4145.801 1.1e+06 1.1e+05 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Losses). All regressions were estimates with time dummies. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.17 Remaining households for the NEW countries 
Variables 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 
GDPg -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016***
 (-3.425) (-3.269) (-3.134) (-2.742) (-3.337) (-3.081) (-3.207) (-3.143) (-3.193) 
TaxconsGDP 0.074* 0.070* 0.064 0.071** 0.078* 0.071** 0.071** 0.075** 0.079** 
 (1.913) (1.793) (1.609) (1.989) (1.803) (1.989) (2.024) (2.042) (2.096) 
HICPHgall -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***
 (-12.417) (-14.285) (-14.908) (-15.217) (-10.975) (-15.299) (-15.214) (-11.960) (-13.031) 
SPn100 0.007         
 (0.488)         
SPn125  -0.001        
  (-0.105)        
SPn167   -0.011       
   (-1.097)       
SPt67    -0.001      
    (-0.163)      
Cn100100     0.010     
     (0.639)     
Ct100      -0.001    
      (-0.229)    
Ct10033       0.002   
       (0.288)   
Ct10067        0.008  
        (0.692)  
Ct100100         0.009 
         (0.882) 
Change 0.920*** 0.923*** 0.929*** 0.924*** 0.916*** 0.924*** 0.920*** 0.911*** 0.910*** 
 (18.832) (18.198) (17.989) (19.599) (17.614) (19.408) (19.712) (18.507) (18.774) 
Constant 1.756** 1.984*** 2.345*** 1.947*** 1.620* 1.956*** 1.923*** 1.775*** 1.671*** 
 (2.488) (2.892) (3.426) (4.554) (1.930) (4.665) (4.537) (3.313) (2.970) 
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 
ܴଶ 0.880 0.880 0.881 0.880 0.880 0.880 0.880 0.880 0.881 
Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
തܴଶ 0.868 0.867 0.869 0.867 0.868 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.869 
Hansen-Test 6.0e+09 2218.358 979.056 361.686 1775.228 2.2e+08 2.7e+04 7663.393 8.2e+05 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Losses). All regressions were estimates with time dummies. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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 regressions with the remaining regions 
Table 4.18 The different Households types for the OLD countries 
Variables 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 
GDPg 0.022* 0.022* 0.021* 0.021* 0.021* 0.021* 0.021* 0.019* 0.020* 0.021* 0.018* 0.018* 0.019* 0.020* 
 (1.777) (1.860) (1.764) (1.788) (1.780) (1.816) (1.857) (1.742) (1.776) (1.787) (1.645) (1.755) (1.776) (1.799) 
TaxconsGDP 0.055 0.055 0.062 0.061 0.058 0.058 0.062 0.064 0.062 0.057 0.063 0.065 0.065 0.061 
 (0.842) (0.827) (0.952) (0.949) (0.877) (0.867) (0.948) (0.980) (0.945) (0.865) (0.963) (1.002) (1.001) (0.926) 
HICPHgculture -0.062** -0.062** -0.061** -0.061* -0.061** -0.061** -0.059* -0.068** -0.059* -0.061** -0.062** -0.060** -0.061** -0.061** 
 (-2.339) (-2.303) (-2.187) (-2.132) (-2.214) (-2.163) (-1.968) (-2.908) (-2.071) (-2.185) (-2.272) (-2.246) (-2.214) (-2.235) 
SPn50  -0.002             
  (-0.145)             
SPn67   0.009            
   (0.517)            
SPn80    0.013           
    (0.746)           
SPn100     0.008          
     (0.501)          
SPn125      0.007         
      (0.378)         
SPn167       0.015        
       (0.693)        
SPt67        0.008       
        (0.983)       
Cn10033         0.015      
         (0.794)      
Cn100100          0.007     
          (0.440)     
Ct100           0.020    
           (0.907)    
Ct10033            0.021   
            (1.019)   
Ct10067             0.018  
             (0.903)  
Ct100100              0.013 
              (0.722) 
Change 1.238*** 1.236*** 1.245*** 1.249*** 1.244*** 1.243*** 1.242*** 1.237*** 1.255*** 1.242*** 1.242*** 1.259*** 1.249*** 1.242*** 
 (15.829) (17.004) (15.988) (16.042) (16.082) (16.296) (15.749) (15.206) (15.870) (16.001) (14.903) (14.930) (15.310) (15.269) 
Constant 4.025*** 4.073*** 3.725*** 3.606*** 3.755*** 3.757*** 3.402** 3.862*** 3.566*** 3.800*** 3.601*** 3.481*** 3.505*** 3.619*** 
 (5.115) (4.605) (4.002) (3.786) (3.714) (3.267) (2.876) (4.819) (3.532) (3.835) (3.799) (3.594) (3.512) (3.549) 
Observations 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 
ܴଶ 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.856 0.859 0.859 0.858 0.857 
Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
തܴଶ 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.849 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.850 
Hansen-Test 1.2e+04 2613.756 1134.045 1526.225 1692.318 1773.026 1942.547 946.576 1230.159 1401.549 1051.507 580.610 525.371 635.569 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
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Table 4.19 The different Households types for the EURO Zone 
Variables 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 
GDPg 0.022** 0.023** 0.021** 0.020** 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 0.022** 0.021** 0.020** 0.021** 0.021** 0.020** 0.020** 
 (2.446) (2.302) (2.077) (2.157) (2.200) (2.227) (2.247) (2.287) (2.177) (2.121) (2.220) (2.311) (2.233) (2.245) 
TaxconsGDP 0.081*** 0.075** 0.073** 0.074** 0.074** 0.074** 0.077** 0.073** 0.073** 0.077** 0.073** 0.073** 0.075** 0.076** 
 (2.833) (2.525) (2.472) (2.492) (2.362) (2.249) (2.258) (2.463) (2.445) (2.308) (2.516) (2.525) (2.457) (2.328) 
HICPHgculture -0.048** -0.048** -0.049** -0.049** -0.049** -0.049** -0.049** -0.048** -0.049** -0.049** -0.049** -0.049** -0.049** -0.049** 
 (-2.409) (-2.376) (-2.448) (-2.389) (-2.383) (-2.391) (-2.316) (-2.241) (-2.394) (-2.353) (-2.428) (-2.405) (-2.453) (-2.368) 
SPn50  -0.008             
  (-0.534)             
SPn67   0.006            
   (0.275)            
SPn80    0.009           
    (0.445)           
SPn100     0.002          
     (0.095)          
SPn125      0.001         
      (0.045)         
SPn167       0.007        
       (0.319)        
SPt67        -0.002       
        (-0.400)       
Cn10033         0.001      
         (0.045)      
Cn100100          0.010     
          (0.443)     
Ct100           0.000    
           (0.049)    
Ct10033            0.002   
            (0.096)   
Ct10067             0.008  
             (0.422)  
Ct100100              0.006 
              (0.363) 
Change 1.199*** 1.174*** 1.177*** 1.178*** 1.179*** 1.179*** 1.178*** 1.181*** 1.179*** 1.179*** 1.178*** 1.179*** 1.178*** 1.179*** 
 (13.041) (13.453) (12.598) (12.787) (12.820) (12.833) (12.726) (12.861) (13.094) (12.703) (12.853) (12.915) (12.837) (12.944) 
Constant 2.827*** 3.097*** 2.845*** 2.734*** 2.910*** 2.934*** 2.703** 2.970*** 2.939*** 2.669*** 2.958*** 2.940*** 2.792*** 2.800*** 
 (8.893) (6.833) (5.511) (4.198) (4.220) (3.697) (2.911) (8.727) (4.382) (3.303) (7.915) (6.278) (4.737) (4.374) 
Observations 218 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
ܴଶ 0.839 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.836 
Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
തܴଶ 0.829 0.826 0.825 0.826 0.825 0.825 0.826 0.825 0.825 0.826 0.825 0.825 0.826 0.826 
Hansen-Test 8626.827 1041.778 808.702 853.152 918.880 751.863 823.716 2.7e+04 530.353 732.485 4742.566 2869.755 930.655 975.902 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
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 Unit root Formulas 
We present the mathematical expressions used to compute the unit root tests of section 
(4.1). In this chapter we presented ܼ௧ሚି௕௔௥ in which the output has an asymptotic standard 
normal distribution.  
We rewrite equation (1) 
Δݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜௧ ൅  ߶௜ݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅  ߳௜௧                                            (IX.4.1) 
Consider 
̃ݐ_ܾܽݎே் ൌ ଵே ∑ ̃ݐ௜்ே௜ୀଵ                                                  (IX.4.2) 
where 
̃ݐ௜் ൌ ∆௬೔
ᇲெഓ௬೔,షభ
ఙ෥೔೅൫௬೔,షభᇲ ெഓ௬೔,షభ൯
భ
మ
                                                (IX.4.3) 
We have that ∆࢟࢏ ൌ ሺ∆ݕ௜ଶ, … , ∆ݕ௜்ሻᇱ , ࢟࢏,ି૚ ൌ ൫ݕ௜ଵ, … , ݕ௜,்ିଵ൯ᇱ and ࡹఛ ൌ ۷ െ
்߬ሺ߬ᇱ் ்߬ሻିଵ߬ᇱ்  
and 
ߪ෤௜௧ଶ ൌ ∆࢟࢏
ᇲࡹഓ࢟೔
்ିଵ                                                      (IX.4.4) 
then 
ܼ௧ሚି௕௔௥ ൌ √ே൛௧ሚ್ೌೝಿ೅ିே
షభ ∑ ாሺ௧ሚ೔೅ሻ೔ಿసభ ൟ  
ඥேషభ ∑ ௏௔௥ሺ௧ሚ೔೅ሻ೔                                     (IX.4.5) 
Both ܧሺ̃ݐ௜்ሻ and ܸܽݎሺ̃ݐ௜்ሻ are obtained by linearly interpolating the values shown in Im et 
al. (2003). 
In the variable in which we performed the Fisher type test we presented the inverse normal 
Z statistics that has the following mathematical expression. 
ܼ ൌ ଵ√ே ∑ Φିଵሺ݌௜ሻே௜ୀଵ                                         (IX.4.6) 
Were Φିଵሺ݌௜ሻ is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function and 
ܼ~ܰሺ0,1ሻ. 
129 
 
 The different regions of the European Union  
The regions of Europe that will be analyzed here show different stages of 
development, which can affect the enforcements of laws and Government effectiveness. 
European Union has grown since its original creation (1952) with the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) formed by 
Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands. In 
1973 entered Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom; later on in 1981 Greece entered. 
Its geographical domain expanded including many countries, such as Portugal and Spain that 
entered in 1986. With the Maastricht Treaty (1993) it was established the current name 
“European Union”. Austria, Sweden and Finland joined in 1995. In 2004 10 countries 
entered: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Malta and Cyprus. In 2007 two more entered, Romania and Bulgaria. They represent two 
distinct realities (level of economic development, culture and language). Some of the new 
countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) came from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR). 
The Euro Zone is constituted by 17 countries88, some of which recently entered the 
European Union. Countries that entered the Euro Zone must obey certain rules that were set 
in order to prevent inflation. A deficit less than 3% of the GDP, a debt less or equal than 
60%, are part of the third stage of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to adopt 
the euro as their currency. Additional to these criteria they had to obey an inflation rate that 
had to be at most, 1.5% points above the average of the three best performing Member States 
of the EU and also the nominal long-term interest rate must not be more than 2 percentage 
points higher than in the three lowest Member States. The rule of Government debt was 
relaxed to allow more countries to enter. (For a detailed description see art 104, 121 and 122 
of the EC Treaty) 
These criteria obey a certain principle; they suppose an average growth rate of 2%, 
deficit can be above 3% in extraordinary circumstances such as crisis. Unfortunately the 
crises stroke the European Union with the sovereign debt crisis. The objective of excessive 
deficit procedures is to prevent and sanction countries that did not meet these criteria. Not 
                                                 
88 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. 
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one or two countries failed to meet these criteria; almost all of them. Examples are Austria, 
Italy, Portugal, France, and Ireland. Instead of sanctions it was proposed deadlines to the 
Member States to meet these criteria. This can affect the use of fiscal policies in order to 
promote expansionary policies, for example reducing the VAT rate on software products.   
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 Robustness Check 
 
Table 4.20 Additional Results 
Variables 96 97 98 
GDPg 0.008 0.008 0.010 
 (1.349) (1.266) (1.585) 
TaxconsGDP 0.068*** 0.063** 0.061** 
 (2.843) (2.658) (2.435) 
HICPHgall -0.010** -0.010** -0.004*** 
 (-2.477) (-2.489) (-3.320) 
SPn50 0.024* 0.024* 0.021** 
 (1.893) (1.914) (2.081) 
School -0.120 -0.119  
 (-1.287) (-1.320)  
Net 0.003  0.003 
 (0.901)  (1.032) 
Change 0.932*** 0.977*** 0.945*** 
 (8.991) (11.925) (9.989) 
Constant 3.863** 3.973*** 2.505*** 
 (2.660) (2.785) (5.788) 
Observations 324 324 346 
ܴଶ 0.880 0.880 0.883 
Countries 27 27 27 
തܴଶ 0.874 0.874 0.877 
Hansen-test 2064.071 5560.705 1066.475 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Losses). All regressions were estimates with time dummies. Robust t-statistics 
are in parentheses. School is the total years of schooling offered in a country and net is the internet users. Both 
variables were retrieved from the WDI of the World Bank. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The problem of software piracy has been growing over the years as a result of the 
exponential development and dissemination of the Internet and Computers. Since original 
conception of WWW protocol by Tim Berners-Lee in 198989, Internet speeds have increased 
exponentially exceeding nowadays more than 100MBPS90. The ability to interact with the 
information society in its different interface types (Computers, Tablets, Smartphones, etc.) 
doesn’t come with the individual; the required knowledge is acquired in many cases at school 
or at the workplace. Furthermore, to take advantages of some of the functionalities of these 
devices it is necessary to have a certain level of skills acquired on school or at the work place 
or even self-taught. With better education comes also the knowledge to download illegal 
software without being caught by national Intellectual Property authorities. Education can 
affect the use of software, nevertheless, books in which content is taught also shape the 
knowledge acquired at the different levels of education, introduction of moral concepts can 
affect student’s perception of illicit behaviour.  
The content relating to Intellectual Property Rights in schoolbooks can shape and 
prevent future use of illicit software. In a recent study MacDonald and Fougere (2003) 
analysed in what extent the software piracy phenomenon is present in MIS (Management 
Information Science) textbooks using Index Citation91. The main result found by these 
authors was that software piracy was present on 72%, ethics was present in 67%, software 
license in 50%, copyright in 50% and intellectual property in 39%.  
 Recent literature (Goel & Nelson, 2009) focused solely on the literacy rate 
indicator a factor that could explain this phenomenon, having established a positive effect 
between literacy and software piracy. There have been attempts to explain piracy rates with 
other variables such as the years of schooling of people with age 25 and over (see Andrés 
(2006b)); in this case more schooling years resulted in less piracy. In our opinion we must 
also understand what happens in each level of education, from pre-primary to university, in 
                                                 
89 http://www.webfoundation.org/vision/history-of-the-web/  
90 Many Internet providers in the European Union such as VOO in Belgium, Vodafone in the different countries 
that operates, offer these speeds. 
91 They used a 5-point likert scale in which 5 represents a perfect coverage: software piracy obtained 1.4; 
software license 0.9; Intellectual Property 1.0; Ethics 1.3 and Copyright 1.2. These results show that software 
piracy must be better taught in the courses of MIS. 
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order to promote concrete measures that Governments can implement with the help of 
national Intellectual Property Offices and European Union authorities. To Know in what 
levels of education is necessary to act primarily to mitigate piracy is essential as well as set 
different approaches at each level. 
This chapter departs from the empirical literature focusing on the financial aspects of 
education, for example, considering the expenditure that the Governments put in different 
levels of education (measured in percentage of GDPpc or GDP). This approach also allows 
us to analyse how this expenditure is made on the different ISCED (International Standard 
Classification of Education) levels from 0 to 692. We also introduce non-financial dimensions 
that reflect years of education offered in a country. The International Standard Classification 
of Education (ISCED) was designed by UNESCO in the early 1970’s to serve “as an 
instrument suitable for assembling, compiling and presenting statistics of education both 
within individual countries and internationally”. The present classification, now known as 
ISCED 1997, was approved by the UNESCO General Conference at its 29th session in 
November 1997. With this method it is possible to compare statistics on education in 
different countries worldwide. 
European Countries have different dimensions (sizes) and, depending on their 
budgetary restrictions and level of taxation, they can spend more or less on education. 
Students at different levels of education receive help to continue his/her studies; this help 
comes in several forms such as scholarships. Normally, the higher the level of education 
attained the more expenses students incur on. Governments carefully attribute this financial 
help to those students with less income in order for them to continue the studies. We will 
analyse if the financial aid to students can influence their behaviour towards using legal or 
illegal software. 
Expenditure on education can go to public and/or private education institutions. We 
will analyse how these expenditure on both types of institutions can be used to mitigate or 
even prevent the software piracy phenomenon.   
                                                 
92 ISCED 0- Pre-primary education; ISCED 1- Primary education or first stage of basic education; ISCED 2- 
Lower secondary or second stage of basic education; ISCED 3- Upper secondary education; ISCED 4- Post-
secondary non-tertiary education; ISCED 5- First Stage of tertiary education; ISCED 6- Second Stage of 
tertiary education. 
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This work studies the effects of education on software piracy, focusing on non-
financial and financial measures, namely the investment (or lack of) in education, as a factor 
that can explain piracy in the European Union.  
 
The main questions that we try to answer are the following: 
(i) More years of schooling offered in a country will reduce piracy? 
(ii) More resources allocated to education can prevent software piracy? 
(iii) In which levels the Governments must allocate more resources and in what 
type of institutions? 
(iv)  Financial aid to students can prevent or even make disappear software 
piracy? 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 5.2 makes a cross-country comparison 
of the students distribution according to different types of educational institutions. Section 
5.3 describes the dataset, variables and methodology used; section 5.4 presents the empirical 
work; finally, section 5.5 concludes. 
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5.2 Distribution of Students in Private and Public educational 
institutions 
Education and its quality can affect a student as its future performance in the 
workplace depends on the skills learned in school; more time at school increases student’s 
future income (Mulligan, 1999) and his perception of the reality, e.g. of social norms and a 
better understanding of the national legal system (Hoskins, D'Hombres, & Campbell, 2008). 
From the earliest times that parents face the decision to choose in which type of 
educational institution should enroll their children. Several factors affect this decision such 
as the quality of the institution, the education of parents, their financial constraints, etc. 
These educational institutions can be classified into public and private. In the first case, they 
are controlled and managed directly by a public education authority or agency93; in the 
second case they are controlled and managed by a non-governmental organization (e.g. a 
Church, Trade Union or business enterprise)94. Both types usually provide additional 
curricular activities such as Music, Chess and different types of Sports. Governments can 
also provide financial help to private institutions by means of national education system 
specific protocols.  
Within the European Union framework, there are several frameworks that promote 
the development of countries95 where educational institutions are included. One example of 
a mechanism to develop the regions is the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF - 
see Council Regulation - EC (1783/1999)). The main objective is to promote regional 
development. These countries must promote policies to help fund allocation to education 
that in turn will lower piracy and promote economic growth. Another important fund is the 
European Social Fund (ESF - see Council Regulation - EC (1784/1999)). This fund has the 
objective to promote active labour market policies and prevent unemployment. One of the 
objectives is the promotion of education and training for the individuals. These funds serve 
to promote the education in a country, among other things. 
Figure 5.1 shows the percentage of students that are attending public and private 
educational institutions in all educational levels. All ISCED levels are jointly considered. To 
                                                 
93 http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2194 
94 http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2123 
95 Countries receive structural funds in order to develop and promote growth (see Council Regulation (EC) 
(1260/1999)) 
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obtain the percentage of students on public institutions, we divided the number of students 
and pupils on public institutions by the total student population (both public and private). In 
the same way to obtain the percentage of students on private institutions we divided the 
students and pupils in private institutions by the total student population. 
Countries such as Belgium and United Kingdom have a great percentage of almost 
50% of students on private educational institutions. Nevertheless, in the United Kingdom 
this percentage has declined over the years. Information on Netherlands was only available 
in 2000 and only 26% were in public institutions. In many countries the percentages of 
students on public institutions is declining over time in favour of private institutions. In 2010, 
the highest levels of students in public educational institutions were present on Greece 
(96%), Lithuania (96%), Slovenia (95%), Ireland (94%) and Bulgaria with 93%. The lowest 
student population on public institutions was on Belgium (44%) and United Kingdom (64%).  
 
Figure 5.1 Distribution of students on public and private educational institutions in 2010 
 
Notes: Source, Eurostat. Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 present the different ISCED levels for public and private 
educational institutions. The ISCED 5 is a result of the sum of the ISCED 5A96 and ISCED 
5B97. It can be seen that Governments through public institutions play an important role in 
providing education for the young. The majority of countries have more than 90% of the 
student population in ISCED 1 through 6. Private institutions also play an important role on 
higher educational levels, namely ISCED 5 and 6 on Latvia. The distribution of students 
according to the type of institution varies among countries, and when the different levels of 
ISCED are considered, there are differences in each country.  
                                                 
96 First stage of tertiary education - Syllabuses that are theoretically based, research preparatory or giving access 
to professions with high skills requirements (level 5A). 
97 First stage of tertiary education - Syllabuses practically oriented and occupationally specific (level 5B). 
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Table 5.1 Distribution of students on public and private educational institutions from ISCED 1 to ISCED 3 
 ISCED 1 ISCED 2 ISCED 3
 Public Private Public Private Public Private
Countries 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 
Belgium 46% 45% 46% 54% 55% 54% 42% 43% 40% 58% 57% 60% 40% 42% 43% 60% 58% 57% 
Bulgaria 100% 100% 99% 0% 0% 1% 100% 99% 98% 0% 1% 2% 99% 98% 97% 1% 2% 3% 
Czech Republic 99% 99% 98% 1% 1% 2% 98% 98% 97% 2% 2% 3% 90% 87% 86% 10% 13% 14% 
Denmark 89% 88% 86% 11% 12% 14% 78% 76% 74% 22% 24% 26% 98% 98% 98% 2% 2% 2% 
Germany 98% 97% 96% 2% 3% 4% 93% 92% 91% 7% 8% 9% 93% 92% 93% 7% 8% 7% 
Estonia 99% 98% 96% 1% 2% 4% 99% 98% 97% 1% 2% 3% 99% 97% 97% 1% 3% 3% 
Ireland 99% 99% 99% 1% 1% 1% 100% 100% NA 0% 0% NA 99% 99% 98% 1% 1% 2% 
Greece 93% 93% 93% 7% 7% 7% 95% 95% 95% 5% 5% 5% 94% 94% 96% 6% 6% 4% 
Spain 67% 68% 68% 33% 32% 32% 67% 68% 69% 33% 32% 31% 79% 78% 78% 21% 22% 22% 
France 85% 85% 85% 15% 15% 15% 79% 79% 78% 21% 21% 22% 70% 70% 68% 30% 30% 32% 
Italy 93% 93% 93% 7% 7% 7% 97% 96% 96% 3% 4% 4% 94% 95% 89% 6% 5% 11% 
Cyprus 96% 94% 92% 4% 6% 8% 90% 87% 82% 10% 13% 18% 89% 87% 83% 11% 13% 17% 
Latvia 99% 99% 99% 1% 1% 1% 99% 99% 99% 1% 1% 1% 99% 98% 98% 1% 2% 2% 
Lithuania 100% 100% 99% 0% 0% 1% 100% 100% 99% 0% 0% 1% 100% 100% 99% 0% 0% 1% 
Luxembourg 93% 93% 91% 7% 7% 9% 79% 80% 81% 21% 20% 19% 85% 84% 84% 15% 16% 16% 
Hungary 95% 94% 91% 5% 6% 9% 95% 93% 91% 5% 7% 9% 91% 85% 79% 9% 15% 21% 
Malta 64% 62% 59% 36% 38% 41% 70% 65% 62% 30% 35% 38% 89% 93% 92% 11% 7% 8% 
Netherlands 31% NA NA 69% NA NA 25% NA NA 75% NA NA 8% NA NA 92% NA NA 
Austria 96% 95% 94% 4% 5% 6% 93% 92% 91% 7% 8% 9% 91% 88% 89% 9% 12% 11% 
Poland 99% 98% 97% 1% 2% 3% 99% 98% 96% 1% 2% 4% 94% 91% 86% 6% 9% 14% 
Portugal 90% 90% 88% 10% 10% 12% 90% 88% 81% 10% 12% 19% 85% 82% 76% 15% 18% 24% 
Romania NA 100% 100% NA 0% 0% NA 100% 100% NA 0% 0% 99% 99% 97% 1% 1% 3% 
Slovenia 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 98% 96% 97% 2% 4% 3% 
Slovakia 96% 95% 94% 4% 5% 6% 95% 94% 94% 5% 6% 6% 93% 89% 86% 7% 11% 14% 
Finland 99% 99% 99% 1% 1% 1% 96% 96% 96% 4% 4% 4% 90% 86% 84% 10% 14% 16% 
Sweden 97% 94% 92% 3% 6% 8% 97% 92% 88% 3% 7% 12% 98% 92% 84% 2% 8% 16% 
United Kingdom 95% 95% 95% 5% 5% 5% 94% 94% 79% 6% 7% 21% 30% 25% 54% 70% 75% 46% 
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Table 5.2 Distribution of students on public and private educational institutions from ISCED 4 to ISCED 6 
 ISCED 4 ISCED 5 ISCED 6
 Public Private Public Private Public Private
GEO/TIME 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 
Belgium 19% 17% 14% 81% 83% 86% 44% 45% 43% 56% 55% 57% 38% 44% 55% 62% 56% 45% 
Bulgaria 81% 49% 20% 19% 51% 80% 89% 83% 78% 11% 17% 22% 100% 99% 98% 0% 1% 2% 
Czech Republic 71% 71% 79% 29% 29% 21% 95% 90% 84% 5% 10% 16% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
Denmark NA 100% NA 0% 0% 0% NA 99% 98% NA 1% 2% NA 100% NA NA 0% NA 
Germany 96% 94% 92% 4% 6% 8% NA 91% 88% NA 9% 12% NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Estonia 89% 92% 91% 11% 8% 9% 19% 18% 17% 81% 82% 83% NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Ireland 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 95% 92% 95% 5% 8% 5% 98% 97% 98% 2% 3% 2% 
Greece 77% 72% NA 23% 28% NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Spain 75% NA NA 25% NA NA 87% 86% 85% 13% 14% 15% 96% 95% 95% 4% 5% 5% 
France 72% 66% 59% 28% 34% 41% 85% 83% 80% 15% 17% 20% 100% 100% 99% 0% 0% 1% 
Italy 76% 79% 21% 24% 21% 79% 94% 94% 91% 6% 6% 9% 97% 96% 96% 3% 4% 4% 
Cyprus NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 29% NA NA 71% NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Latvia 98% 94% 86% 2% 6% 14% 2% 4% 6% 98% 96% 94% 0% 0% NA 100% 100% NA 
Lithuania NA 100% 100% NA 0% 0% 96% 92% 88% 4% 8% 12% NA 100% 99% NA 0% 1% 
Luxembourg NA 100% NA NA 0% NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Hungary 95% 67% 61% 5% 33% 39% 87% 85% 83% 13% 15% 17% 98% 95% 93% 2% 5% 7% 
Malta 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% NA 100% 100% NA 0% 0% NA 
Netherlands NA NA NA NA NA NA 31% NA NA 69% NA NA 79% NA NA 21% NA NA 
Austria 85% 82% 81% 15% 18% 19% 92% 86% 83% 8% 14% 17% 100% 100% 98% 0% 0% 2% 
Poland 45% 46% 23% 55% 54% 77% 72% 70% 67% 28% 30% 33% 92% 92% 93% 8% 8% 7% 
Portugal NA 28% 87% NA 72% 13% 68% 73% 76% 32% 27% 24% 87% 89% 93% 13% 11% 7% 
Romania 59% 49% 56% 41% 51% 44% 71% 77% NA 29% 23% NA NA 100% 98% NA 0% 2% 
Slovenia 100% 98% 99% 0% 2% 1% NA 92% 87% NA 8% 13% NA 88% 87% NA 12% 13% 
Slovakia 84% 75% 81% 16% 25% 19% 100% 98% 83% 0% 2% 17% 100% 99% 97% 0% 1% 3% 
Finland 72% 87% 85% 28% 13% 15% 88% 89% NA 12% 11% NA 100% 100% NA 0% 0% NA 
Sweden 94% 98% 49% 6% 14% 51% 94% 93% 91% 6% 7% 9% 93% 93% 93% 7% 7% 7% 
United Kingdom NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
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5.3 Data and variable description  
The construction of our dataset was based on the official statistics provided by the 
Eurostat website, from 2000 to 2011. Additional to this, the software piracy rates were 
retrieved from the official annual reports provided by the Business Software Alliance (BSA, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2010b, 2012). Data on the number of years of both primary and secondary 
education offered by each country were drawn from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) provided by the World Bank.  
 
 Dependent Variable (Software Piracy) 
Before a software product is released to the public it is necessary many hours of 
work (sometimes millions of euros in R&D), after of which the product is finalized and all 
bugs are eliminated. The feedback of possible software bugs is usually provided by testers98 
in early stages of software development (Alpha and Beta versions). Costs associated with 
software can vary; different categories of products (games, movies, productivity software) 
will have different mean prices. After a software product is finished the owner will seek 
copyright protection on a national or International Property Office. The software price will 
not reflect the actual hard copy but a license, and this price should take into account all 
previous costs devoted to its development. Not paying this license constitutes a crime 
(software piracy).  
The dependent variable is the software piracy rates that represent the percentage of 
software that is illegally used. We can define Software Piracy as the unauthorized use of 
software, being for leisure or work, without paying a license to the owner. The Business 
Software Alliance provides an aggregate estimate of software piracy in a country and several 
categories of products are considered: General Productivity Applications99, Professional 
                                                 
98 http://www.istqb.org/   
99 1. Databases, 2. Presentations Graphics, 3. Project Management, 4.  Spreadsheets, 5. Word Processing. 
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Applications100, and Utilities101. They also included operating systems, consumer-oriented 
software (games, personal finance and reference) and local-language software. 
Software piracy can come in different forms: i) Softlifting, when we purchase a 
single licensed copy of the software and load it on multiple computers, contrary to the license 
terms; ii) Internet piracy occurs when we make unauthorized copies of copyrighted software 
available to others electronically, for example, lending to friends; iii) Software counterfeiting 
is the illegal duplication and distribution of copyrighted software in a form designed to make 
it appear to be legitimate; iv) OEM unbundling occurs when selling stand-alone software 
that was intended to be bundled with specific accompanying hardware; v) Hard disk loading 
installing consists of putting unauthorized copies of software onto the hard disks of personal 
computers, often as an incentive for the end user to buy the hardware from that particular 
hardware dealer; and vi) renting when unauthorized rental of software for temporary use is 
made similar to what occurs in Films. 
 
 Control Variables 
This subsection describes variables, found by previous authors as affecting software 
piracy in a country. Variables affect the disposable income of households by means of 
personal income, taxation or inflation.  
Previous authors found that the Gross Domestic per capita negatively affected the 
levels of software piracy (Goel & Nelson, 2009; Ram D. Gopal & Sanders, 1998; Marron & 
Steel, 2000). In Chapter 4 we found that, in the European Union, the impact of this variable 
was marginal. We will introduce a proxy variable that will represent the expenditure of 
households: household’s final consumption expenditure per capita102. This variable is 
expected to have a negative impact on piracy, e.g., more expenditure on goods and services 
reduces piracy as they have more disposable income. 
                                                 
1006. Accounting, 7. Languages, 8. Curricular, 9. Desktop Publishing, 10. Other Languages, 11. Professional 
Drawing and Painting, 12. Programming Tools. 
101 13. Application Utilities, 14. Calendar & Scheduling, 15. Clips, 16. Communications, 17. Education 
Administration & Productivity, 18. Electronic Mail, 19. Fonts, 20. Forms, 21. General Business, 22. Internet 
Access and Tools, 23. Personal and Business Productivity, 24. PIM’s, 25. System Utilities and 26. Training. 
102 Final consumption expenditure (ESA95, 3.75-3.99) consists of expenditure incurred by residential 
institutional units on goods or services that are used for the direct satisfaction of the individual needs or wants 
or the collective needs of members of the community. 
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A measure of taxation in a country will be used (as with Chapter 4 The relative 
importance of consumption, corporate and labour taxation as a share of total GDP will be 
used. These taxes have a strong effect on an economy being households affected by them. 
The consumption taxation taxes their expenditure on goods and services, capital taxation 
taxes their income from deposits and labour taxation taxes their income. All taxes are 
expected to have a positive impact. 
A control variable that measures the inflation of a country will be used; this variable 
allows a comparison of the evolution of prices across the European Union. Several 
dimensions can be considered here. In Chapter 4 we considered inflation of overall products, 
cultural products and communications. Results were similar in all categories of products. 
These variables were found to affect negatively software piracy losses, being this effect 
significant but marginal (values ranged from -0.004 to -0.006). Our analysis in this chapter 
focus on a different dependent variable, so these values may be different. Inflation may not 
affect software prices directly; nevertheless an increase on overall prices will affect the 
disposable income of households. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on 
software piracy. 
 
 Education dimension 
This subsection introduces the education dimension, describing both non-financial and 
financial variables that can affect piracy. The non-financial measure of education will affect 
the future income of households as higher education can represent more job opportunities 
with better salaries. In the financial aspects, more resources allocated would provide better 
curricula and greater awareness by students about illicit content and about the consequences 
of their use. Resources could also be applied into the acquisition of software for personal 
use. 
 
5.3.3.1 Non-financial educational dimension 
We introduce a non-financial variable in the educational dimension that will reflect 
the education offered by a country in the primary and secondary levels. In Chapter 3  we 
studied this variable, analysing all countries present in the official publications provided by 
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the Business Software Alliance. Both primary and secondary education had a negative impact 
on piracy, which indicates that more time spent at school reduces the risk of using illicit 
software. In our analysis we will consider the total schooling years offered by a country at 
both primary and secondary levels. This variable is expected to have a negative impact on 
piracy. 
 
H1: More schooling years on primary and secondary education will lower piracy 
 
5.3.3.2 Financial educational dimension 
Expenditure on education can come from local Governments and Central 
Governments but usually the Central Government redistributes the income from taxes to the 
ministry of education that by turn will use it on schools and universities. Our main objective 
is to find if education plays an important role in deterring software piracy and, for that 
purpose, we will examine, when possible, the different ISCED levels. 
Spending on education can come from different sources; one of these is the financial 
aid to students103 as a percentage of total public expenditure on education. This variable is 
disaggregated into ISCED 1-4 and 5-6. This financial aid can come in the form of 
scholarships due to the low income of the parents, or can result from good grades and good 
behaviour. This variable is expected to have a negative effect. When considering the possible 
effect that this variable has on piracy we must consider the education of students, e.g. more 
education can also represent more knowledge of how to use and seek illegal software. This 
financial help can also provide resources to spend improving the access to digital content for 
example with the possibility to buy access to both Internet (at higher speeds) and a Personal 
Computer (of higher performance). 
 
H2: Financial aid to students considering all ISCED levels has a negative effect 
on Software Piracy. 
                                                 
103 Financial aid to pupils and students as % of total public expenditure on education, for all levels of education 
combined or on ISCED 1-4 and ISCED 5-6. 
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So far, previous authors only considered non-financial indicators such as literacy 
rates or years of schooling based on Barro and Lee (2013) dataset. To improve previous 
research we will introduce the annual expenditure on public and private104 educational 
institutions per student/pupil compared to GDPpc.  We will also consider the impact of 
public spending on education compared to GDP105 (in both cases we expect the same results). 
Unfortunately the Eurostat don’t provide a disaggregated analysis into public and private 
educational institutions. More spending on educational institutions can result in better 
curricula and also better resources to connect schools to the digital economy, for example 
offering higher Internet speeds and better computers for students. A disaggregated analysis 
using ISCED 0, ISCED 1, ISCED 2-4 and ISCED 5-6 will be considered.  
 
H3: More spending on Education at all levels will reduce software piracy. 
 
These resources must be made available to students and also increasing student’s 
awareness when using software. Moreover, these resources also increase the potential for 
practicing software piracy. We expect that more educational expenditure on education will 
reduce piracy, although we expect a positive effect on higher educational levels as a result 
of better access to the digital world. We expect that the impact on the different educational 
levels may be different. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
104 Annual expenditure on public and private educational institutions per pupil compared to GDP per capita for 
all levels of education combined based on full-time equivalents or on ISCED 1, ISCED 2-4 and ISCED 5-6. 
105 Total public expenditure on education as % of GDP, for all levels of education combined and on  ISCED 1, 
ISCED 2-4 and ISCED 5-6 
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5.4 Empirical Evidence 
 Econometric Specification 
In this section we provide the econometric specification that will be used. We can 
divide our analysis in two: one, considering the effects of public spending and other, 
analysing in what type of educational institutions expenditure is made. The main 
methodology used will be the fixed effect model as it was found by Andrés (2006a) and in 
Chapter 4  to be suited for the analysis within the European Union. 
In model 6.1 we include the variables that will be used in the first analysis. The 
general econometric specification is given by: 
 
ܴܲ௜௧ ൌ ߙଵln ሺܪܨܥܧ݌ܿሻ௜௧ ൅ ߙଶݐܽݔ௜௧ ൅ ߙଷݏ݄ܿ݋݋݈௜௧ ൅ ߙସܪܫܥܲܪ݃௜௧ ൅ ߙହܣܫܦ݈݈ܽ௜௧ ൅
ߙ଺ܲݑܾܧݔ݌݈݈ܽ௜௧ ൅ ߙ଻݄ܿܽ݊݃݁௧ ൅ ߛ௜ ൅ ߴ௜௧                                                   (6.1) 
 
where PR is the software piracy rate, HFCEpc is the consumption of households 
(both in natural logarithms); tax is the sum of tax on consumption as a share of GDP 
(TaxConsGDP), labour taxation as a share of GDP (TaxlabGDP) and capital taxation as a 
share of GDP (TaxCapGDP). ݐܽݔ௜௧ ൌ ܶܽݔܥ݋݊ݏܩܦܲ ൅ ܶܽݔܮܾܽܩܦܲ ൅ ܶܽݔܥܽ݌ܩܦܲ. 
School represents the total number of years of schooling offered by a country, which is the 
sum of both primary and secondary education. ݏ݄ܿ݋݋݈ ൌ ݌ݎ݅݉ܽݎݕ ൅ ݏ݁ܿ݋݊݀ܽݎݕ; HICPHg 
is the inflation for the overall products in a country. 
PubExpall is the total public spending on education as a share of GDP; this variable 
can be decomposed into PubExp0, PubExp1, PubExp24 and PubExp56, which represent the 
ISCED 0, 1, 2-4 and 5-6 respectively. Financial aid to students is given by AIDall, which 
can also be decomposed into AID14 and AID56, associated with ISCED 1-4 and ISCED 5-
6 respectively. A variable that reflects the change in the methodology provided by the 
Business Software Alliance is introduced (change)106. ߴ௜௧ represents the error term and ߛ௜ is 
a panel specific component. i indexes the countries, i = 1,…,28 and t the time t = 
2000,…,2010.  
                                                 
106 Based on the results of Png (2010). 
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In equation 6.2 and 6.3 we provide the econometric specification for the remaining 
analysis, e.g. assessing in what type of educational institution to invest in order to lower 
piracy and in what levels.  
 
ܴܲ௜௧ ൌ ߚଵln ሺܪܨܥܧ݌ܿሻ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶݐܽݔ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷݏ݄ܿ݋݋݈௜௧ ൅ ߚସܪܫܥܲܪ݃௜௧ ൅ ߚହܣܫܦ݈݈ܽ௜௧ ൅
ߚ଺ܲݑܾܲݎ݈݈݅ܽ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଻݄ܿܽ݊݃݁௧ ൅  ߛ௜ ൅ ߴ௜௧                                            (6.2) 
 
ܴܲ௜௧ ൌ ߚଵln ሺܪܨܥܧ݌ܿሻ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶݐܽݔ௜௧ ൅ ߚସݏ݄ܿ݋݋݈௜௧ ൅ ߚହܪܫܥܲܪ݃௜௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܣܫܦ݈݈ܽ௜௧ ൅
ߚ଻ܲݑܾ݈݈ܽ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଼݄ܿܽ݊݃݁௧ ൅  ߛ௜ ൅ ߴ௜௧                                               (6.3) 
 
PubPriall is the expenditure on public and private educational institutions per 
student as a percentage of GDPpc. Puball is educational expenditure only on public 
institutions. The first variable can be decomposed into PubPri1, PubPri24 and PubPri56, 
representing expenditure on the different ISCED levels. The second variable can be 
decomposed into Pub1, Pub24 and Pub56 (related again with their ISCED levels). 
 
 Summary Statistics 
Table 5.3 presents the summary statistics for the entire sample. Luxembourg has 
the minimum piracy rate, which is 20%. This rate has been constant over the last three years. 
Bulgaria has the highest rate at 78% in 2000. With respect to financial aid, it can be seen that 
more resources are allocated into higher levels of education. This also happens in relation to 
expenditure on education on both public and private educational institutions. Public 
spending on education on the different ISCED levels show that less spending is devoted to 
lower educational levels, on ISCED 1 on average 1.34% of GDP is devoted to education 
while in ISCED 2-4, 2.23%. This increase does not reflect only an increase on the number 
of pupils in higher levels, but also that expenditure per student, either when we just consider 
the public or the public and private expenditure, is also higher in higher levels of education, 
as can be seen when we compare the Pub and PubPri variables across education levels. The 
maximum value of inflation occurred in Romania in 2000. Figure 5.2 also shows the trend 
in software piracy rates over the last years. 
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Table 5.3 Summary Statistics 
Variable        Obs.        Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
PR 329 43.60 13.77 20.00 78.00 
ln(HFCEpc) 336 9.41 0.74 7.31 10.51 
Primary 336 5.32 1.04 4.00 8.00 
Secondary 336 6.98 1.08 5.00 9.00 
school 336 12.30 0.48 11.00 13.00 
TaxConsGDP 334 12.15 1.87 7.3 19.2 
TaxCapGDP 334 7.02 2.48 1.7 14 
TaxLabGDP 334 17.19 5.1 9.1 30.8 
HICPHg 336 3.46 3.88 -1.70 45.70 
Change 336 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 
PubExpall 319 5.28 1.15 2.88 8.81 
PubExp0 294 0.56 0.24 0.00 1.61 
PubExp1 300 1.34 0.47 0.49 2.69 
PubExp24 301 2.23 0.60 0.71 5.31 
PubExp56 290 1.23 0.43 0.51 2.71 
AIDall 316 6.56 4.29 0.00 23.10 
AID14 303 4.25 3.68 0.00 20.90 
AID56 306 16.30 11.30 0.10 59.00 
Puball 296 25.54 4.90 16.30 48.20 
Pub1 301 20.93 5.13 9.80 39.00 
Pub24 301 25.48 6.61 13.00 73.10 
Pub56 283 40.98 12.26 18.50 95.90 
PubPriall 277 25.60 3.91 17.40 43.50 
PubPri1 281 21.07 5.00 10.90 37.60 
PubPri24 281 25.49 5.76 13.00 63.00 
PubPri56 279 38.29 7.13 21.40 56.00 
Notes: S.D represents the standard deviation, Min. the minimum and Max. the maximum. 
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Figure 5.2 Piracy trend 
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5.5 Effects of public spending on education in software piracy 
In this subsection we present the empirical results for public spending on education. 
We start by introducing an aggregated analysis, and then we examine what happens in the 
different ISCED levels. In each of the regressions reported we present the Hansen-test 
statistic that is a robust version of the Hausman test (Schaffer & Stillman, 2010). When 
performing estimation we must choose the appropriate estimation for the analysis. In our 
framework we could use the random effect (RE) or the fixed effect model. The Hausman 
test assumes, under the null hypothesis, that the RE estimator is consistent. The fixed effects 
estimator uses orthogonality conditions where the regressors are uncorrelated with the 
idiosyncratic error term. On the other hand, the random effect model assumes on top of this 
that the regressors are uncorrelated with the group-specific error; Hansen-test treats this 
assumption as an additional orthogonality condition. In this case, rejecting the null 
hypothesis favours the fixed effect model. We also report in Annex XII the unit root tests of 
the variables used, namely the Fisher type unit root test (I. Choi, 2001). In this framework 
four tests are available: Inverse chi-squared; Inverse normal; Inverse logit and Modified inverse 
chi-squared. Based on I. Choi (2001) simulations results, the inverse normal Z statistic offers the 
best trade-off between size and power. All variables are stationary.   
 
 Control Variables 
Table 5.4 presents the preliminary results. In column 1 to 3 we provide the baseline 
model in which only the control variables are present; variables have the expected values 
and are significant with the exception of tax. 
The first variable introduced that represent an economic dimension, was the 
household final consumption expenditure (ln(HFCEpc)). This variable has a negative value, 
which indicates that when final consumption of goods increases (also means that households 
have more money available), this reduces software piracy. Several categories of goods can 
be considered in this type of consumption: durable goods, semi-durable goods and non-
durable goods. We can interpret the magnitude effect of the change in software piracy rate 
resulting from change in independent variable by one standard deviation. If we consider the 
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-5.874 coefficient and the standard deviation of 0.74 on the HFCEpc, multiplying the two 
results in a reduction of piracy of -4.3 point. 
Durable goods in the framework of the digital economy can be seen as a purchase 
of a computer or a printer. Semi-durable goods are software products. This purchase can be 
annual in the case of software such as Antivirus or productivity software in which annual 
releases are available in a regular basis (e.g. Matlab). Computer and Console games can also 
be considered a semi-durable good, as the time to amortize them is fairly low, with the 
exception of certain RPG (Role Play Games) types. Examples of non-durable goods are 
toners and other consumables (paper, ink). Households also have more money to spend on 
services; examples of which are the monthly Internet fees, but also annual software 
subscriptions. One example in the gaming framework is the annual Playstation Plus 
subscription that allows the user to play many games and purchase others with smaller prices.  
Another variable introduced that affects income, namely by changing the price of 
products, was the inflation rate. While in many cases software products are not affected by 
inflation, being its prices constant over the years, the effect of inflation have a positive effect 
on software piracy being significant at 5%. Our initially hypothesis is also supported. This 
effect indicates that an increase of overall products prices can lead to less disposable income 
of households to purchase non-essential goods such as movies or music. Households will 
shift their consumption to illicit software. Increasing this variable by one standard deviation 
would result in an increase of piracy of 0.44 points (3.88*0.115). 
The final control variable introduced measures the relative importance of taxation; 
significance was not present.  
 
 Educational dimension 
5.5.2.1 Non-financial educational dimension 
Within this dimension, we introduced the total years of schooling offered by a 
country measured by the school, primary and secondary variables. This variable has a 
negative impact on piracy supporting our initial hypothesis. This is not a measure of 
education attained but a measured of education offered. Results indicate that when a country 
changes its years of schooling in both primary and secondary education, it can reduce piracy, 
but the effects may not be verified immediately after the change. These changes must be 
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made with caution has there are countries in which this value is extremely high (13 years in 
Germany and Ireland are two examples). In this case an increase is not feasible. But there 
are countries that have only 11 years of schooling (Bulgaria); this value was increase to 12 
years in 2003. A change in one standard deviation of this variable results in an improvement 
of software piracy of (-2.479*1.04) -2.57 in primary and (-2.239*1.07) -2.4 in secondary 
education. When a detailed analysis is made on the ISCED levels (Table 5.5), both primary 
and secondary are significant across specifications. 
Table 5.4 Public expenditure on Education for all the ISCED levels 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 
ln(HFCEpc) -5.874*** -5.510*** -5.437*** -1.761 -2.333* 
 (-4.967) (-4.708) (-4.435) (-1.040) (-1.867) 
HICPHg 0.097 0.095 0.095 0.115** 0.178** 
 (1.392) (1.351) (1.373) (2.417) (2.016) 
Primary -1.651 -1.355  -2.479* -2.026 
 (-1.021) (-0.906)  (-1.729) (-1.195) 
Secondary -1.974 -1.689  -2.239 -1.925 
 (-1.015) (-0.921)  (-1.258) (-0.936) 
School   -1.376   
   (-1.029)   
TaxConsGDP 0.003     
 (0.007)     
TaxLabGDP -0.391     
 (-1.064)     
TaxCapGDP 0.187     
 (0.531)     
Tax  -0.064 -0.068 -0.022 0.119 
  (-0.270) (-0.291) (-0.118) (0.767) 
AIDall    0.070  
    (0.617)  
AID14     -0.010 
     (-0.093) 
AID56     0.087** 
     (1.976) 
PubExpall    -1.164** -1.168** 
    (-2.418) (-2.398) 
Change -1.947** -1.993** -2.009** -3.722*** -3.252*** 
 (-2.225) (-2.250) (-2.272) (-2.607) (-2.733) 
Constant 127.991*** 117.944*** 115.364*** 97.331*** 90.359*** 
 (4.941) (4.894) (5.498) (3.912) (3.685) 
Observations 327 327 327 308 285 
Countries 28 28 28 28 27 
ܴଶ 0.487 0.476 0.476 0.560 0.544 
തܴଶ 0.464 0.456 0.457 0.534 0.515 
Hansen test 73.090 72.380 115.641 1008.522 783.704 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: Dependent variable is PR (piracy rates). All regressions were estimates with time dummies. 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Degrees of freedom of t-distribution for n>120 are: critical values at 10% 
are 1.645; at 5% are 1.960 and at 1% are 2.576. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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5.5.2.2 Financial Educational dimension 
In columns 4 and 5 of Table 5.4 we introduce the public spending on education as 
a share of GDP and financial aid to students. Our initial hypothesis within this dimension is 
also supported. Results show that public spending on education can reduce software piracy 
but, at the same time, financial help given to students may have a positive impact on piracy.  
When an aggregated analysis is made on financial aid to students, there is a positive 
impact of 0.070 without significance. In column 5 we present a disaggregated analysis 
(AID14, and AID56): AID14 is negative but not significant; only on higher levels of 
education, e.g. AID56, significance was present with a coefficient of 0.087. This positive 
impact can be explained by more availability of digital content provided to students but also 
more knowledge to seek and download illegal software without being caught. As predicted, 
different impacts on the different levels of education are present. The negative impact on 
educational expenditure can be explained by more resources available to teachers that will 
promote educational methods that will be passed to students improving their perception of 
the new technologies. More resources on education can also be used to control Internet 
access points using the central server. That policy could limit bandwidth when seeking illicit 
content.  A change in one standard deviation of these variable results in an change of 
software piracy of 1 point (0.087*12.26) for AID56 and -1.34 points (-1.168*1.15) for  
PubExpall. 
 
After establishing our baseline model we consider a disaggregated analysis based 
on the different ISCED levels. Table 5.5 presents the results. In column 6 we include all 
expenditures on the different educational levels; as expected they have a negative effect on 
software piracy. Significance was found on PubExp56 at 1% with a coefficient of -4.031. In 
the ISCED that ranges from 5 to 6, students are in the University. During this period of their 
life they begin to learn with the new technologies and preparing to the labour market within 
its respective fields of study.  
Increase awareness through, for example, an improved curriculum, could reduce 
piracy. But, as results show, financial help to students have a positive effect. The promotion 
of consumption of legal software is not an easy task; even software with a reduced price is 
pirated.  
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Columns 7 to 12 investigate the individual effects on the different ISCED levels; 
PubExp56 has the same impact and significance. This result indicates that the first step to 
reduce piracy is in the university graduates that, by turn, will teach their children and will 
adopt measures to reduce piracy. Young graduates that will work either at firms or in 
teaching will increase the awareness of the new generations. An increase by one standard 
deviation of PubExp56 would decrease piracy by 1.78 points (-4.162*0.43). Hansen test 
favours the fixed effect model on all regressions with a significance of 1%. 
 
Table 5.5 Detailed Public expenditure on Education for the different ISCED levels 
Variables 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
ln(HFCEpc) -1.578 -1.467 -1.592 -1.495 -1.164 -1.262 -1.131 
 (-1.293) (-1.077) (-1.160) (-1.065) (-0.991) (-1.026) (-1.008) 
Primary -3.328*** -2.762* -2.857* -2.719** -3.254*** -3.104*** -3.316*** 
 (-2.721) (-1.958) (-1.912) (-2.254) (-3.269) (-2.640) (-3.321) 
Secondary -3.602** -2.979* -3.148* -2.817* -3.505*** -3.618*** -3.794*** 
 (-2.492) (-1.804) (-1.852) (-1.922) (-2.923) (-2.613) (-3.193) 
TaxConsGDP 0.236 0.090 0.137 0.167 0.198 0.534** 0.534** 
 (0.846) (0.270) (0.420) (0.505) (0.697) (2.271) (2.294) 
TaxLabGDP 0.002 -0.231 -0.144 -0.163 -0.021 -0.095 0.028 
 (0.009) (-0.986) (-0.620) (-0.656) (-0.105) (-0.464) (0.145) 
HICPHg 0.162** 0.182*** 0.179*** 0.164*** 0.170*** 0.199*** 0.187*** 
 (2.394) (2.877) (2.929) (2.576) (2.661) (3.179) (3.023) 
AIDall 0.099 0.028 0.043 0.046 0.088   
 (0.979) (0.254) (0.398) (0.430) (0.945)   
AID14      -0.001 0.025 
      (-0.013) (0.263) 
AID56      0.088** 0.072 
      (2.205) (1.549) 
PubExp0 -0.388 -0.258    0.319  
 (-0.193) (-0.167)    (0.155)  
PubExp1 -0.757  -1.154     
 (-0.593)  (-0.860)     
PubExp24 -0.180   -0.591    
 (-0.410)   (-1.197)    
PubExp56 -4.031***    -4.162***  -2.821** 
 (-3.223)    (-3.270)  (-2.094) 
Change -4.817*** -5.463*** -5.663*** -5.547*** -4.883*** -5.851 -4.973*** 
 (-3.984) (-4.193) (-4.269) (-4.199) (-4.120) (-1.233) (-4.702) 
Constant 105.730*** 97.346*** 99.518*** 95.311*** 100.337*** 92.165*** 94.449*** 
 (5.260) (4.234) (4.106) (4.493) (5.520) (4.479) (5.558) 
Observations 284 286 288 289 286 267 268 
Countries 27 28 28 28 27 27 27 
ܴଶ 0.603 0.569 0.573 0.567 0.594 0.574 0.583 
തܴଶ 0.570 0.538 0.543 0.537 0.565 0.540 0.549 
Hansen test 801.993 654.661 1046.784 3514.025 1382.423 1154.172 2068.230 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: Dependent variable is PR (piracy rates). All regressions were estimates with time dummies. Robust 
t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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5.6 Effects on software piracy of expenditure on education on 
different types of institutions 
 Having established that more public spending on education as a share of GDP 
reduces software piracy, this section now investigates in what type of educational institutions 
more resources must be allocated in order to prevent piracy. Expenditure is measured per 
student/pupil as a percentage of GDPpc.  As in with the previous case, we present first an 
aggregated analysis, which is shown in Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.6 Expenditure on public and private education and on public education for all the 
ISCED levels 
 Public Institutions Public and Private institutions 
Variables 13 14 15 16 
ln(HFCEpc) -2.031 -1.994* -0.921 -0.697 
 (-1.159) (-1.652) (-0.476) (-0.567) 
School -0.817 -0.451 -2.694** -2.504** 
 (-0.751) (-0.358) (-2.182) (-2.000) 
Tax -0.053 0.026 -0.182 0.019 
 (-0.304) (0.196) (-0.927) (0.115) 
HICPHg 0.110*** 0.164** 0.214 0.292* 
 (3.298) (2.455) (1.382) (1.742) 
AIDall -0.007  0.080  
 (-0.059)  (0.737)  
AID14  -0.121  -0.012 
  (-1.520)  (-0.147) 
AID56  0.094*  0.108** 
  (1.830)  (2.328) 
Puball -0.189** -0.156*   
 (-2.156) (-1.733)   
PubPriall   -0.107 -0.091 
   (-1.176) (-1.206) 
Change -3.068** -2.907*** -3.772*** -3.819*** 
 (-2.397) (-2.615) (-2.846) (-3.404) 
Constant 79.508*** 68.825*** 93.312*** 79.109*** 
 (3.826) (3.627) (4.095) (4.074) 
Observations 287 264 273 259 
Countries 28 27 27 27 
ܴଶ 0.601 0.621 0.528 0.553 
തܴଶ 0.576 0.593 0.497 0.519 
Hansen test 9.3e+04 6615.450 815.291 863.573 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: Dependent variable is PR (piracy rates). All regressions were estimates with time dummies. Robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Columns 13 to 16 show the results for expenditure on public and on public and 
private institutions. A disaggregated analysis on public and private educational institutions 
is not possible, nevertheless it has a negative effect on piracy. Significance is only present 
when we only consider expenditure on public educational institutions. More expenditure on 
education compared to GDPpc will lower piracy. 
Results for the control variables are maintained but losing some significance. We 
can also observe that financial aid to students on ISCED 5-6 has a positive effect being 
significant at least at 10%. Financial aid to students helps to mitigate the problem of software 
piracy when students are still young, but it has not the desired effect on higher levels. To 
prevent this it is necessary to implement direct measures that lead students to think that using 
illicit software is not appropriate, or indirect measures such as a substantial software price 
reduction of “online software” when compared to the traditional retail versions. This policy 
is already in practice with respect to Office 365 for students; they can acquire a license for 
four years for 79 euros. To benefit from this measure it is only necessary a proof such as 
student number (ISIC) or university email. Results suggest that resources must be focused 
essentially on public educational institutions, which, in the majority of countries, are also 
the predominant ones. More formally, a change in one standard deviation of this variable 
results in an improvement of software piracy of -0.76 (-0.156*4.9) points; in this case it does 
not reach a 1% improvement.  
Years of schooling are only significant when both types of educational institutions 
are considered, having the expected sign. 
Finally, Table 5.7 presents a disaggregated analysis according to the different 
ISCED levels. When all levels are considered together (column 17 and 18), expenditure on 
public institutions on ISCED 2-4 and ISCED 5-6 is negative and significant at least at 5%. 
A disaggregated analysis is made on the remaining columns (19 to 21). All variables that 
represent public expenditure are negative and significant. 
 The remaining columns show the expenditure both on public and private 
educational institutions. Column 22 shows the expenditure on the different ISCED levels 
considered together. None are significant. A disaggregated (column 23 to 25) analysis show 
that more expenditure per student on lower levels, e.g, ISCED1 to ISCED 4 will lower 
piracy. We also confirm that in all regressions the Hansen-test favours the fixed effect model. 
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Measures to promote ethics can be easily implemented in private institutions as an 
extra-curricular activity, but this will depend on the willingness of each school. In private 
schools oriented to business and law this is easily implemented, while in schools more 
oriented to arts, this may not be so effective. Public institutions have more restrict rules and 
some face severe financial constraints that can prevent the implementation of additional 
extra-curricular activities. Considering both public and private educational institutions, if we 
change by one standard deviation PubPri1 and PubPri24, this will decrease piracy by 1.14 
points (-0.228*5) and 0.78 points (-0.135*5.76), respectively. Based on the results, more 
expenditure per studentis more effective on lower levels of education. 
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Table 5.7 Expenditure on public and private education and on public education for the different ISCED levels 
 Public Institutions Public and Private Institutions 
Variables 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
ln(HFCEpc) -5.861*** -5.987*** -5.426*** -5.968*** -6.650*** -4.445*** -4.390*** -5.316*** -6.045*** 
 (-4.562) (-4.925) (-4.326) (-5.361) (-6.013) (-3.346) (-3.449) (-4.374) (-5.015) 
School -0.131 -0.066 -0.233 0.059 -0.042 -2.008 -2.133 -1.808 -2.058 
 (-0.096) (-0.053) (-0.151) (0.048) (-0.032) (-1.270) (-1.293) (-1.224) (-1.295) 
Tax -0.048 0.106 0.054 0.085 0.047 0.110 0.083 0.076 -0.010 
 (-0.234) (0.602) (0.311) (0.473) (0.244) (0.552) (0.415) (0.355) (-0.042) 
HICPHg 0.081** 0.115* 0.111 0.124 0.144 0.307** 0.316** 0.299* 0.314** 
 (2.508) (1.737) (1.146) (1.506) (1.639) (2.023) (2.045) (1.945) (2.022) 
AIDall -0.087         
 (-0.822)         
AID14  -0.097 -0.130 -0.103 -0.154* -0.010 -0.018 0.000 -0.013 
  (-1.092) (-1.473) (-1.231) (-1.686) (-0.094) (-0.175) (0.001) (-0.117) 
AID56  0.016 0.069 0.059 0.046 0.081** 0.085** 0.074* 0.077 
  (0.221) (1.289) (1.173) (0.626) (1.971) (2.037) (1.786) (1.617) 
Pub1 -0.072 -0.075 -0.188*       
 (-0.637) (-0.604) (-1.792)       
Pub24 -0.102* -0.111**  -0.148**      
 (-1.915) (-2.083)  (-2.089)      
Pub56 -0.063** -0.065**   -0.092***     
 (-2.062) (-2.063)   (-2.649)     
PubPri1      -0.170 -0.228**   
      (-1.219) (-2.173)   
PubPri24      -0.079  -0.135***  
      (-1.264)  (-2.577)  
PubPri56      -0.000   -0.024 
      (-0.007)   (-0.433) 
change -1.589* -1.402 -1.242 -1.242 -1.338 -1.404 -1.420 -1.491* -1.589* 
 (-1.863) (-1.577) (-1.481) (-1.498) (-1.455) (-1.603) (-1.616) (-1.720) (-1.796) 
Constant 110.628*** 104.276*** 98.555*** 98.780*** 108.841*** 108.949*** 110.102*** 114.003*** 124.654*** 
 (5.641) (6.245) (4.890) (5.593) (5.496) (5.117) (5.102) (5.210) (5.629) 
Observations 272 252 265 265 258 259 259 259 261 
Countries 26 26 27 27 26 27 27 27 27 
ܴଶ 0.553 0.549 0.516 0.528 0.511 0.465 0.461 0.457 0.443 
തܴଶ 0.527 0.518 0.488 0.502 0.483 0.429 0.430 0.425 0.412 
Hansen test 1677.655 1160.316 527.681 1151.464 1158.328 391.824 120.626 266.095 297.185 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: Dependent variable is PR (piracy rates). All regressions were estimates with time dummies. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively.
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5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter analysed the effects that expenditure on education has in deterring 
software piracy. We compared the different ISCED levels according to the 1997 
classification. This classification will be replaced by a new ISCED 2011 methodology that 
will begin in 2013 and will take into account a more disaggregated analysis. 
Results on the impact of educational expenditure on software piracy were based on 
the 28 Member States of the European Union from 2000 to 2010. Based on previous 
literature (Andrés, 2006a; Chen et al., 2010) and also on Chapter 4  we used the fixed effect 
model that was also the most appropriate according with the Hansen test.  
More years of schooling on both primary and secondary education will reduce 
piracy. In spite of this, this may be difficult to implement in some countries that have already 
high number of schooling years. 
We found that more educational expenditures have a deterrent effect on piracy 
while financial help to students, favours availability of digital content. This will increase the 
probability of the search and use of illicit software. When a more detailed analysis is made 
on the different ISCED 1997 classifications, we found strong evidence that expenditure on 
ISCED 5-6 as a share of GDP can lead to a software piracy decrease. This expenditure can 
be promoted by national governments, for example with an increase in the quality of school 
manuals. When the analysis considers the type of institution in which the expenditure is 
made, more expenditure on ISCED 1 to ISCED 4 per pupil/student as a percentage of GDPpc 
leads to less piracy.  
Even if national Governments have financial constraints, namely budgetary deficits 
that prevent more resources allocated to improve their education, an increase of these 
expenses could reduce piracy. Within the European Union, structural funds should be better 
allocated in this area.  
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 Unit Root test 
 
Table 5.8 Unit root test 
Variable Inverse Normal Z Statistic
PR -10.4580*** 
ln(HFCEpc) -6.2472*** 
Primary -9.3080*** 
Secondary -7.1065*** 
School -11.2991*** 
TaxConsGDP -8.2616*** 
TaxCapGDP -9.6379*** 
TaxLabGDP -6.3579*** 
HICPHg -11.1203*** 
Pubexpall -6.6238*** 
Pubexp0 -7.2837*** 
Pubexp1 -6.5188*** 
Pubexp24 -7.8452*** 
Pubexp56 -8.4047*** 
AIDall -8.3605*** 
AID14 -9.4367*** 
AID56 -6.6238*** 
Puball -5.0545*** 
Pub1 -5.8668*** 
Pub24 -4.7734*** 
Pub56 -7.3692*** 
PubPriall -6.2092*** 
PubPri1 -5.6190*** 
PubPri24 -6.0002*** 
PubPri56 -7.7283*** 
Notes: Unit root Fisher-type test. In all variables it was subtracted cross-sectional means and 
included a drift term. This test assumes under the null hypothesis that all panels contain unit 
roots against the alternative hypothesis that at least some panels are stationary. Due to the 
nature of the panel dataset, being extremely unbalanced this test was the only one available. 
  
163 
 
  Robustness Checks 
 
Table 5.9 robustness using HFCEpc from different products/services 
VARIABLES 26 27 28 29 30 
ln(HFCEpc) -5.695***     
 (-5.061)     
Ln(HFCEpcdurable)  -1.460**    
  (-2.018)    
Ln(HFCEpcsemidurable)   -1.534   
   (-1.506)   
Ln(HFCEpcnondurable)    -5.285***  
    (-5.459)  
Ln(HFCEpcservices)     -4.641*** 
     (-4.149) 
School -2.403 -3.394** -2.900 -2.560 -2.600 
 (-1.183) (-2.307) (-1.460) (-1.310) (-1.302) 
tax 0.057 0.065 0.065 0.023 0.009 
 (0.274) (0.306) (0.299) (0.108) (0.038) 
HICPHg 0.068 0.104** 0.107** 0.088 0.077 
 (1.163) (2.040) (1.998) (1.574) (1.244) 
AIDall 0.059 0.121 0.057 0.095 0.080 
 (0.587) (1.206) (0.546) (0.963) (0.769) 
PubexpGDPall -1.706*** -1.966*** -1.849*** -2.048*** -1.873*** 
 (-4.190) (-4.698) (-4.234) (-4.472) (-4.336) 
change -1.285 -1.834** -1.927*** -1.141 -1.151 
 (-1.534) (-2.429) (-2.650) (-1.492) (-1.358) 
Constant 133.649*** 103.494*** 97.936*** 127.533*** 123.866***
 (5.030) (4.880) (3.733) (5.082) (4.703) 
Observations 308 285 286 286 286 
Countries 28 26 26 26 26 
ܴଶ 0.498 0.444 0.442 0.499 0.482 
തܴଶ 0.476 0.417 0.415 0.475 0.457 
Hansen test 762.889 540.805 2023.576 1064.785 1390.415 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: HFCEpc durable goods (HFCEpcdurable), HFCEpc semi-durable goods 
(HFCEpcsemidurable), HFCEpc non-durable goods (HFCEpcnondurable), HFCEpc in services 
(HFCEpcservices). Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.10 Robustness check using patent applications ICT 
VARIABLES 31 32 33 34 35 
ln(HFCEpc) -5.719*** -5.982*** -6.303*** -6.176*** -6.092*** 
 (-4.706) (-4.194) (-5.566) (-4.818) (-6.007) 
school -2.470 -2.661* -2.379 -3.319** -2.805* 
 (-1.209) (-1.939) (-1.160) (-2.527) (-1.845) 
Tax 0.039 0.200 0.240 0.010 0.170 
 (0.187) (1.019) (1.200) (0.049) (0.943) 
HICPHg 0.077 0.263*** 0.074 0.038 0.068 
 (1.228) (2.601) (1.110) (0.458) (0.762) 
aidall 0.069 0.138 0.057 0.125 0.114 
 (0.572) (0.842) (0.401) (0.795) (0.852) 
PubexpGDPall -1.663*** -0.962 -1.042 -1.557*** -1.229** 
 (-2.973) (-1.568) (-1.594) (-2.831) (-2.419) 
patICTpc 0.028     
 (1.103)     
patconselectpc  0.171***    
  (6.653)    
Patcomputerpc   0.134***   
   (3.376)   
pattelecomunicationpc    0.013  
    (0.367)  
patotherICTpc     0.092 
     (1.058) 
change -1.071 -0.789 -0.741 -1.249 -1.143 
 (-1.270) (-0.872) (-0.859) (-1.415) (-1.289) 
Constant 134.046*** 125.623*** 126.429*** 148.940*** 133.647*** 
 (5.013) (5.877) (4.581) (6.962) (5.824) 
Observations 300 231 272 271 283 
Countries 28 28 28 28 28 
ܴଶ 0.498 0.509 0.530 0.496 0.488 
തܴଶ 0.474 0.477 0.504 0.469 0.461 
Hansen test 3865.562 107.160 1727.979 253.904 735.971 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: ICT patent applications to the EPO by priority year at national level. Information and communication 
technology (ICT) – total (patICTpc), Consumer electronics (patconselectpc), Computers (Patcomputerpc), 
Telecommunications (pattelecomunicationpc), Other ICT (patotherICTpc). Variables are per per capita. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database# 
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  The ISCED classification 
The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) was designed by 
UNESCO in the early 1970’s to serve “as an instrument suitable for assembling, compiling 
and presenting statistics of education both within individual countries and internationally”. 
The present classification, now known as ISCED 1997, was approved by the UNESCO 
General Conference at its 29th session in November 1997. With this method it is possible to 
compare statistics on education in different countries worldwide. 
This classification is divided into six categories:  
 ISCED 0- Pre-primary education 
 ISCED 1- Primary education or first stage of basic education 
 ISCED 2- Lower secondary or second stage of basic education 
 ISCED 3- Upper secondary education 
 ISCED 4- Post-secondary non-tertiary education 
 ISCED 5- First Stage of tertiary education 
 ISCED 6- Second Stage of tertiary education. 
Each of these categories is characterized by being progressive; each additional level 
represents more complex subjects taught. When this methodology was implemented, and to 
facilitate a more detailed analysis within each level of education, some levels were 
disaggregated. For example the ISCED 3 was divided into 3A, 3B and 3C. Some of these 
would lead directly to the labor market. Each level has variable proxy’s that make possible 
its calculation; for example, the main criteria for determining the ISCED 6 is the ability to 
make research-oriented content and submission of thesis or dissertation, the subsidiary 
criteria is the ability to prepare graduates for faculty and research posts. We now define each 
level of the ISCED level. 
- ISCED 0, (pre-primary) is the initial stage of organized instruction; it is designed 
primarily to introduce very young children to a school-type environment. One example 
is the kinder garden. 
- ISCED 1 is designed to give students a sound basic education in reading, writing and 
mathematics along with an elementary understanding of other subjects such as history, 
geography, natural science, social science, art and music. In some cases religious 
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instruction is featured. Example of this is the primary education that, in many cases 
represents 4 years of schooling.  
- ISCED 2 is designed to complete the provision of basic education which began at 
ISCED 1. The educational aim is to lay the foundation for lifelong learning and human 
development on which countries may expand, systematically, further educational 
opportunities. The programmes at this level are usually on a more subject-oriented 
pattern using more specialized teachers and more often several teachers conducting 
classes in their field of specialization. This level of education sometimes coincides 
with the compulsory education.  
- ISCED 3 begins after the compulsory education. The entrance age to this level is 
typically 15 or 16 years. The educational programmes included at this level typically 
require the completion of some 9 years of full-time education (since the beginning of 
level 1) for admission or a combination of education and vocational or technical 
experience and with as minimum entrance requirements the completion of level 2. 
- ISCED 4 captures programmes that straddle the boundary between upper-secondary 
and post-secondary education from an international point of view, even though they 
might clearly be considered as upper-secondary or post-secondary programmes in a 
national context.   
- ISCED 5 level or tertiary programmes are characterized by a theoretical background 
that will serve for the labor market in future. Depending on the areas, it can range from 
4 to 6 years of schooling. Some areas will allow an internship in the final year to apply 
the theory learned. This level of education will allow the progression to level 6 that is 
a research program. 
- ISCED 6 is reserved for tertiary programmes which lead to the award of an advanced 
research qualification. The programmes are therefore devoted to advanced study and 
original research and are not based on course-work only (examples of these are the 
Master and PhD programs; some have subjects that will help the future research). 
Source: Unesco. International Standard Classification of Education I S C E D 1997. 
Unesco Institute for Statistics. May 2006, Re-edition 
 
This methodology suffers some deficiencies; the disaggregation is small which can 
limit international comparisons, for example at a university level. This methodology has 16 
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years, in 2011 it was published an improvement to this classification with the ISCED 2011. 
Unfortunately for an econometric analysis we must use the old methodology. International 
organization such as the EUROSTAT, World Bank and OECD will implement these new 
measures. It is expected that the first international education data collections using ISCED 
2011 will begin in 2013 or 2014.     
The new ISCED 2011 levels will be disaggregated into: 
 ISCED 0- Less than primary 
 ISCED 1- Primary 
 ISCED 2- Lower secondary 
 ISCED 3- Upper secondary 
 ISCED 4- Post-secondary non-tertiary 
 ISCED 5- Short-cycle tertiary 
 ISCED 6- Bachelor or equivalent 
 ISCED 7- Master or equivalent 
 ISCED 8- Doctoral or equivalent 
 ISCED 9- Not elsewhere classified 
This new classification will allow an in deep analysis of the different levels of 
education, at the university level, allowing international comparisons. Previous ISCED level 
included many types of education in the same level, unfortunately, even in the ISCED 1997 
classification, financial indicators for each  dimension is not available (e.g. ISCED 1,2,3 
separately). 
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Chapter 6  Economic growth and software piracy 
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6.1 Introduction 
The literature on software piracy, which can be seen as a subgroup of studies about 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR, henceforth), has focused either in studying its 
determinants or its impact on economic growth.  
Examples of the studies that focused on the determinants are: Shadlen et al. (2005) 
which studied if the level of software protection and also if international mechanisms, such 
as Copyright laws, can mitigate piracy. They analyze the direct pressures exerted by the US 
(US Special 301107), for the foreign countries to increase or to exert more efficiently IPR 
protection. Lack of enforcement of Bilateral Political Pressures, TRIPS108 and Trade 
dependence on US can explain the levels of piracy in these countries. Others authors, such 
as (Andrés (2006a); Goel and Nelson (2009)) have done more comprehensive studies (see 
also Chapter 3  Summing up, these authors found that economic dimensions measured by 
the introduction of GDP have a negative impact on piracy; higher income leads to less piracy.  
In terms of the impact on economic growth, most of the empirical literature has 
focused not specifically on software piracy but on the impact of IPR protection on Economic 
growth (Falvey et al., 2006; Gould & Gruben, 1996; Park & Ginarte, 1997).  From these 
studies we can conclude that IPR protection favors economic growth, being this impact 
slightly higher on more open economies. Also IPR protection appears to favor low and 
higher income economies while in the middle-income countries this is not necessarily true. 
Exceptions to this holistic type of analysis are the works of Andrés and Goel (2012) and 
Rodriguez-Montemayor (2013),which focused specifically on the effects of software piracy. 
Andrés and Goel (2012) found that software piracy rates affected positively economic 
growth. Rodriguez-Montemayor (2013) considered the effect of genuine and unlicensed 
software on income. When both variables were considered separately they had a positive 
impact, but when both were introduced simultaneously the unlicensed software reduced the 
                                                 
107 The Special 301 Report is prepared annually by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
under Section 301 as amended of the Trade Act of 1974. The reports identify trade barriers to US companies 
and products due to the intellectual property laws, such as copyright, patents and trademarks, in other countries. 
Each year the USTR must identify countries which do not provide "adequate and effective" protection of 
intellectual property rights or "fair and equitable market access to United States persons that rely upon 
intellectual property rights". 
108 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
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income of the country However, up to our knowledge, these two approaches have not been 
combined. As is referred in several papers, software piracy has an effect on growth, but 
growth is one of the determinants of software piracy. This chapter will try to bridge that gap 
by estimating simultaneous the two effects and measure the effect of piracy on growth and 
vice-versa.  
To answer these questions we used data from the official publications of the 
Business Software Alliance (BSA), World Development Indicators (WDI) and Barro and Lee 
(2013). A simultaneous equation approach (3SLS) for the years 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010, 
comprising 75 countries will be used in the analysis. 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 6.2 presents the variables and 
econometric specification; section 6.3 presents the empirical work. Finally, section 6.4 
concludes.  
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6.2 Data and Econometric Specification 
Many factors can affect the economic growth of a country, especially innovation in 
the form of investment (gross capital formation), consumption (GDPpc) and protection of 
inventions (patents and trademarks). Other variables such as the software piracy in a country 
can also have negative impact on growth, as potential software sales are lost. On the other 
hand, the existence of some piracy can have a positive effect on growth as workers 
productivity may increase, due to access to more software tools. One of the determinants of 
software piracy is the national income of a country and, in this perspective; economic growth 
may have a role in this impact. To take into account this simultaneity (e.g. piracy affects 
economic growth and vice-versa) we will consider a system of equations that can explain 
this phenomenon. 
We will use the 3SLS estimator which is suited when we have a system of structural 
equations in which one of them include one or more endogenous variables among the 
explanatory variables (Zellner & Theil, 1962). Another advantage of the 3SLS is that it is 
more efficient to capture the interrelation between equations and the causal and feedback 
effects between the variables (AlDakhil, 1998; Wooldridge, 2010). 
To construct our model, we retrieved our data from the Word Development 
Indicators (WDI)109 of the World Bank, the official publications of the Business Software 
Alliance110 and for the educational dimension we retrieved data on schooling years of the 
Barro and Lee (2013) dataset111 for 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010; for a total of 75 countries. 
Our model is defined in equation 6.1 and 6.2.  
 
߂ܩܦܲ݌ܿ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܺ ൅ ߙଵଵܴܲ௜௧ ൅ ߙଵଶܴܲଶ ௜௧ ൅ ௜ܵ ൅ ܦܧ ௜ܸ ൅ ߝ௜௧        ሺ6.1ሻ 
 
ܴܲ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ߂ܩܦܲ݌ܿ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶZ ൅ ൅ ௜ܵ ൅ ܦܧ ௜ܸ ൅ ߳௜௧                        (6.2) 
 
                                                 
109 Available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators ; these correspond to the 
control variables 
110 The values of Software Piracy Rates 
111 Data available at http://www.barrolee.com/data/dataexp.htm  
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The dependent variables are the GDP growth per capita (߂ܩܦܲ݌ܿ௜௧), and the 
software piracy rates measured in percentage (ܴܲ௜௧). The vector ܺ represents the control 
variables in the growth equation and the vector Z the control variables in the piracy rate 
equation; these are explained in the following subsection.  
The software piracy rates (BSA, 2003, 2011) measures the percentage of unlicensed 
software that is used illegally and, as explained before,  its effect on growth is dubious.  
In economic growth it is common to use five years’ intervals to prevent results 
being affected by business cycles (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2003, p. 534). In 2002/2003 
occurred a change of the methodology used by the Business Software Alliance to compute 
piracy rates (Png, 2010). As with previous studies, we also consider five period time spans 
leaving two periods before and after the change in methodology. When implementing the 
econometric specification, the dataset is reduced to three time periods. In our model we also 
introduce country dummies represented by ௜ܵ and also time dummies. Regarding variable 
indexes, i represents the countries, t the time periods and ߳௜௧ represents the error terms. ߂ is 
the first difference operator. 
 
 Economic growth equation 
Equation 6.3 shows the main determinants of economic growth, extending the 
neoclassical growth model that is a function of capital and labor (Solow, 1956). In our model 
the growth equation is a function of several variables.  
 
߂ܩܦܲ݌ܿ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܮ5. ܩܦܲ݌ܿ௜௧ ൅ ߙଶ߂ܩܦܫ௜௧ ൅ ߙଷ߂ܮܾܽ௜௧ ൅ ߙସ݂݈݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊௜௧ ൅
൅ߙହ߂ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ௜௧ ൅ߙ଺ܰ݁ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߙ଻ܯ݋ܾ݈݅݁௜௧ ൅ ߙ଼ܨܤܫ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ߙଽ݄ܲ݋݊݁ 
൅ߙଵ଴ݏ݄ܿ݋݋݈௜௧ ൅ ߙଵଵܴܲ௜௧ ൅ ߙଵଶܴܲଶ ௜௧ ൅ ௜ܵ ൅ ܦܧ ௜ܸ ൅ ߝ௜௧             (6.3) 
 
i=1,…,75 and t=2000,2005,2010 
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We introduce the GDP per capita112 ሺܩܦܲ݌ܿ௜௧) lagged five periods that is measured 
at 2005 constant prices. It is expected to have a negative effect based on the results of Romer 
(1990). In Economic growth we have absolute convergence when poorer economies growth, 
in per capita terms, faster than richer economies (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2003, p. 45). We 
will test this hypothesis against different groups of countries. To test this absolute 
convergence, we will also use a dummy variable DEV which takes the value 1 if it is a low 
or a lower-middle-income country and zero otherwise. 
Another variable introduced is the gross capital formation growth (߂ܩܦܫ) measured 
at constant prices. It is expected to promote growth following, between others, Goel and 
Ram (1994).  
We also include the growth rate of labor force (߂ܮܾܽ). This variable can have mixed 
results (Aiginger, 2005) and labor policies can also affect economic growth. It can affect 
positively economic growth because less inactive persons are in the economy. Less social 
contributions in the form of subsidies to unemployed will be paid. Furthermore, these 
workers will have more money to spend on the economy. On the other side this variable can 
affect negatively economic growth because an overwhelming supply of labor force can drive 
salaries down, following the law of demand and supply. This will lead to less disposable 
income of workers. Also, more workers can increase pressure on the countries resources and 
have a detrimental effect on growth.   
Inflation rate (inflation) may affect economic growth. This variable has been found 
to negatively affect economic growth (Barro, 2013b). It represents the evolution of prices 
over the years. 
The export growth (߂Export) of goods and services indicates how the national 
economy is performing. Andraz and Rodrigues (2010) analyzed the impact on exports for 
the Portuguese economy over the period of 1977 to 2004. Results show that exports increase 
economic growth in the long run.  
A variable that reflects access to digital content is the Internet users (Net). This 
variable indicates the level of access to the World Wide Web (WWW) measured per 100 
people. More access to information will increase the consumption of digital goods that will 
increase national income (C. Choi & Hoon Yi, 2009; Clarke, 2008). Additional to this we 
                                                 
112 This variable takes into account purchase power parity 
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will introduce broadband access (FBIS), mobile cellular subscriptions (Mobile) and 
telephone users (Phone). 
Human capital can affect economic growth and, in fact, Barro (2013a) found that it 
had a positive effect on economic growth. In our model we consider the total effective year 
of schooling that students have, considering a broad age group of people with age 15 and 
over (school) (Barro & Lee, 2013). More schooling years indicates that employees can be 
more productive with the same limited resources. 
 
 Software piracy equation 
The equation (6.4) describes the macroeconomic determinants of software piracy. 
 
ܴܲ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ߂ܩܦܲ݌ܿ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶln ሺܲܽݐ݌ܿሻ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷln ሺܶݎܽ݀݌ܿሻ௜௧ ൅    
൅ߚସܰ݁ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚହܯ݋ܾ݈݅݁௜௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܨܤܫ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ߚ଻݄ܲ݋݊݁ ൅ ߚ଼ݏ݄ܿ݋݋݈௜௧ ൅ ௜ܵ ൅ ߳௜௧ (6.4) 
 
 
It is a result of the sum of dimensions that represent economic aspects, access to 
information, educational and variables that describe technological dimensions. 
 
6.2.2.1 Economic dimension 
 Several measures of income were considered in previous studies. Goel and Nelson 
(2009) considered the GDPpc having a deterrent effect on piracy. Another measured 
considered using a sample of European Countries (EU 27) in Chapter 4 was the ߂ܩܦܲ݌ܿ. 
This variable had a positive effect but was not significant. Using a panel of 75 countries for 
1995, 2000 and 2002; Bezmen and Depken (2005) also found a positive relationship between 
߂ܩܦܲ݌ܿ and software piracy.  
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6.2.2.2 Access to information 
Access to information measures the availability of digital content and is represented 
by the variables Net, FBIS, Phone, Mobile that will affect the availability of software (both 
legal and illegal). It is expected to affect negatively piracy based on the results of Goel and 
Nelson (2009), Boyce (2011) and in Chapter 3  
 
6.2.2.3 Educational dimension 
The educational dimension is represented by the number of effective schooling 
years in a country (school) (Barro & Lee, 2013) (the same as in the growth equation). More 
schooling years indicate that students are aware of the consequences of using digital content 
in an illicit way. Nevertheless, they may seek this content. Previous authors found that this 
dimension affects negatively piracy in a country using different variables. Years of schooling 
of population age 25 and over have a negative effect, without significance (Andrés, 2006b). 
This variable is only available in 5 years’ time periods. Extending this result in Chapter 3 
we used the years of schooling offered in a country that was also found to have a negative 
impact on piracy, being significant. 
 
6.2.2.4 Technological dimensions. 
The final dimension considered is the technological one; we introduce the patents 
and trademark applicants done both by residents and non-residents. A trademark is a result 
of a distinctive sign that identifies a specific product; can represent letters, symbols, 
drawings, etc. It is sought in order to prevent unfair competition113 by competitors. A patent 
is an exclusive right granted for an invention, which is a product or a process that provides, 
in general, a new way of doing something, or offers a new technical solution to a problem. 
In both cases these types of protection can be sought by the residents of a country that offers 
                                                 
113 Unfair competition in a sense means that the competitors compete on unequal terms, because favorable or 
disadvantageous conditions are applied to some competitors but not to others; or that the actions of some 
competitors actively harm the position of others with respect to their ability to compete on equal and fair terms. 
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protection, but can also be sought by foreigners that want the protection of their products 
abroad. We use these variables per capita in natural logarithms. 
Total patents ln(Patpc) is a result of the sum of patents done by residents and by 
non-residents. In the same way total trademarks ln(Tradpc) is the result of the sum of 
trademark applicants from residents and non-residents. Both variables were retrieved from 
the WDI of the World Bank and are measured in per capita terms. It is expected that these 
variables can affect software piracy in a country (based on Chapter 3  although the signs can 
be mixed.  
Table 6.1 presents the basic summary statistics of the variables used.  
 
Table 6.1 Summary statistics all sample 
    Variable  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Endogenous variables      
߂GDPpc        297 0.0341 0.0328 -0.1150 0.1374 
PR        273 0.5986 0.2106 0.2 0.99 
Exogenous variables   
߂GDI        295  .0786 0.127 -.424 0.752 
GDPpc        298  15451.88 12144.47 813.35 52313.91 
߂Lab        300  0.0133 0.0176 -0.0454 0.0611 
Inflation        294  0.1037 0.3022 -0.0370 3.7675 
߂Export        295  0.1048 0.0973 -0.518 0.89 
Net        293 24.89 27.05 0.0001 95 
Phone        299 28.68 20.11 0.24 73.04 
FBIS        195 8.60 10.54 0 37.99 
Mobile        300 51.43 47.38 0 195.57 
School        300 8.81 2.33 1.62 13.1 
ܴܲଶ        273 0.4026 0.2520 0.04 0.98 
ln(Tradpc)        285 -6.99 1.15 -10.32 -3.64 
ln(Patpc)        275 -9.11 1.63 -13.32 -5.67 
DEV        300  0.24 0.43 0 1 
Notes: S.D represents the standard deviation, Min. the minimum and Max. the maximum. 
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6.3 Empirical Application 
 Empirical evidence  
This section presents the empirical results of the growth equation (see equation 1) 
and the piracy rate equation (see equation 2) using the 3SLS. In the empirical analysis we 
introduced country and time dummies to take into account our panel data.  
In the growth equation we introduced the initial GDP measured by the L5.GDPpc, 
without significance. In Model 2 and 4 we introduce an alternative measure of income on 
the growth equation. DEV is a dummy variable that represents low income and lower-
middle-income countries based on the division of the WDI. We found evidence of absolute 
convergence (due to the significance of DEV), which indicates that poor economies growth 
faster, in per capita terms, than advanced economies. GDPpcg represents the economic 
dimension in the piracy rate equation. Results show that more income growth leads to more 
piracy because the software market is more mature, e.g., there are more products available 
to sell in stores and online retailers. This is a robust result, being always significant at 1%. 
Regarding gross domestic investment results show that, as expected, it affects 
positively economic growth, being significant at 1% across specifications. 
As Andrés and Goel (2012) some of our results show that the growth of the labor 
force results in lower economic growth (model 2 and 4). However, not only the result is not 
robust across equations, but it is never statistically significant.  
Another important variable that can affect the growth is the inflation that a country 
has annually. A high level of inflation, which indicates an overall increase in prices, will 
have a negative effect on household consumptions, has their disposable income is reduced 
by this phenomenon, decreasing their standard of living (Barro, 2013b). It was expected that 
this variable had a negative effect on growth and a positive effect on software piracy. 
However, although the point estimations were positive in both models, they were never 
statistically significant.  
We also considered the effect of exports of goods and services (߂Export). Exports 
represent the importance of goods and services that are produced nationally, and sold to the 
rest of the world. As expected it has a positive effect (Andraz & Rodrigues, 2010) being 
significant. More production of goods such as merchandize or services will increase profits 
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of firms, which will offer more work to the nationals that, in turn, will increase national 
income. 
Four measures that represent access to digital content were introduced in the growth 
equation (Net, Mobile, Phone and FBIS). All these variables measure the usage per 100 
inhabitants.  
We can observe that these variables can affect economic growth in two ways. The 
first way represents a positive impact: more access to information leads to increase 
productivity as people will seek better ways to do their jobs, and more consumption of digital 
goods (C. Choi & Hoon Yi, 2009; Clarke, 2008) which is represented by the access to 
broadband (FBIS) variable. The other effect that Internet users have is a negative one: as 
more users access at the same time the network, they will decrease the overall Internet traffic 
speeds which will potentially lower productivity. This negative effect can be seen especially 
on firms that need the Internet to work on a daily basis such as online retail stores, consulting 
and distribution of digital content such as games, movies or music. This negative effect is 
represented by the access to the Internet (Net) variable. Results are surprising and suggest 
that, for attaining a sustainable growth, it is necessary good infrastructures, but these must 
represent quality. In our case the simple access to the Internet is not sufficient to attain 
growth; it is necessary broadband access. Both variables are robust. 
These variables also affect the piracy rate equation. They represent access to 
information dimension. Results shows that having the ability to search digital content don’t 
necessarily mean that people will seek illegal software. Although even people that always 
sought legal software can seek illegal content at some point in their life. This result indicates 
that infrastructures that can seek potential pirates are well developed and that they are used 
efficiently by national Governments. 
Results show that the education offered by a country has a positive effect on 
economic growth, results also obtained by Barro (2013a). This indicates that more years of 
schooling will lead to higher productivity. To assess the impact of education on the piracy 
rate equation, we also introduced total years of schooling (school). This variable has a 
negative impact on piracy (reduces piracy). However in both cases the estimator was not 
significant. A negative impact was found by Andrés (2006b) using a cross-sectional data 
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analysis. Other measures exist such as literacy rate (see Goel and Nelson (2009)), and 
education expenditure (see  Chapter 5    
To see the impact of piracy on economic growth we introduced the piracy rate (PR) 
and squared PR. We found a negative coefficient on the quadratic term of the piracy rate, 
thus indicating a concave relation between PR and growth. As can be seen in Annex XV, 
until a certain level of piracy it will promote economic growth but at a diminishing rate, 
achieving a maximum around 80%. From this level onwards, increases in PR will lead to 
smaller levels of economic growth. This indicates that the potential benefits of using illegal 
software to the economy due to a marginal increase in PR will be smaller as PR increases 
and eventually they will be overtaken by losses. Our results are opposed to the ones found 
by Andrés and Goel (2012), who found a convex relationship. However we should note that 
these authors used a cross sectional approach, which does not consider the time dimension, 
which is captured in our approach. 
Finally we also introduced in the piracy rate equation a dimension that measures 
technological development in a country. The benefits of a higher level of protection can be 
seen in the negative effect of trademarks, being significant at 1%. Firms may seek on national 
and international Intellectual Property Office protection for their products (brands, logos, 
drawings) and due to the high value added that they bring to the economy they are protected. 
Another variable in this dimension that was introduced was the patent applicants. A patent 
occurs when an innovation is present on a product that can differentiate it against other 
products. One example of an innovation is a new process that can be implemented that will 
increase units produced with the same amount of resources. We also have a negative impact 
on this variable, although statistically insignificant. These results indicate that national and 
international Intellectual Property Rights Offices appear to protect well both trademarks and 
patents, although only the first is significant.  
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Table 6.2 3SLS regressions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 ߂GDPpc PR ߂GDPpc PR ߂GDPpc PR ߂GDPpc PR 
߂GDPpc  0.9813***  1.0473***  0.9737***  1.0184*** 
  (0.2048)  (0.2061)  (0.2006)  (0.1971) 
L5.GDPpc -0.000001  -0.0000001      
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)      
DEV     -0.4160***  -0.3798***  
     (0.1109)  (0.0887)  
߂GDI 0.0779***  0.0824***  0.0779***  0.0829***  
 (0.0168)  (0.0165)  (0.0176)  (0.0172)  
߂Lab 0.0339  -0.0361  0.0463  -0.0286  
 (0.1554)  (0.1468)  (0.1622)  (0.1542)  
Inflation 0.0398  0.0378  0.0432  0.0408  
 (0.0394)  (0.0377)  (0.0409)  (0.0392)  
߂Export 0.1119***  0.1084***  0.1148***  0.1121***  
 (0.0319)  (0.0301)  (0.0325)  (0.0303)  
Net -0.0006* 0.0003   -0.0006* 0.0003   
 (0.0003) (0.0005)   (0.0003) (0.0005)   
Phone -0.0003 -0.0008   -0.0002 -0.0008   
 (0.0005) (0.0007)   (0.0005) (0.0007)   
FBIS 0.0012** -0.0025*** 0.0008 -0.0019*** 0.0013** -0.0026*** 0.0009* -0.0020*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
Mobile -0.0001 -0.0005** -0.0002 -0.0004** -0.0001 -0.0005*** -0.0002 -0.0005** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
School 0.0051 -0.0033 0.0037 -0.0055 0.0045 -0.0038 0.0035 -0.0055 
 (0.0075) (0.0117) (0.0074) (0.0118) (0.0079) (0.0117) (0.0078) (0.0117) 
PR 1.9232***  1.9846***  2.0492***  2.0805***  
 (0.4706)  (0.4555)  (0.4733)  (0.4426)  
ܴܲଶ -1.1991***  -1.2273***  -1.2744***  -1.2862***  
 (0.3744)  (0.3570)  (0.3802)  (0.3506)  
ln(Tradpc)  -0.0382***  -0.0413***  -0.0383***  -0.0416*** 
  (0.0129)  (0.0124)  (0.0129)  (0.0123) 
ln(Patpc)  -0.0066  -0.0081  -0.0069  -0.0081 
  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0052)  (0.0052) 
correlation -0.64761 -0.66758 -0.64759 -0.6622 
Observations 172 172 173 173 173 173 174 174 
R-squared 0.234 0.981 0.196 0.981 0.179 0.981 0.153 0.981 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Correlation is the correlation errors 
of equation 1 and 2. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed the effect of software piracy on economic growth. To 
implement this analysis it was introduced a system of equation using the 3SLS for a large 
panel of countries for which information on software piracy was available (1995, 2000, 2005 
and 2010 spanning 75 countries). This allowed us to control simultaneously the two 
reciprocal problems, e.g., software piracy affect economic growth combined with the effect 
of economic growth on piracy.  
We found that access to the digital economy through Internet access is not sufficient 
to promote growth; broadband access must be made available to the population in order to 
foster growth. Variables regarding access to information negatively affected software piracy 
rates. 
We analyzed the nonlinear relationship of piracy on economic growth with the 
introduction of the square of this variable. Results showed that there is evidence of a concave 
relationship between piracy rates and economic growth. For lower levels of piracy rate, a 
marginal increase on it will increase the growth rate, however this increase will be smaller 
the bigger is the level piracy rate, and from around 80% marginal increases in PR will lead 
to smaller levels of economic growth. This indicates that the potential benefits of using 
illegal software to the economy due to a marginal increase in PR will be smaller as PR 
increases and eventually they will be overtaken by losses. 
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 Relationship between piracy and growth 
Figure 6.1 Concave relationship in model 1 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Concave relationship in model 2 
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Figure 6.3 Concave relationship in model 3 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Concave relationship in model 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97 10
1
G
D
Pp
c 
gr
ow
th
Piracy Rate
Concave relationship Model 3
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97 10
1
G
D
Pp
c 
gr
ow
th
Piracy Rate
Concave relationship Model 4
186 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
187 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7  Final Conclusions 
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This work tried to study the main macroeconomic determinants of software piracy. 
The main objective was to provide a comprehensive understanding of the software piracy 
phenomenon, first with a global approach using all countries for which information on 
software piracy data is available, then analyzing a specific region, the European Union. Our 
work departs from previous empirical literature in the sense that we provide a cross country 
time series approach to the problem from a large time span as opposed to simple cross 
sectional data.   
Empirical literature on this specific topic is still relatively new, and due to data 
restrictions on certain dimensions, the majority of studies opted for a cross country analysis. 
The objective of Chapter 1 was to provide an introduction to the problem of 
software piracy and its relevance for the economy and the benefits in its reduction. 
The main objective of Chapter 2 was to provide a detailed summary of previous 
empirical findings, systematizing them on stylized facts that were used in subsequent 
chapters. Literature only focused on systematizing theoretical works; our major contribution 
was in systematizing empirical ones. The major difficulty faced here was on the proliferation 
of methodologies and results found by different areas of studies that made difficult a 
systematization of results in the field of economics.  
Chapter 3 used results from some stylized facts encountered in Chapter 2  
expanding it to new variables. The main focused was on the determinants of software piracy 
losses, the methodology used was the System GMM because the dataset was persistent over 
the years. When determining the causes of software piracy it was taken into account the 
break in the series occurred in 2002/2003 that was a result of the change in methodology to 
compute software piracy. The major macroeconomic dimensions that represented labor 
force, technological, educational and access to information and institutional dimensions 
were significant, and could explain this phenomenon. Although the methodology was 
appropriate for this analysis, a detailed comparison of continents and levels of developments 
were not possible. Future empirical work must take into account whenever possible the 
different realities of countries and the division of continents present in the official 
publications.  
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After establishing that these macroeconomic determinants were significant we 
proceeded our analysis for the European Union. A more detailed analysis on variables was 
available on the Eurostat website which were used in the subsequent chapters. 
 Chapter 4 described the effects that taxation can have on several typical households 
of the European Union. We also used the Software piracy losses as a dependent variable, but 
in this case, due to small number of observations, we used the fixed effect model that was 
also found to be appropriate when analyzing this phenomenon of Europe (Andrés, 2006a). 
Results showed that taxation had a positive effect on software piracy but affecting differently 
the households. To further assess our results we split our sample into Old Countries (15 
European Countries) and the Euro Zone (17 European Countries). Results were only 
significant on the New countries (12 European Countries) and outside the Euro Zone (10 
European Countries). These results can be used by the European Commission and the 
European Patent Office when assessing and promoting policies to reduce piracy and the use 
of other illicit content, even one based on hardware. 
 We also choose to analyze the determinants of software piracy in the European 
Union, focusing on the effects that education expenditure has on piracy in a county in 
Chapter 5 We introduced software piracy rates as a dependent variable. Several estimations 
were possible but we choose the fixed effects as with the previous chapter. Two measures of 
expenditure were introduced, public expenditure on education, measured as a share of GDP, 
that comes from national Governments budgets and also the expenditure that is made on 
private and public educational institutions measured as a percentage of GDPpc. Another 
measure was introduced that reflected the financial aid to students as a share of GDP. Results 
showed that more expenditure on education considering all ISCED levels will reduce 
software piracy. A detailed analysis was made considering a detailed disaggregation based 
on the different ISCED levels; results showed that more expenditure on ISCED 5-6, will 
reduce piracy. The other dimension introduced that measured the financial aid to students 
had a positive impact on piracy. These results indicate that for reducing piracy, resources 
must be better allocated, for example trough funds that come from the European Union. 
Both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 presented a detailed analysis with a detailed 
disaggregation of variables measuring household taxation and educational expenditure. 
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Having established the major macroeconomic dimensions in the previous chapters 
we provided a detailed analysis of the effects of piracy on economic growth in Chapter 6  
We implemented a panel data analysis using 3SLS (3 Stage Least Squares). New 
technologies can improve productivity but lack of protection can result in less investment 
because software companies have less incentive to invest because returns of their investment 
on R&D will be smaller. Results show that software piracy will reduce economic growth. 
One possible limitation was that with this methodology it was not possible to divide the 
sample into the different continents. Future empirical works studying the effects of this illicit 
behavior on economic growth must take into account this disaggregation. 
Overall, this thesis makes a substantial contribution to the empirical literature in the 
sense that it provides the major determinants of software piracy considering a large time 
span and large country sample. This work can also be used as the foundation of future 
theoretical works focusing on policy implications of several actions that policymakers can 
choose. It also provides the baseline requirements to construct an index that can be used to 
measure the illicit behavior in the subject of the digital economy, namely software piracy. 
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